Global Nuclear Disarmament and Northeast Asia Security: A Japanese Perspective

Hiromichi Umebayashi
President, Peace Depot, Yokohama, Japan

Prepared for Workshop on
"Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament"
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March 11-12, 2004

1. Introduction

It is well known that the fundamentals of the current nuclear disarmament policy of Japan have been established in mid to late 1960s by Eisaku Sato Administration. In this framework, promotion of nuclear disarmament is one of four larger nuclear policies. The minutes of Prime Minister Sato's comprehensive statement on such policies in the Diet (National Parliament) in 1968 read as follows.[1]

> "With regard to the nuclear policy of our country, I can say there are four pillars.
>
> Firstly, we will not develop nuclear weapons, we will not allow bringing-in of them, and we will not possess them. These are so-called three non-nuclear principles. (Some shouted 'You are lying.') I hear someone's hoot that I am lying. No. I should be clear about it.
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> Secondly, our nation, which had tragic experiences caused by nuclear weapons, has desire to eliminate or abolish such weapons. However, as a matter of reality, we cannot realize it immediately, so for the time being we will make our efforts for nuclear disarmament[2] to start with whatever practically possible. Accordingly we are expressing our views (internationally) on international regulation and control. Even such tasks are not easy and we have to work with patience.
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> Thirdly, consistent with the Peace Constitution, we will maintain our own self-defense force to defend against the conventional invasion. But in relation to the international nuclear threat, our security continues to rely upon the U.S. nuclear deterrence. This is the third decision.
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> Fourthly, we will make our best to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a priority of our national policy. We will contribute to the global progress of science and technology. While we ourselves will enjoy the benefit of such progress, it will make our nation more prideful, prestigious, and consequently more influential in addressing peace issues.
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> The above four is the foundation of the nuclear policies of our nation." (translation by the author)

Yasuo Fukuda, Cabinet Secretary of the Koizumi Administration, made a controversial comment in a recent press conference that the three non-nuclear principles could be changed.[3] His statement obviously departed from past statements made by other administrations as they often referred to the three non-nuclear principles as unchangeable principles of the nation. In a special Diet session organized specifically to discuss over Fukuda's comments, he reaffirmed, in the presence of Prime Minister Koizumi and without logical explanation, that they are unchangeable.[4] The turmoil ceased. However, it is now more important to ask why they are so. Given the contemporary trends in Japan in which various political and legal systems constructed upon the Article 9 of Peace Constitution undergo new scrutiny, it is relevant and important to review and examine the logics that were developed to make up the nuclear policies of Japan. For this purpose, we will focus in this

paper upon the development of Diet discussions on nuclear issues until 1968, when the above four pillars was established, because the Diet is the only official arena where underlying logics of political decisions are questioned and answered in specific security situations of the time.

2. Diet Discussions over Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

No doubt, the "Treaty of Peace with Japan" (San Francisco Peace Treaty) and "Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America" (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) are the most fundamental treaties that influenced the post World War II history of Japan. The two treaties were signed on Sep. 8, 1950, ratified on Nov. 18, 1951 and entered into force on Apr. 28, 1952. Although the Diet started sessions in May 1947, twenty months after the surrender of Japan, it was under the control of GHQ (General Headquarter) of the occupation force headed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers during the whole lead time to the two treaties. The GHQ press code prohibited any acts and reports that will create serious distrust of the Allied Powers. Reports and criticisms on human aspects of atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S. were considered to be such examples.

Although the contents of the treaty became open only one month before the signature of the treaty, heated disputes took place in advance between the proponents of overall peace and those of separate peace with U.S.-led allies. At the entrance of the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and Soviet Union, the disputes were inevitably related to the impact of atomic bombs upon the security of Japan. Many of the proponents of overall peace argued that the invention of atomic weapons created the situation in which Japan would be more vulnerable to annihilation if it would ally with one side of the world. Accordingly, some argued for the status of permanent neutrality of Japan for the same reason.

> "Suppose that Japan enters an arrangement of military protection of particular states and seeks its security by providing military bases to them. Of course, I do hope that there will be no war between the U.S. and Soviet Union, but if a war should break out between the two countries, then mainland Japan would become a battle field and a central target of air raids, and would be razed to the ground by tens of atomic bombs. …I believe, therefore, the only way left is some form of substantial neutrality."[5]
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> "…if matters should go worse, the atomic bombs could fall upon our people. In order to prevent it, we have to maintain as good terms as possible with Soviet and Chukyo (Communist China). We should not abandon such efforts by saying it would be very difficult. …When these treaties are ratified and enter into force, I think we will need a system of civil defense (to protect against atomic bombs) preparing for the emergency."[6]

These arguments exhibit the underlying logics of their contention. They recognized that the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the global confrontational climate governing such weapons were critical terms to define the safety of Japan. Since "safety of Japan" is a word that can be used by both sides of the disputes over security issues, specific analysis of the situation is essential to justify either one of them. Nevertheless, there was no counter argument from proponents

of two treaties or from the Government, referring to the nuclear dimension of their contention.

In the same period of time, there were some discussions about the nuclear disarmament per se. It is note-worthy that the first challenge in the Diet history against the atomic bombs came from humanitarian perspectives in November 1949. It was claimed that atomic bombs were to be banned because of its inhumane nature. However, Government of Japan (GOJ) made no comment.

> "Member (Koichi) Sekou: …I believe it is inhumane to wage a war using atomic bombs. Especially, peace advocates in the world are unanimous in arguing that future use of atomic bombs will annihilate the whole world. We have many survivors who experienced miseries caused by atomic bombings. Then on this occasion, I would like to listen to the Prime Minister's unequivocal view that the use of atomic weapons is inhumane. I believe your response would contribute to the world peace enormously.
>
> Prime Minister (Shigeru) Yoshida: This is related to diplomatic affairs, and I have no freedom to comment on it at this time. I will comment on later days."[7]

Also parliamentarians mostly from Communist Party asked the Government for support the ban of atomic weapons and their use in relation to the Stockholm Peace Appeal that was adopted in March 1950, and to the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War that broke out in June 1950. As is exemplified by the case of Kanichi Kawakami, a communist who strongly requested Prime Minister's support of the "absolute ban" of atomic weapons[8] and was expelled from the Diet because of his anti-imperialist speech next year, genuine exchange of logics on nuclear disarmament was very difficult at the Diet that was placed under the control of GHQ.

However, it is to be noted that there appeared already a notion expressed by a GOJ official that nuclear weapons were preventing the war, a view that later became common to the advocates of nuclear deterrence.

> "…it is a common saying in the peace movement community that any country that may use atomic bombs is asserted to be on the side of invasion whatever the reason may be. I think, however, measures to build peace and serve as a breakwater against the risk of war are pursued through sufficiently strengthening the most advanced armaments. I think it is a global trend. I don't believe they are meant to prepare for a war. This is the view of the Foreign Ministry."[9]

3. Diet Discussions over Nuclear Test Ban and Atomic Energy

When Japan enacted the Fundamental Law for Atomic Energy in December 1955, it closed the door to its military use of the nuclear energy. By this time since the recovery of independence in 1952, Japanese public had received considerable flow of information on the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, including photos and survivors' memoirs. In addition, there was another accident of great influence upon Japanese public opinions and politics, namely the Bikini hydrogen bomb test on March 1, 1954 and the suffering of Japanese fishing boats. The Article 2 of the Fundamental Law reads "Research, development and use of atomic energy will be limited to the peaceful purposes and conducted while securing safety, operated under a democratic administration

and maintaining independence. Their outcomes will be publicized and voluntarily contributed to international cooperation" (translation by the author). But it is remarkable that there was no argument in the Diet against abandoning military option. Rather much discussion was made regarding the danger that the Administration might allow any clandestine diversion from the peaceful purposes. In fact the concerns of the conservative Administration were directed more to maintain harmony with the rising public opposition to nuclear weapons, the deepening Japan-U.S. security relationship and the desire to develop national nuclear science and technology.

As expected from a historic coincidence that the first Japanese national budget to construct a home made nuclear reactor was proposed on the very next day of the first Bikini hydrogen bomb test in 1954, the developments of the Diet discussions from March 1954 to December 1955 were very instrumental to shape the later Japanese nuclear policy. The first adoption of Diet resolution on the international control of atomic energy and the ban of atomic weapons in April 1954 was an intermediate landmark achievement in this period. Both Houses resolved similar texts unanimously but with a little different emphasis.

The "Resolution on the International Control of Atomic Energy" by the House of Representatives reads, "This House will request the United Nations (U.N.) immediately to take effective and appropriate measures to promote the international control and peaceful use of atomic energy and the ban of use of atomic weapons, as well as measures to prevent damages caused by atomic weapon tests. It resolves the aforesaid."[10] The "Resolution on the International Control of Atomic Energy and the Ban of Atomic Weapons" by the House of Councilors reads, "This House will request the U.N. urgently to take appropriate measures to realize the establishment of the effective international control of atomic energy, the ban of atomic weapons, and the prevention of damages caused by atomic weapon tests, as well as measures to achieve peaceful use of atomic energy for promotion of welfare of humankind. It resolves the aforesaid."[11] It is to be added that these resolutions were welcomed by the Administration, and that Japan was not the member of the U.N. at that time. It was allowed to join the U.N. in December 1956.

In the Diet sessions leading to such resolutions emerged some significant elements concerning the logics of Japan for nuclear disarmament. One is the logic of Japan's responsibility to humankind. It calls on Japan to speak out toward international community about the danger of nuclear weapons and the necessity of their prohibition. All speeches from different political parties presented to support the resolutions contained such logic. Obviously it came out of overwhelming voices for "no more Hiroshima and Nagasaki" in the civil society. Another notable one is the logic of the benefit of the free world that came from the Administration. It claimed that while the international control was good idea, Japan should not jeopardize the U.S. efforts to improve its arsenals until the international agreement was reached. Katsuo Okazaki, then Foreign Minister of Japan, responded in the Diet as follows.

> "As for Government of Japan, we are very eager to tackle the international control of atomic energy. …However, pending its accomplishment, both the Soviet Union side and the U.S. and the U.K. side will conduct various (atomic) tests and try to make new inventions. Therefore I don't want to take any measures to weaken the defense force

of the free world."[12]

"We believe that to strengthen the U.S. defense force is to increase the safety of the world. Therefore, we would like to seek measures (to protect fishery) as much as possible so that we may cooperate with the U.S. protection of secrecy (regarding the tests) and may not disturb the U.S. tests."[13]

These two logics, Japan's responsibility to humankind and benefit of the free world, were seemingly conflicting with each other, but they still worked in preserving apparent consistency of the Administration's nuclear disarmament policy. It could call for the international control and ban of nuclear weapons and at the same time it could cooperate with the U.S. on the U.S. bomb development until the international agreement was attained. Two years later, both houses adopted further resolutions to call for the nuclear test ban,[14] but the hypocritical structure of the logic remained same.

4. Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Elements of Three Principles

The Law to Establish Defense Agency and the Law of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) were passed by the Diet in June 1954, thus the Diet debates over the Japanese rearmament took place almost in parallel with debates leading to the above Diet resolutions in 1954. The nuclear armament of the SDF was clearly denied in such debates but the nuclear armament of the U.S. Forces Japan was accepted by the GOJ at that time.

"Member (Shichiro) Hozumi: …I would like to ask the two questions regarding the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan and growing SDF of Japan …First, I think you should say that the SDF or future armed forces of Japan will never possess nor use atomic weapons. Do you agree? Second, we would like to ask the U.S. Forces neither to possess nor to use atomic bombs, but naturally we cannot dictate them. …However, …I think it is natural for us to refuse their bringing-in of atomic weapons to the U.S. military bases in Japan, since the Japanese people will be the first that suffer damages from such dangerous weapons. …

Vice Prime Minister (Taketora) Ogata: …As for your question whether the Japanese SDF will possess atomic weapons, no, it will not. As for the possession of such weapons by the U.S. Forces in Japan, …I think Japan should not interfere, though I don't think such situation will occur for the time being. This is the question of the U.S. Forces, and we cannot dictate them not to be equipped …"[15]

When the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty grew the central political agenda in Japan, one of the key claims of the Administration was to attain more equal partnership with the U.S. by such revision. In the meantime, concerns about the atmospheric nuclear tests were swelling in the international community. Annual number of the atmospheric nuclear tests marked 62 in the U.S., the highest record in history, and 34 in Soviet Union.[16] The House of Councilors unanimously resolved the ban of nuclear weapons for the third time in 1957. A year later the House of Representatives adopted another test ban resolution, in which "it was reaffirmed that Japan will not possess nuclear

weapons," and the House of Councilors unanimously passed the forth resolution to ban nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, the nuclear armament of the U.S. Forces became a controversial political issue. Contrary to the previous position of the Government, Acting Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi came to the position in February 1957 that he would say "no" to any prior consultation offered by the U.S. to introduce a U.S. atomic troop.[17] Later of the year, Kishi, then formal Prime Minister, made a clearer statement to deny any possible bringing-in of nuclear weapons by the U.S. forces. The reasoning for it was not to make Japan a base for major U.S. missiles and involved in the U.S. nuclear strategy.

> "You may concern about the possibility that Japan will become a base of the U.S. major missiles and get involved in the U.S. atomic strategy in the future. In this regard, as I have said clearly in the past, I reaffirm unequivocally herewith that we will never allow the bringing-in of the U.S. nuclear weapons. Also we will never equip the SDF with such weapons."[18]

Thus, by the time of the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement of September 11, 1958 in which both sides agreed to initiate negotiations to revise the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, each element of later three non-nuclear principles had become a sort of norm in the Japanese domestic politics. As we see in the above discussions, underlying logics to support these principles were related to the recognition of inhumane nature of nuclear weapons, the safety consideration of the world and Japan, the sense of responsibility of the only bombed nation to the world. It is useful to note that all of these logics came from global or universal perspectives and none from regional perspectives.

4. Chinese Nuclear Test and East Asia Regional Perspective

China's first nuclear test took place in October 1964. It apparently stirred in-depth security discussions in the Diet, but they ended in much less change in the security policy framework of Japan. One notable change, however, was the clearer emphasis of the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrence in relation to the protection of Japan. The Chinese Bomb tightened up the link between the nuclear disarmament policy and Japan-U.S. Security arrangement.

The theory of nuclear deterrence had been already common in the security discussions in the Diet at that time. The first notion in the Diet that nuclear weapons had roles to prevent war appeared as early as in 1951.[19] In the discussions leading to the revision of the Security Treaty, frequently appeared such notion that the U.S.-Japan security system is a part of the U.S. global nuclear deterrence system. Clearly, these discussions were done in the global Cold War context. However, Chinese nuclear tests turned the U.S. nuclear deterrent into a direct defense measure for Japan. Just ten days before the Chinese test, which had already been a prospect, Junya Koizumi, then Defense Minister under the 3rd Ikeda Administration, dared to say that there was no need of policy change of Japan if China developed nuclear weapons.

> "Our view is that the nuclear weapons are primarily the deterrent force against the war. It has been our formal policy that, in the Japan-U.S. security system, our national defense depends upon the U.S. in relation to the nuclear weapons. With this spirit and

policy, we need not take any counter measures such as nuclear arming of ourselves, even if Chukyo (Communist China) completes its nuclear arsenals."[20]

This belief in the credible U.S. nuclear deterrence under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was more clearly reiterated by himself ten days after the test actually took place, responding to Akimichi Ito, a socialist, who questioned about the Administration's view on the possible re-revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1970.

"As you point out, it is the time of re-revision of the Security Treaty around 1970. I also agree with Ito-sensei that the results of the Chinese nuclear test this time will make a great progress by that time. Despite such circumstances, I believe that Japan need not change its fundamental policies that Japan does not go nuclear and also opposes bringing-in of nuclear weapons. We should go as we do now."[21]

Eisaku Sato, who was a member of the 3rd Ikeda Cabinet, succeeded him as Prime Minister two weeks after such Diet discussion. In about two years, Sato formalized the four pillars of Japanese nuclear policy that was cited in Section 1 of this paper. As is seen from the above discussions, all pillars other than the third one, including elements of the three non-nuclear principles, had already been there, and what Sato innovated clearly by such formulation was the third pillar, the dependence upon the U.S. nuclear deterrence to defend Japan. Importantly, it had a concrete regional context, namely it was introduced to deter the Chinese nuclear forces. About one and a half month before the comprehensive statement, Sato explained as follows.

"… under the Peace Constitution and three non-nuclear principles, the responsibility imposed upon myself is how I can guarantee the safety of Japan. …when I met President Johnson in 1965, as well as this time, I asked him if the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty could protect Japan against any attack, in other words against the nuclear attack upon Japan. He responded that obviously he would protect Japan against any kind of attack. This is the purpose of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. …now Chukyo, our neighbor, is developing nuclear weapons. …They have tested six times already. …I am convinced that even if Chukyo acquires nuclear weapons today, safety of Japan is secured under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."[22]

5. Lessons to the Future: Significance of a Northeast Asia NWFZ

This policy framework of four pillars remains unchanged today. When Japan ratified the NPT in 1976 and the CTBT in 1997, both of which enhanced further the impediment for Japan to go nuclear, concerns of the conservatives were eventually appeased and apparent harmony between the conservatives and the progressives were maintained because of this framework. However, in this framework it means that Japan's policy of three non-nuclear principles and call for global nuclear disarmament have to be bolstered by the nuclear deterrence of the U.S., most powerful nuclear believer. Naturally, dilemmas, contradictions, internal conflicts and crashes have occurred frequently within the framework. One of the most well-known of such crashes is found in relation to the portcall and homeporting of nuclear carrying U.S. naval vessels. The U.S. claims that such vessels

are part of deterrent forces, and then Japan needs them for its security. However three non-nuclear principles prohibit the bringing-in of nuclear weapons. Ample official documents and evidences have been revealed to tell the existence of secret accord between Japan and the U.S. to allow such portcall, but the GOJ has constantly been denying them.

Global nuclear disarmament efforts by Japan have also been affected by the consideration of their consistency with the U.S. global and regional defense posture. One of the significant examples is the attempt by the Government of Japan to weaken the text of its U.N. General Assembly resolution in 2001 in relation to the call on the early entry into force of the CTBT. In spite of the fact Japan had publicly announced many times that the CTBT was the top priority agenda of its nuclear disarmament policy, it deleted a traditional phrase to urge the early entry into force from its draft text of the resolution[23] in August 2001 in order to avoid conflicts and get support of the U.S., because the latter had renounced the CTBT a month before. Partly because of the strong public opposition against this policy shift of the GOJ and partly because of the eventual finding that the U.S. would not support even the watered-down resolution, the GOJ managed to recover the traditional phrase in the final form of its resolution.[24]

It is very important to note that the nuclear disarmament setbacks related to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty arrangement also happened by the initiative of Japan. When Masashi Nishihara, President, National Defense Academy of Japan, contributed an op-ed to the Washington Post in August 2003,[25] he insisted "Washington should not sign a pact stating that it has no intention of launching a nuclear attack on North Korea," because it might eventually create circumstances that "Tokyo could no longer rely on its alliance with Washington and thus might decide to develop its own retaliatory nuclear weapons." It will be safe to assume that his contribution is intended to carry the message from the GOJ, with or without prior consultation between the two, to the U.S. Administration at the time of a six party talk on North Korea approaching in two weeks. According to a Kyodo News report from Washington DC,[26] by the time of that six party talk, the GOJ had requested the U.S. to preserve its nuclear deterrence against North Korea, and accordingly at a three party high level consultation at the end of September 2003, involving the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, the U.S. accepted Japan's request and assured Japan that it would maintain its nuclear umbrella against North Korea even after the U.S. provided some sort of security assurance to North Korea.

This example impresses on us how the way of thinking of the GOJ about the East Asia regional security remains the same with that of the days just after the Chinese first nuclear tests. However, Japan is now much more powerful and influential country than it was in 1964, and if it wants, it can formulate and develop its own new regional security strategy by using its influential power. In fact, this power is placed at a juncture in that it can also be powerful to prolong the stalemate of nuclear disarmament or even to enhance the nuclear risk for the sake of alleged safety of Japan by means of the U.S. nuclear deterrence.

As was examined in the above, genuine non-nuclear policies of Japan, originated from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences and sense of responsibility as a member of humankind, are consolidated in Sato's first two pillars. On the other hand, the third pillar, which kills the impetus of

invaluable first two, was introduced to address the regional security concerns. Therefore, what is vitally needed is an alternative vision on the East Asia regional security arrangement that can address the security concerns of the region without relying upon the U.S. nuclear deterrence. Obviously, the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) with appropriate negative security assurances is considered to be a thoughtful approach in this respect.[27]

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[1] Diet Minutes, 58th, Plenary, House of Representatives, Jan. 30, 1968

[2] It is appropriate here to explain about a Japanese linguistic problem. In Japanese language "nuclear disarmament" (kaku-gunshuku) means more likely "reduction of nuclear weapons" than their eventual "elimination." When people want to be exact, they use the term "abolition of nuclear weapons" (kakuheiki-haizetsu) or "(total) elimination of nuclear weapons" in order to mean the achievement of zero nuclear weapons. In the citations from the Diet Minutes, the present author automatically translates the term "kaku-gunshuku" into "nuclear disarmament."

[3] Asahi Shimbun, Jun. 1, 2002

[4] Diet Minutes, 154th, Special Committee on Measures to Situations of Armed Attack, House of Representatives, Jun. 10, 2003

[5] Kei Hoashi (Socialist Party of Japan): Diet Minutes, 6th, Plenary, House of Councilors, Nov. 10, 1949 (translation by the author)

[6] Aisuke Okamoto (independent, Ryokufu-kai): Diet Minutes, 12th, Special Committee on Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Nov. 16, 1951 (translation by the author)

[7] Diet Minutes, 6th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Nov. 24, 1949. Koichi Sekou was independent at that time. (translation by the author)

[8] 8th Diet, Plenary, House of Representatives, Jul. 15, 1950

[9] Ryuen Kusaba: Diet Minutes, 10th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Councilors, Feb. 6, 1951. (translation by the author)

[10] Diet Minutes, 19th, Plenary, House of Representatives, Apr. 1, 1954 (translation by the author)

[11] Diet Minutes, 19th, Plenary, House of Councilors, Apr. 5, 1954 (translation by the author)

[12] Diet Minutes, 19th, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mar. 25, 1954 (translation by the author)

[13] Diet Minutes, 19th, Standing Committee on Welfare, Mar. 25, 1954 (translation by the author)

[14] House of Representatives: "Resolution on the Request to Prohibit Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Tests," Feb. 9, 1956, and House of Councilors: "Resolution on the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Tests," Feb. 10, 1956.

[15] Diet Minutes, 19th, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mar. 29, 1954. Shichiro Hozumi was a Socialist. (translation by the author)

[16] Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1996

[17] Diet Minutes, 26th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Feb. 8, 1957

[18] Nobusuke Kishi: Diet Minutes, 28th, Plenary, House of Councilors, Dec. 23, 1957 (translation by the author)

[19] See note 8.

[20] Diet Minutes, 46th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Oct. 6, 1964 (translation by the author)

[21] Diet Minutes, 46th, Standing Committee on Cabinet, House of Councilors, Oct. 26, 1964 (translation by the author)

[22] Diet Minutes, 57th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 1967 (translation by the author)

[23] A/C.1/56/L.35

[24] A/RES/56/24

[25] Masashi Nishihara: "North Korea's Trojan Horse," The Washington Post, Aug. 14, 2003

[26] The Kanagawa Shimbun, Oct. 31, 2003

[27] As a realistic scheme of a Northeast NWFZ, the present author presented "three plus three" scheme in which three non-nuclear states, Japan and two Koreas, compose the zone, and three surrounding nuclear states, the U.S., Russia and China, provide security assurances to the zone. See Hiromichi Umebayashi: "A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," Peace Depot Briefing, April 30, 2003. On this topic, there are valuable contributions by John E. Endicott et al, Kumao Kaneko, and Andrew Mack. Literature references on these contributions are found in the above Peace Depot Briefing.