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What the Graduate School of Peace Studies Aims to Achieve

Ryo Oshiba

In April this year, the Hiroshima Peace Institute inaugurated the Graduate School of Peace Studies at Hiroshima City University, launching a Master's Degree Program in peace studies. This is the first graduate school dedicated to peace studies among public university graduate schools in Japan.

This graduate school offers peace studies originating from Hiroshima, and holds several lectures on Hiroshima's atomic bomb experience, in a group of courses titled "Hiroshima and Nuclear Issues." These are courses that only the Graduate School of Peace Studies can offer.

While featuring these unique courses, its curriculum is designed to enable students to pursue studies in various academic disciplines, including law, politics, sociology, and history, as well as learn about research methodologies. One of the characteristics of Hiroshima-originated peace studies is its intention to disseminate Hiroshima's experiences and efforts to people at home and abroad using theories and perspectives of each academic discipline, and to pass these on to the next generation.

The graduate school aims to help students not only acquire the professional expertise in their fields of interest, but also cultivate their capabilities to understand thought patterns and research results in other fields.

It is certainly meaningful to analyze and explain incidents and events that occur on a daily basis in the real world. However, it is also important to examine what underlies these incidents and events—for instance: the structure of modern society, the tide of history that forms the structure, and characteristics of human behavior. If you pursue peace studies as an academic discipline, you need to learn about methodologies for deeply understanding various social incidents and events, and develop expert analytical skills in a specific field.

In addition to the above expertise, students also need to obtain an understanding of fields other than their specialized ones. Peace is a phenomenon that is ambiguous and multidimensional. The issues of peace have a lot to do with various fields such as law, politics, sociology, history, education, philosophy, and natural science. For this reason, peace studies is said to be interdisciplinary. Those who engage in peace studies are therefore required to gain both high expertise in a specialized field and deep understanding in other disciplines.

The Master's Degree Program of the Graduate School of Peace Studies strives to ensure that students can acquire outstanding problem-finding and solving skills.

As in other social sciences, in peace studies it is extremely important to notice the problem. Researchers should always check whether there are any problems that are overlooked or unnoticed, or problems they have noticed but don't know how to call to public attention.

By reading many books and investigating previous studies, you will begin to clarify the point at issue. In my specialized field, for example, if the concept of human dignity is presented, you might find a problem that you had not previously noticed.

Additionally, you might discover a problem while listening to various people's stories. It is safe to say that conducting dialogue with other people is one type of fieldwork in peace studies. Here in Hiroshima, opportunities abound for engaging in such dialogues.

It is true that, "Throw away your books, Let's go into the streets (*Sho wo suteyo, machi e deyo*)" proposed by Shuji Terayama is a good idea. However, I would like to recommend the idea of, "Let's go to the town with your books (*Sho wo motte machi e deyo*)" as suggested by Ikuya Sato. [Notes: *Sho wo suteyo, machi e deyo* (*Throw away your books, Let's go into the streets*), by Shuji Terayama, published in 1967 by Haga Shoten; *Fieldwork—Sho wo motte machi ni deyo* (*Let's go to the town with your books*), by Ikuya Sato, published in 2006 by Shinyosha.]

Finally, I would like to mention that the Graduate School is committed to improving students' communication abilities by providing diverse occasions and employing various methods. If graduate students complete an excellent thesis, it would of course be largely due of their own endeavors. However, please remember that the support of many people is what enables these students to devote themselves to study and research in graduate school. I therefore hope that they will use what they have learned in graduate school to give back to society, not using it strictly for their own sake. The power to "communicate" things to others is a quality that is indispensable for building and maintaining peace.

Next year, Japan will mark the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings. It is an important task for us to discuss how we should pass on the atomic bomb experiences and memories to future generations. The Hiroshima Peace Institute is determined to tackle this task, by nurturing next-generation individuals who will convey the atomic bomb experiences and memories and communicate these invaluable assets to people all around Japan and overseas, through the education provided by the Graduate School of Peace Studies.

(Director at HPI)

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The Current Trends in Nuclear Disarmament after the Conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Kazumi Mizumoto

Introduction: Current Trends in Nuclear Disarmament

As of July 7, 2019, it has been two years since the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which has promoted the treaty, won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, giving hope to citizens who seek to abolish nuclear weapons. However, shortly after that, in January 2018, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, a U.S. academic journal specifically addressing nuclear issues, announced that the Doomsday Clock—which symbolizes how close humanity is to annihilation due to nuclear war, with the apocalyptic event depicted as midnight on the clock—moved forward to two minutes before midnight. This is the Clock's closest approach to midnight since its inception, matching that in 1953 when the Clock ticked to two minutes before midnight after the United States and the Soviet Union began testing hydrogen bombs, setting off the nuclear arms race.

According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the worldwide total inventory of nuclear weapons as of January 2019 stood at 13,865 (600 less than 2018 figures), with more than 91% of them owned by the U.S. and Russia. While the nuclear development programs of North Korea and Iran have been a matter of concern, the U.S. and Russia must be well aware that the two nuclear superpowers shoulder the greatest responsibility for humanity's survival.

Dark Shadow Cast by Worsening U.S.-Russia Relations

The worsening relations between the United States and Russia have cast a dark shadow on international affairs. The Ukraine crisis broke out after the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula in the aftermath of political changes in Ukraine in 2014. Since then, the conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia has intensified, with U.S.-Russian relations ever-worsening—the U.S. has pursued its plan to build missile defense systems in Europe, evoking strong opposition from the Russian Federation.

In February 2019, the U.S. Trump administration notified its Russian counterpart that the U.S. would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which was concluded between the two countries in 1987. It was the first nuclear weapons elimination treaty to have been signed between Washington and Moscow, and an epoch-making deal that is thought to have helped bring an end to the Cold War. In response, Russia declared that it would also suspend its participation in the pact. The INF Treaty was formally terminated on August 2 this year, enabling both countries to resume the arms race to develop ground-launched medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kms.

The end of the INF Treaty makes the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) the sole remaining nuclear arms reduction treaty between Russia and the U.S. New START came into effect in February 2011, and limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads (mounted on a missile with a range of 5,500 km or longer) to 1,550. However, if no improvement is made in bilateral relations, this treaty is likely to expire in February 2021, thus removing the warhead limitations. The international community

should urge again that the U.S. and Russia take responsible action.

Possibility of TPNW's Entry into Force

The TPNW considers nuclear weapons themselves to be evil, and includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon activities, such as their development, testing and production, as well as the use of such weapons for military purposes. The TPNW therefore gives great hope to those who wish to eliminate nuclear weapons. However, it is meaningless if the Treaty does not actually work. First of all, we should ensure the Treaty enters into force. One article of the TPNW stipulates that "This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited." As of July 1, 2019, a total of 23 countries have ratified it, requiring ratification from 27 additional countries. Moreover, if nuclear weapon states do not join the Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons cannot be reduced. The greatest challenge is how to realize their accession to the TPNW.

However, adoption of the TPNW is not without meaning. Two years ago, it was adopted at the U.N. negotiating conference by a vote of 122 states in favor (with one vote against and one abstention), which accounted for nearly two-thirds of all the countries around the world. This indicates that the prohibition of nuclear weapons, which the Treaty aims to achieve, is becoming a certain norm in the international community. Among the 70 states that have already signed the Treaty, if 27 signatories that have not yet ratified give ratification, the Treaty can enter into force. For this reason, some people think that its ratification is a matter of time. Even if nuclear weapon states have not acceded, once the TPNW enters into force, its provisions prescribe that the first meeting of States Parties shall be convened within one year, and further meetings of States Parties shall be convened on a biennial basis, and that a conference to review the status of the Treaty shall be convened after a period of five years following its entry into force. Through these meetings, a "TPNW Process" will be formed, which will have considerable significance.

Future Challenges: U.S.'s Sophisticated Approach to Winning over Other TPNW Opponents

Meanwhile, there are many challenges to be addressed to enhance the Treaty's effectiveness. First, we should consider how to deal with nations possessing nuclear weapons that have opposed the TPNW from the beginning, and nations under a nuclear umbrella. The most crucial task will be how to conclude the discussions at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference slated for 2020.

Of the past NPT Review Conferences held every five years, only the three conferences in 1995, 2000, and 2015 succeeded in concluding meaningful agreements toward nuclear disarmament. A concern has risen as to whether or not next year's conference will be able to achieve a positive result as at the above conferences. However, from what we saw at the Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2020 NPT Review Conference held at the United Nations Headquarters from April to May 2019, the nuclear weapon states were strongly opposed to the TPNW, making the prospects bleak.

In particular, the U.S. has taken a sophisticated approach. In the

The Significance of Counter-proliferation Financing

Yasuhiro Fukui

Counter-proliferation financing refers to measures designed to freeze the assets of a natural person or an entity who intends to acquire WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) including nuclear weapons. It differs from traditional disarmament and non-proliferation measures in that it specifically aims to freeze funds and the financing for companies producing WMDs. This approach bears similarity to the “naming and shaming” method used by some NGOs that openly publish the name of companies that produce cluster munitions, or of the ICAN campaign which discloses the names of financial institutions that invest in companies involved in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, counter-proliferation financing measures go beyond such techniques because states themselves can order the assets of suspected perpetrators to be frozen without delay, based on United Nations Security Council resolutions that are legally binding. However, their legally coercive powers may constitute a serious violation of human rights if a natural person or an entity were designated by mistake.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental organization working with the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and is tasked with regulating not only counter-proliferation financing, but also, anti-money laundering measures and counter-terrorist financing. Pursuant to these goals, the FATF has officially adopted 40 recommendations and participating OECD States are obligated to implement these measures. In the framework of the FATF the working definition of *proliferation financing* is: “the act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations.”

A process of mutual evaluation is to be conducted by an international team in Japan in 2019 to assess the status of the country’s implementation of the FATF recommendations. Based on subsequent discussions at a plenary meeting to be held next summer,

the results of the mutual evaluation will be disclosed in a final report to be issued in the fall of 2020. The mutual evaluation of Japan includes questionnaire surveys conducted in May and June of this year, and on-site inspections of supervising organizations, including the Financial Services Agency, and financial institutions such as banks, by the international evaluation team. Authorities, such as the Financial Service Agency (part of the Ministry of Finance) the Crime Revenue Prevention Office of the Japanese Police Agency, and financial institutions in the private sector, have been struggling since the result of the third mutual evaluation, conducted ten years ago, severely criticized the poor performance of Japanese financial institutions.

The emergence of new state-of-the-art financial technologies, such as Bitcoin and other crypto-assets, has required authorities and financial institutions to quickly develop and implement additional measures. Furthermore, local banks, credit banks (so called *Shinkin*) and overseas branches of Mega-bank have been targeted for clandestine money-laundering operations by DPRK related banks. To prevent this, measures implemented by the FATF require banks to verify the source of funds for money transfers, especially those over 100,000 yen, including verifying whether the recipient of the money is the head of a foreign state, a top executive of a foreign government or central bank or organizations belonging to them, or one of their family members. Such individuals are considered to be PEP (politically exposed persons).

It is clear that funds used for nuclear weapon development programs in the DPRK were partially procured with assets that were moved through the Japanese Banking System. Therefore, if the results of the mutual evaluations are not sufficient, the financing of Japanese companies through overseas banks will become more difficult and there will be an unnecessary and substantially negative impact on the Japanese economy. To assure the utility of counter-proliferation financing and non-proliferation measures, the international community awaits the effective implementation of the FATF recommendations.

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negotiation phase, the country opposed the TPNW on the grounds of the “unstable international security environment.” However, in the 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, the U.S. government changed its attitude, and proposed the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative. And in the 2019 Preparatory Committee meeting, the government announced that it would launch the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament Working Group (CEWG) this summer in Washington D.C.

As problems regarding the global security environment, the U.S. has cited, for example, the tensions in South Asia and the Middle East, the increasing nuclear arsenal in Asia, and the nuclear weapons modernization promoted by some countries. The U.S. denies the TPNW, saying that while ignoring these problems regarding the security environment, you should not take an approach based on the

idea that reducing and prohibiting nuclear weapons will be a solution, and that the approach will inevitably fail.

However, Washington has taken very few specific actions—just offering support in starting the negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Its true purpose appears to win over other countries opposing the Treaty to its side. In next year’s NPT Review Conference, a confrontation may occur between the CEND group led by the U.S. and the group of non-nuclear-weapon states that are in support of the Treaty. Japan, which aims to be a bridge-builder between confronting countries, says that it wants to participate in the CEND group, if invited. However, it is a matter of great concern that Japan might end up just being forced to work like a “butler” who is loyal to his master.

(Professor at HPI)

Nuclear Power in the Manhattan Project

Robert Jacobs

In 1953 American President Dwight Eisenhower spoke before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City and talked of his desire for the world to know and share “atoms for peace.” In those early days of the Cold War with two bitter rivals, the United States and Soviet Union, both engaged in a nuclear arms race and actively developing thermonuclear weapons (h-bombs), there were grave international concerns about the risk of nuclear war. Eisenhower spoke of how the world could instead be envisioned as a place of peace and wealth. “The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed,” he intoned, “this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind.” This idea was expressed more directly by that most American of communicators, the Walt Disney Company. Published in 1956, a few years after Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech, and just a year before the United States began to operate a commercial nuclear power plant that produced electricity for civilian use at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, *The Walt Disney story of our friend the atom* was a paean to nuclear power. “We all know the story of the military atom, and we all wish it weren’t true,” writes Heinz Haber in the prologue of the book, “so far, the atom is a superb villain. Its power of destruction is foremost in our minds. But the same power can be put to use for creation, for the welfare of mankind...It is up to us to give the story a happy ending. If we use atomic energy wisely, we can make a hero out of a villain.”

Such discourse suggested that the immense power of nuclear weapons witnessed in the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki could somehow be transformed and the atom—this amazing storehouse of energy—could be engineered to provide that power for peaceful uses. Seemingly, since the atom had been “split” and the energy inside of it released, we could now work to release that energy for good rather than for evil; rather than being threatened by the atom, all of the people of the world could benefit from atomic energy.

Shrouded behind such discourse was the fact that nuclear power plants had actually been invented before nuclear weapons, in fact, the invention of nuclear power plants was a fundamental step in the later manufacture of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power plants were invented as a part of the Manhattan Project. They were designed, developed, built and operated first by the Manhattan Project, and became an essential part of the manufacturing of the nuclear weapons that the United States used in the two nuclear attacks on Japan in August 1945.

The first controlled and sustained nuclear chain reaction—the basis of a nuclear power plant—was achieved in Chicago on 2 December 1942. This was CP-1, short for Chicago Pile 1. During the month of November in 1942 a team had constructed the pile in a rackets court under the stands of the football stadium at the University of Chicago. The pile consisted of over 6 tons of “natural” uranium (uranium in its raw form, as it comes out of the Earth when it is mined), 50 tons of uranium oxide, and over 400 tons of graphite. The graphite formed the structure of the pile and the uranium was used as the nuclear fuel.

On 2 December 1942 Enrico Fermi’s team would achieve

a controlled chain reaction, splitting the nuclei of uranium-235 atoms and releasing energy, in a manner that could be controlled: it could be turned up, turned down, and ultimately turned off. This proved that it was possible to operate a nuclear power plant. The Met Lab was primarily tasked in late 1942 and 1943 with developing an efficient method for plutonium production. Plutonium had been “invented” in a laboratory at the University of California in late 1940 (“invented” since traces amounts do exist in nature, but it was unknown to humans until it was manufactured in the lab). Plutonium-239 also has a fissionable nucleus, just like uranium-235.

The Manhattan Project designated a site in Eastern Washington state to be the location where the United States would manufacture plutonium for its nuclear weapons: the Hanford Engineer Works. While the Manhattan Project had built several research reactors to refine the design of nuclear power plants, the first reactors built for industrial operation were built at Hanford. Construction began on the B Reactor, the first non-research nuclear power plant ever built, in March of 1943 at Hanford. The B Reactor went critical—began to burn nuclear fuel—in the spring of 1944.

Eventually nine nuclear power plants were to be built at Hanford, and they would manufacture over 55 metric tons of plutonium. As the Cold War evolved, a second plutonium production facility would be set up by the United States military at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where an additional five nuclear power plants would be built to manufacture plutonium for the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile.

The United States would construct 14 nuclear power plants solely to manufacture plutonium, from which it would build more than 60,000 nuclear weapons during the Cold War. In fact, the first 13 nuclear reactors built in the United States were built to produce plutonium, it was the 14th nuclear reactor built in the U.S. that was the first built specifically to produce electricity for civilian use, at Shippingport in 1957. First things first.

With its 13 plutonium production nuclear power plants in operation, steadily churning out tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, American leaders began to think about building more nuclear power plants, with the new purpose of generating electricity. The actual transition being suggested in Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech was not a transition from nuclear weapons to nuclear power plants, but rather, a transition from nuclear power plants being used to kill people to their being used to provide people with electricity. It was not a wish for a “new” technology, but rather a policy to use a technology developed for mass murder for additional, constructive uses.

Nuclear power plants were invented as part of the Manhattan Project two and a half years before the project succeeded in building a nuclear weapon. The first 13 nuclear power plants built in the United States did not generate electricity, but only plutonium for weapons of mass destruction. This is the origin of nuclear power.

(Professor at HPI)

Philippines Perspectives Regarding Japanese Army Stragglers: The Search Operations on Lubang Island

Hitoshi Nagai

On March 12, 1974, Hiroo Onoda, a former Second Lieutenant in the Japanese Imperial Army, returned to Japan for the first time in about 30 years from Lubang Island in the Philippines. His return was jubilantly welcomed by people in Japan, who praised him as a “hero.” Even after the end of World War II, Onoda had refused to surrender and survived nearly three decades hiding in the jungle. Perhaps the Japanese people were surprised at the news that the former soldier in a tattered military uniform had emerged from the jungle, and pleased at his safe return home.

On the other hand, around that time, the local people living on Lubang Island felt relieved to hear that he had left the island. Why? The story of this Japanese army straggler has generally been told from the angle of Onoda. In this paper, however, I would like to review this topic from the perspective of the Philippines.

Even after the war ended in August 1945, 55 Japanese soldiers refused to surrender and hid in the jungle on Lubang Island. By the end of March 1946, 48 of them had surrendered, with another three soldiers killed during a clash with U.S. troops. Second Lieutenant Onoda and three other soldiers remained hidden in the jungle. Around July, 1950, one of the four, Private Yūichi Akatsu walked away from the others to surrender. This clarified that three soldiers were still alive.

People living on the peaceful island of Lubang deeply feared the Japanese soldiers who remained after the end of the war. These Japanese army stragglers posed a threat to local people’s lives and property. Since their lives were at risk even while farming in the mountains, local people requested several times that the Philippine government find the Japanese soldiers hiding in the jungle. On May 7, 1954, Philippine Army Scout Rangers encountered the three remaining Japanese soldiers in Gonting, located on the south of the island, where one of them, Corporal Shōichi Shimada, was shot dead. Second Lieutenant Onoda and Private Kinshichi Kozuka ran away from the site. Shortly after that, the families of these two Japanese soldiers and an official of the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare were sent to Lubang Island as a “*Settoku tai* (persuasion team).” Although a search was conducted for about three weeks from the end of May to the middle of June, they could not find the soldiers. Subsequently, the residents suffered a series of incidents, in which people and animals were killed, apparently by the remaining Japanese soldiers.

In January 1959 a local resident was shot and his *carabao* (water buffalo) also shot to death. In February of the same year a local construction worker was also killed. The local people demanded that the Philippine government take appropriate action, and as a result, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) began an operation to subdue the remaining soldiers. Hearing this news, the Japanese government dispatched a search team, including members of the Onoda and Kozuka families. From May to December the Japanese team conducted massive search operations with the Filipino team. Nevertheless, no traces indicating they were still alive was found, and on December 9, 1959 an official statement was released to announce the death of the two remaining soldiers. Subsequently, the official view was that no Japanese soldiers remained on Lubang Island. Needless to say, however, this did not convince the local people.

This situation changed dramatically after an incident that occurred on October 19, 1972, in which Kozuka was shot to death. Local residents found Onoda and Kozuka burning piles of rice that the farmers had harvested, and reported it to the PC, which rushed to the site. In the resulting gunfight between the PC and the two men, Kozuka was shot and killed, but Onoda escaped. After this incident, which revealed that Onoda was still alive, Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos assigned the task of searching for him to the Philippine Air Force (PAF), in place of the PC. President Marcos then gave the PAF strict orders not to kill Onoda. Additionally the Philippine government promised the Japanese officials that as soon as Onoda was taken into custody, it would transfer him to the Japanese government. What lay behind this promise was diplomatic considerations given by the Marcos administration, that adopted a friendly policy towards Japan.

In October 1972 the Philippines President’s office organized “Task Force Onoda,” to search for Onoda. PAF Lieutenant Colonel Pedro D. Juachon, security officer for the Executive Secretary, was put in

charge. Juachon was given the mission of taking Onoda into custody alive by Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor, Jr. Since he was aware of the anger of the local people who had been besieged by the Japanese soldiers, Juachon felt the need to forbear their revenge. For this reason, soon after his arrival on Lubang Island, Juachon assembled the local people to explain the purpose of the search and ask for their understanding and cooperation. At the same time, Juachon said that if someone tried to kill Onoda, he would kill that person, displaying his strong commitment to accomplish the mission.

“Task Force Onoda” involved collaboration among the PAF, the local people and the delegation (search team) from the Japanese government. Juachon emphasized to the Philippine parties concerned that the task force’s mission was to rescue Onoda without injury, and that even if they came across Onoda and he shot at them, they must not respond to his attack but retreat. Although the search operations continued for about half a year from October 1972, the task force was not able to find Onoda, and the search was called off on April 15 the following year.

The situation was finally resolved by Norio Suzuki, a 24-year-old Japanese adventurer. This young man had traveled to Lubang Island to look for Onoda independently. Suzuki camped there with cooperation from the town mayor and others, and finally encountered Onoda on February 20, 1974. Onoda promised Suzuki he would surrender, on the condition of an order from his superior. The two men then separated, and immediately former Major Yoshimi Taniguchi, Onoda’s former commanding officer, was dispatched to the island. On the evening of March 9, 1974, Onoda showed up before Taniguchi and Suzuki at a camp on the island, and at last surrendered upon receiving a verbal order from Taniguchi that released him from his military duties.

There were several factors that urged Onoda to surrender himself. It is certain that the order from his superior was an important factor, but what should not be overlooked was the search efforts by both the Philippine and Japanese governments. The former soldier had heard his family members’ voices, thoroughly read newspapers left by the search team, and lastly encountered a young Japanese man who was camping by himself. Onoda later said that, judging from these facts, he came to believe that “it was a hundred-to-one odds” that the war was indeed over, which convinced him to surrender. If that was true, we could say that the search efforts by the Japanese and Philippine authorities were also key factors that moved his heart and paved the way for his surrender.

On March 10, Onoda descended the mountain, under the escort of PAF officers. This was probably done in anticipation of any unforeseen problems, such as an attack against Onoda by local people. During the night on the same day, the former soldier arrived at the air force station on the island, and surrendered to PAF Commanding General Jose L. Rancudo. In the morning of March 11, Onoda was transferred from Lubang Island to Manila by PAF helicopter. He then paid a courtesy visit to President Marcos at Malacañang Palace, where the president extended a “full and complete pardon to Lt. Onoda for any violations he may have committed during and after the war.” The following day, Onoda returned to Japan.

Many efforts by Philippine and Japanese parties concerned were behind the rescue of former Second Lieutenant Onoda. Certainly, the newspapers left by the Japanese search team, his family’s requests for his appearance, and the order from his commanding officer played key roles in accomplishing Onoda’s surrender. However, we should not make light of the responses from the Philippine government that created these conditions. What should be noted is that these measures were taken by restraining the anger and frustration of the victims of the residents on Lubang Island—some of whom were killed or injured, and others deprived of their property by Japanese soldiers (after all, no individual compensations were made for the victims). On March 12, 1974, Onoda safely returned home, without facing worst-case scenarios, including the occurrence of any gunfight or any casualties. However, behind the scenes, the local people who had been victimized by the Japanese army stragglers were forced to be silent due to diplomatic considerations.

(Professor at HPI)

Public Relations in Postwar Britain and Japan: Fieldwork at the National Archives of the United Kingdom

Kyungjin Ha

Between March 19 and 23, 2019, I visited the National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) located in Richmond upon Thames in southwest London. The main purpose was to investigate records on the activities of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in and around Hiroshima. However, I was able to find reference materials that were more informative than expected, which made the fieldwork fruitful. Based on the research findings, this paper attempts to broaden the perspective in understanding the history of public relations in postwar Japan.

To begin with, I would like to mention that “Public Relations in Postwar Britain and Japan” is a very rare theme. Conventional studies on public relations in Japan—in particular, historical research to investigate its origin and starting point—have attached primary importance to the United States. The reason behind this is related to the trend in studies on the occupation of Japan, which form the foundation for research into the history of public relations. While studies on the occupation of Japan are supposed to focus on the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), these studies have clarified the actual conditions of the occupation, almost wholly centering on the U.S. military. Also, public relations studies have put a spotlight on how the GHQ’s occupational policy awakened political and economic entities in postwar Japan to work as practitioners of public relations, based on the assumption that the occupation forces were equal to the U.S. military.

I have no intention of raising any objections to these arguments. However, some issues remain to be discussed to provide deeper insight into this history. Even if the occupation of Japan was conducted under a power structure with the U.S. military as the de facto head, the GHQ was an organ of the Allied Powers, and various countries dispatched their military organizations to reside in Japan during the occupation period. Hiroshima and its surrounding areas came under the control of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), which consisted of British, Australian, New Zealand, and British-ruled Indian military forces. As pointed out in the book *Eirenopogun no nihon shinchu to tenkai* (*British Commonwealth Occupation Force’s presence and deployment in Japan*) by Takeshi Chida (published in 1997 by Ochanomizu Shobo) and other related works, the BCOF units in charge of the Chugoku and Shikoku regions often had different views from those of the GHQ and the military government that executed GHQ directives, while working in cooperation with them in performing their duties.

Going back to the history of public relations, the GHQ and the military government made suggestions to the prefectural governments nationwide to install units responsible for public relations activities (called the Public Relations Office, or PRO). The aim was to encourage the country to reflect its public’s opinions in information disclosure and policymaking, thereby advancing Japan’s administrative democratization and establishing interactive relationships between the government and the private sector. On the one hand, the GHQ and the military government formulated a code and practiced censorship to eliminate obstacles to the occupation; on the other hand, they sought to have democratic communication take root in Japan. That attempt was itself ironic.

In light of the above history, we can consider that after World War II public relations was transplanted by the GHQ, in the course of reforming Japan’s militaristic and autocratic politics and government into advanced, democratic ones. However, this research has highlighted an issue regarding public relations in occupied Japan that cannot be fully explained by this simple theory. Specifically, there was a model other

than the American military for advancing democracy.

The major duties of the BCOF were to maintain security in the Chugoku and Shikoku regions, including the disarmament of Japan’s army and naval forces, disposal of discarded weapons, and crackdown on black markets and unlawful immigration. Civic administration was under the charge of the U.S. military. However, the BCOF carried out extensive sanitary, education and cultural programs, to meet the need for establishing friendly relationships with multilateral military organizations and soldiers, as well as with local residents whom the BCOF contacted while fulfilling their duties. Furthermore, the BCOF placed emphasis on activities to communicate information not only to the GHQ, but also to governments and people of countries comprising the British Commonwealth. For example, the BCOF published an original newspaper to explain the significance and achievements of its activities and cultivate their support. In postwar Japan, the BCOF played a key role not only in enforcing the occupation, but also in practicing public relations at the same time.

Also, a relationship of tension regarding public relations can be observed between the GHQ and the BCOF. The reference materials that I obtained during this research include many documents that clearly show an aspect of the BCOF as an observer that attentively watched the information dissemination and communication activities conducted by the GHQ (primarily the U.S. military). In some reports, the BCOF analyzed that the U.S. activities that extensively covered diverse fields, such as public relations, advertising, secret intelligence, censorship and culture, would ultimately lead to the “Americanization” of Japan. These reports were carefully studied and discussed by relevant divisions of the British government. The author considers that the BCOF provided the U.K. and other Commonwealth countries with important perspectives to be integrated when these nations conceived their strategies against Japan, while referencing the U.S. approaches.

The BCOF and its public relations activities in the regions under its jurisdiction made up only a small part of the larger picture of the occupation. Nevertheless, records left by the BCOF prompt us to look into the occupation of Japan in a multifaceted manner. In other words, the BCOF records highlight the fact that the occupation, whose objectives were to reconstruct Japanese society and transform the Japanese people’s mindset, was carried out by various forces that had different motives within the Allied Powers. Among other things, the BCOF records indicate that America/the U.S. military, which played a central role, had implications not only for Japanese society and people, but also for each county involved in the occupation and reform of Japan, influencing their identity as enforcers of the occupation.

The above perspective will open the possibility for a new interpretation of public relations, which is regarded to have been introduced to Japan to advance postwar democracy. Notably, by revisiting whether there were any other elements than “America” during the process in which public relations became widespread in various parts of occupied Japan, we can examine the history of postwar public relations and how it should be conducted. As the cases of the BCOF and the British government suggest, the pluralistic enforcers of Japan’s occupation directed close attention to the U.S. military and its public relations approach. Their attention focused first only on public relations that the U.S. conducted in occupied Japan, then grew to cover public relations in American society as a whole. Tracing this process might enable us to obtain clues to better understand the global expansion of public relations after World War II.

(Associate Professor at HPI)

Hello from HPI

OSHIBA Ryo

Director / Specially Appointed Professor



Dr. Ryo Oshiba was born in Hyogo Prefecture in 1954. He graduated from the Department of Law, Hitotsubashi University. He holds an M.A. from the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the doctoral course at Yale University. Before taking his present post at HPI in April 2019, Dr. Oshiba served as Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law, Sophia University; Professor in the Department of Law, Hitotsubashi University and Vice President of the same university; and Professor at the School of International Politics, Economics and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University. He also was President of the Japan Association of International Relations (2004–2006). He specializes in international relations. His publications include: [Single-authored] *Kokusai soshiki no seiji keizaigaku (Political economy of international organizations)* published by Yuhikaku Publishing in 1994, and *Kokusai seiji riron (Theories of international politics)* from Minerva Shobo in 2016; [Authored/edited] *Nihon no gaiko (dai 5 kan) Taigai seisaku—Kadai hen (Japan's diplomacy, vol. 5, challenges in diplomatic policy)*, published by Iwanami Shoten in 2013; and [Coauthored/edited] *Power kara yomitoku, global governance ron (Power shifts and global governance)*, published by Yuhikaku Publishing in 2018.

Hello, I am Ryo Oshiba, and am happy to assume my new role here at the Hiroshima Peace Institute. My specialty field is international relations. I use a theoretical framework to study international organizations that work to alleviate poverty. To achieve peace and peacekeeping, it is vital to address the issues of reconstruction and poverty. In the Graduate School of Peace Studies (Master's Degree Program) inaugurated this academic year, I will strive to nurture graduates who can understand peace studies originating in Hiroshima, thereby cultivating individuals who can communicate Hiroshima's historical experiences to others in Japan and around the world. Through our research and education activities, we want to contribute to building and maintaining world peace as HPI aims to achieve, and to further developing local communities.

OKIMURA Tadashi

Professor



Having grown up in Tokyo, Dr. Tadashi Okimura graduated from undergraduate studies at the College of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. He then obtained his M.A. in government and politics from the University of Maryland in the United States, and completed the doctoral program without a Ph.D. degree in the Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University. Later, in 2007 he received his Ph.D. in law from the Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University. After serving as Professor in the Faculty of Policy Studies, University of Shimane, he was appointed Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University in April 2019. His books (coauthored) include: *Gigaton Gap—Kiko hendo to kokusai kosho (Gigaton Gap—Climate change and international negotiations)*, published by Alterna in 2015; *Asia no kankyoho seisaku to Nippon (Asian environmental policies and Japan)*, published by Shojihomu in 2015; and *Kokusai-seijigaku nyumon (Introduction to international politics)*, published by Minerva Shobo in 2008.

I am Tadashi Okimura. I am pleased to have joined the faculty of the Hiroshima Peace Institute from this spring. I specialize in international relations. I have mainly studied the formation of international regimes regarding global environmental issues. In recent years, international regimes have been formed in an increasingly interdisciplinary manner. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the UN, comprise a set of 17 goals to be achieved by 2030 that were defined based on the premise that interrelations exist between the three aspects of the environment, the economy, and society. Among the goals, Goal 16, which is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, is closely related to one of the HPI's founding objectives—contributing to realizing sustainable global peace and to developing local communities. In the future, I would like to put my energies into social contribution activities, in addition to fostering practitioners and researchers, in the Graduate School of Peace Studies, who can work toward achieving peace.

Development of HPI Research Projects

Xianfen Xu

Since FY2000, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) has implemented various research projects as part of its efforts to further encourage research activities. This fiscal year (FY2019), six projects were selected from among many entries, bringing the total number of adopted research projects to 33 since FY2000.

The six research projects adopted this fiscal year will address a wide variety of themes. These projects are intended to pursue peace studies from historical, local, regional, and/or global perspectives. Specific research themes are as follows: “Comparative Study on the Japanese War Crime Trials: 70 Years after Their Conclusion,” “Preliminary Research on the Cultural Construction of Hiroshima as a City of Peace: Viewing the Hiroshima Toyo Carp as a Clue,” “Charting the Myanmar Ethnic Peace Process,” “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Measures through Funding Regulations including Proliferation Financing,” “Peace, Nuclear Weapons, and Governance Issues in Asia,” and “Experience of the European Security Community: Lessons for Establishing an East Asian Community.” Among these, “Peace, Nuclear Weapons, and Governance Issues in Asia” is the theme of a continuing research project, under which a handbook of the same title was published by Kyodo News in the

previous fiscal year. This project aims to produce the next volume of the handbook.

Each research project is designed as an interdisciplinary study that transcends the boundaries of various specific academic fields, and is carried out to achieve a concrete objective following a detailed research plan. The respective project teams are comprised of HPI researchers and external research collaborators. These members work together holding regular research meetings or conducting surveys overseas, thereby exchanging views among researchers both in and outside Japan. Through these vigorous research activities, the HPI aims to deepen collaborative research and expand the network of researchers.

The HPI will disseminate the results of its research projects widely to outside organizations and individuals, through report presentations at academic conferences and the publication of academic papers and research works. At the same time, the HPI will actively share these research findings with the general public by organizing HPI public lecture series and other events.

(Associate Professor at HPI)

- ◆ **Dec. 3-5** Hitoshi Nagai conducts field research work and gathers oral history interviews regarding the Japanese army stragglers on Lubang Island in the Philippines.
 - ◆ **Dec. 8** Akiko Naono gives a presentation on the atomic bomb survivors' movement from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s at the Japanese Association for Contemporary Historical Studies held at Kwansei Gakuin University.
 - ◆ **Dec. 10-11** Gen Kikkawa, Narayanan Ganesan, Robert Jacobs and Makiko Takemoto attend and present papers at a joint workshop "Processes of Peace & Democratization," held by HPI, Catholic University Portugal and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung at Catholic University Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal.
- 2019
- ◆ **Jan. 10** Xianfen Xu gives a lecture, "China in Northeast Asia," at a seminar for students from Kyungpook National University at Hiroshima City University.
 - ◆ **Jan. 16** Hyun Jin Son gives a lecture, "Unification of Korean Peninsula," and Kyungjin Ha gives a lecture, "Peace and Media: Focusing on Power Industry and Public Relations in Postwar Japan," to the students of Kyungpook National University at Hiroshima City University.
 - ◆ **Jan. 17** Takemoto gives a lecture, "German and Japanese Peace Movement," at a seminar for students from Kyungpook National University, held at Hiroshima City University.
 - ◆ **Jan. 31** Kazumi Mizumoto attends as a committee member of the Hiroshima Prefecture's "Hiroshima Report Drafting Project" meeting organized by and held at the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo.
 - ◆ **Feb. 4** Ganesan gives a lecture, "Threats to Peace in Southeast Asia," to postgraduate students from Tsukuba University at the Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City University.
 - ◆ **Feb. 8** Ha delivers a lecture, "Global Media: Politics and Communication," in the 4th HPI Public Lecture Series in English at the Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City University.
 - ◆ **Feb. 21** Ha presents a lecture, "Historical Sociology of Public Relations," to media officials in a seminar organized by the Asahi Shimbun Hiroshima Bureau.
 - ◆ **Feb. 22** Son attends an opinion exchange meeting with the Nagasaki Youth Delegation as a commentator at Nagasaki University.
 - ◆ **Feb. 24-Mar. 11** Jacobs conducts field work and gathers oral history interviews at Chernobyl in the Ukraine and Sellafield in the United Kingdom.
 - ◆ **Feb. 25** Tetsuo Sato's Book Review, "*Whaling in the Antarctic: Significance and Implications of the ICJ Judgment*, edited by Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dai Tamada. Leiden/Boston, Brill/Nijhoff, 2016. Pp. ix, 423." is published in the *Japanese Yearbook of International Law*, Volume 61, 2018, pp. 333-339.
 - ◆ **Mar. 8** Kikkawa gives a lecture, "The Memory of History and the Multilateral Security Architecture," at Aoyamagakuin University. ▽Mizumoto serves as vice-chair at the 25th meeting of the Exhibition Review Committee of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum at the International Conference Center Hiroshima.
 - ◆ **Mar. 12** Mizumoto attends the annual meeting of the Advisory Research Group of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum at the Museum.
 - ◆ **Mar. 25-29** Yasuhito Fukui participates in the group of governmental experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) as an academic representative and makes a statement in French, Geneva, Switzerland.
 - ◆ **Mar. 27** Kikkawa gives a special lecture, "The Dilemma of Globalization and Nationalism," at Hiroshima Shudo University.
 - ◆ **Mar. 30** Tetsuo Sato's Book Review, "How We Could Read ONUMA Yasuaki, *International Law in a Transcivilizational World* (Cambridge University Press, 2017)" is published in *Tokyo Review of International Law*, No. 6, 2018, pp. 159-179.
 - ◆ **Apr. 20** Akihiro Kawakami gives a public lecture, "What is the Constitution?" at the Niho Public Hall, Hiroshima.
 - ◆ **Apr. 26** Jacobs gives a lecture, "The Problems of Long-term Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Worldwide," to the Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Decommissioning and Environmental Recovery, INUDECO 2019, in Slavutych, Ukraine (by Skype).
 - ◆ **Apr. 27** Fukui attends the annual conference of the Japan Branch of the Association of International Law at the University of Tokyo.
 - ◆ **Apr. 30-May 2** Fukui participates in the 3rd Preparatory committee for 2020 NPT Review Conference at UN Headquarters in New York.
 - ◆ **May 3** Kawakami gives a lecture, "Abe Administration and Constitutional Revision in Japan," hosted by the Saga Peace Movement Center at the Mate Plaza SAGA.
 - ◆ **May 19** Sato and Fukui attend the 2019 annual meeting of the Japanese Association of World Law, held in Tokyo. ▽ Kawakami participates as a panelist in the symposium, "The Article 9 is a Treasure of Japan, Asia and the World," at Meiji University.
 - ◆ **May 21-25** Ganesan gives public lectures on Southeast Asian international relations and threats to peace at Mandalay and Yadanabon Universities, Myanmar.
 - ◆ **May 23** Son gives a presentation, "Japan's Policy towards ASEAN," at the workshop "Change in International Strategic Environment and South Korea's New South Policy," at the Korea Institute for National Unification, Gangwon-do, Korea.
 - ◆ **May 26** Mizumoto attends the 1st meeting on the Peace Declaration organized by the City of Hiroshima at the International Conference Center Hiroshima. ▽Takemoto gives a paper, "German Pacifism and Peace Movements in the 20th Century: Its Continuity and Break," at the annual meeting of the Historical Science Society of Japan at Rikkyo University.
 - ◆ **May 28** Xu gives a lecture, "Sino-US-Japan Triangular Relations," at the School of History, Capital Normal University, Beijing.
 - ◆ **May 30** Ryo Oshiba gives a presentation, "Resilient Peace," at the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, Jeju, Korea.

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