

East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan

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Entering into the new century, the security circumstance in East Asia has been deteriorating mainly because of the North Korean nuclear issue, and among Japanese experts the argument that Japan should go nuclear has emerged and developed. In order to promote global nuclear disarmament, the situation in East Asia is critical and we need to create more peaceful and secure circumstance here.

First, I will discuss and analyze the argument for a nuclear Japan: How has this argument come out? How has this argument developed? What are the reasons of promoters? Second, I will consider the negative effects of Japan's nuclearization. In particular, what kind of negative effects would it have to Japanese security as well as East Asian security? Third, I will examine the probability of Japan going nuclear, taking all kinds of arguments in Japan into account.

Fourth, I will identify and survey three main backgrounds of the arguments for a nuclear Japan and propose the ways to get rid of or remedy the backgrounds in order to prevent Japan from going nuclear as well as to promote the regional peace and security. As the first cause is the North Korean nuclear issue, we need to resolve the issue as soon as possible. Since the nuclear nonproliferation regime has been eroded as the second cause, we have to examine the ways to rebuild and strengthen the regime. As the last cause for recent instability comes out of Japanese security policy, we should rethink Japanese security policy in order to improve the regional security environment.

NEW ARGUMENTS FOR A NUCLEAR JAPAN

Emergence of New Arguments in Japan

For a long time it was considered a taboo to discuss whether Japan should go nuclear and those who argued for a nuclear Japan were generally severely criticized, sometimes losing their political posts. On May 13, 2002, Japan's Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe stated at Waseda University that Japanese Constitution did not prohibit Japan from using tactical nuclear weapons. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, on May 31, 2002, commenting on it, told that an amendment of the three non-nuclear principles could take place, suggesting the future possibility of the amendment. While these statements were criticized by the mass media, they did not lose their posts and no political disorder resulted. Facing with the changing international environment, including the threat from North Korea, the taboo has been weakening.¹

On September 17, 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang to attend a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il. Although they agreed a joint statement, the abduction issue of Japanese nationals could not be well resolved, and it created strong anger to and distrust in North Korea among Japanese public, followed by North Korea's admission of their uranium enrichment program in the middle of October. In the light of these developments, some experts started arguments how to prepare for a possible attack by North Korea with nuclear missiles.

In December 2002, Professor Terumasa Nakanishi of Kyoto University stated, "The best way for Japan to avoid being the target of North Korean nuclear missiles is for the prime minister to declare without delay that Japan will arm itself with nuclear weapons. If North Korea threatens us with nuclear missile, we should say that we are obliged to go nuclear," and literary critic Kazuya Fukuda asserted, "We should make it clear that we have capability to make nuclear weapons and can make them as soon as we decide."²

The arguments in Japan are principally a reaction to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, and they call on Japan to develop nuclear weapons in order to counterbalance the nuclear threat from North Korea, or to resist to and prevail over North Korea's political blackmail.

Arguments in the United States

In parallel with the development in Japan, some experts in the United States argued on a possibility of Japan's nuclearization in the context of the North Korean issue.

On January 3, 2003, Mr. Charles Krauthammer wrote in the Washington Post, "We should go to the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing North Korea and thus stopping its march to go nuclear, we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrent of its own. Even better, we would sympathetically regard any request by Japan to acquire American nuclear missiles as an immediate and interim deterrent. If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China's is a nuclear Japan. It's time to share the nightmare."³

On January 6, 2003, Mr. Ted Carpenter of the Cato Institute, after examining three options to deal

with North Korea, recommended the following approach; Washington should inform North Korea that, unless it abandons its nuclear program, the United States will encourage South Korea and Japan to make their own decisions about also going nuclear.⁴

On February 16, 2003, Senator John McCain commented on a nuclear North Korea on FOX TV, stating “I think the Chinese have to understand that unless they become very engaged with North Korea and bring about a quick resolution to this crisis then the Japanese will have no choice but to nuclear arm themselves.”⁵

On March 16, 2003, Vice-President Dick Cheney, on NBC TV, commented that Pyongyang’s yen for the bomb could set off a regional arms race and others, perhaps Japan, for example, might be forced to consider whether or not they want to readdress the nuclear question.⁶ This statement has special relevance because it comes from within the administration.

The arguments by the U.S. experts are not directly calling for or encouraging Japan to develop nuclear weapons, but rather they are more likely messages to China and to North Korea. However, the arguments in the United States triggered more active arguments in Japan, and many of those in Japan who argued for Japan’s going nuclear interpreted the arguments in the United States as a signal of U.S. tacit approval or encouragement of a nuclear Japan.

Main Arguments for a Nuclear Japan among Japanese Experts

Japan should go nuclear to counter the threat from North Korea, as the United States will approve Japan’s nuclearization. The vast majority of those who support the idea of Japan going nuclear presuppose that the United States will approve or acquiesce to a nuclear Japan mainly based on the statements by American experts, in particular those made by Vice-President Cheney. They argue that Japan does not have to worry of the collapse of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty even if Japan gets nuclear weapons, and that Japan’s new arguments emerged just because Americans argue for nuclear Japan.

Professor Terumasa Nakanishi, an advocate of Japan’s nuclearization even before Cheney’s statement, interprets his statement as an advertising balloon for Japan, and a sign of containment against North Korean nuclear development and Chinese arms buildup. In the longer term, Japan’s nuclearization is in the U.S. interest. Responding to the claim that we do not need nuclear weapons because of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, he states that the option of relying on extended deterrence can only be considered credible in a situation where there is a perfectly bipolar confrontation such as the structure in the Cold War, and it will be hard for us to find any effective way of dealing with the situation other than with nuclear arms of our own. Japan must not hesitate to declare its intention of acquiring a nuclear capability if any of the following three situations becomes reality: i) a situation in which the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security clearly wavers; ii) a situation in which

China develops a full-fledged naval capability extending to the high seas and establishes a regular presence around Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands; or iii) a situation in which the question of North Korea's nuclear capability is allowed to remain ambiguous.⁷

Kazuya Fukuda, while arguing that Japan would not be isolated under the approval by the United States, asserts, "As the number of the states that have or are eager to have nuclear weapons is increasing, the myth of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is about to die. As a dangerous state is developing a nuclear capability, the illusion of the nuclear umbrella is disappearing. Therefore, Japan has no other option than to go nuclear to maintain its own nuclear deterrent."⁸

Professor Satoshi Morimoto, while arguing that we should respond to North Korea's nuclear forces by development and deployment of missile defense and guided precision weapons, asserts that as a last resort we should pursue British-style nuclearization where the United States provides us with nuclear-capable Polaris submarines, in the case when we are under serious nuclear threat from a neighboring country, but we can not completely depend on nuclear deterrence under the Alliance, and the NPT and other international undertakings do not ensure the survivability of Japan.⁹

Kan Itoh, while understanding that the United States would permit a nuclear Japan and the United States is not necessarily dependable, argues that Japan should maintain an independent nuclear deterrent through many small submarines and destroyers with nuclear cruise missiles.¹⁰

Main purpose of these strong arguments for a nuclear Japan, based on the presumption of the U.S. approval, is to counter the North Korean nuclear threat.

NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF JAPAN'S NUCLEARIZATION

When we think of Japan's nuclearization from the viewpoints of Japanese and regional as well as international security, Japan's nuclearization would have many negative effects on them and sometimes be counterproductive to security environments in general.

It Would Undermine the Security in East Asia

With regard to the East Asian countries, a nuclear Japan would encourage a Chinese nuclear build-up and probably lead to nuclearization by South Korea and Taiwan as well. As a result, Japan would be less secure. Mataka Kamiya analyzes as follows: Japan's decision to go nuclear would surely undermine the stability of the international environment in which the country lives. As a resource-poor island country, friendly international relations are Japan's only hope to maintain its security and prosperity....A decision to go nuclear might trigger an arms race in Northeast Asia—in a worst-case scenario, prompting the two Koreas and Taiwan to accelerate their nuclear development or go nuclear as well—ultimately reducing regional and global security.¹¹

Yuri Kase states, “Japan’s nuclearization would likely to trigger severe criticism in the region, in particular from China, which could result in deterioration of the international environment in the region, where there are various contentious issues. The political situations on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait remain tense, and there are uncertainties over the national objectives and military capabilities among the countries in Northeast Asia.”¹² Shinichi Ogawa warns that Japanese development of nuclear weapons, even if initiated for the limited purpose to deter North Korea, would give incentives to China and Russia for improving their nuclear arsenals to strengthen deterrent against Japan.¹³

It Would Damage the Friendly Relationship with the United States

In relation to the United States, Japan’s nuclearization would obstruct the friendly relationship between the two, lead to the collapse of the Alliance, and make Japan confront with the United States, and as a result be harmful to Japan’s security. It is argued that, “If Japan goes nuclear, the United States would be threatened most, and it would lead to the cutoff of Japan’s defense lifeline, the Alliance.”¹⁴ Yuri Kase argues, “There is little doubt that a nuclear Japan would severely harm the U.S.-Japan security relationship....There is no promising alternative to the existing U.S.-Japanese security alliance as the base for Japan’s national security in the foreseeable future.”¹⁵ Mataka Kamiya states, “Japan’s decision to develop nuclear weapons would inevitably have a detrimental effect on the country’s relationship with the United States – Japan’s most important bilateral relationship. U.S. leaderships do not want to see Japan become a major military power, much less a nuclear power.”¹⁶

The deterioration of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement would have negative effect not only to Japanese security, but also to the East Asian regional security environment because the U.S. presence here also plays a role to stabilize the regional situation.

It Would Collapse the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Regarding the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, Japan’s nuclearization would lead to a breakdown of the regime and invite many states to have nuclear weapons, and as a result, Japanese security would decrease. It is argued “The political cost of Japan’s going nuclear would be extremely expensive. Japan has to withdraw from the NPT. The damage that Japan’s withdrawal from the NPT would incur on the nuclear nonproliferation regime could not be compared with the case of North Korea’s withdrawal. Japan is one of the most faithful and important members of the NPT. If Japan withdraws from the NPT by radically shifting from the previous policy, the regime would become just nominal and many states would possibly acquire nuclear arsenals. As a result,

once nuclear weapons are used in a regional conflict, the world would fall into disorder, and Japan's economical prosperity would be severely damaged.”¹⁷

It Would Damage Japan's International Status

With regard to international position of Japan, if Japan withdraws from the NPT and develops nuclear weapons, it would be severely criticized and isolated from the rest of the world. That result would run counter to Japanese political and security interests. It is argued that “North Korea's nuclear threat is temporary. If Japan chooses to have nuclear weapons to counter it, Japan would have to confront with international isolation.”¹⁸ Tetsuo Maeda warns that Japan would confront with just the same critical international public opinion as in the 1930s when Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, as Japan have to withdraw from the NPT, IAEA safeguards agreement and the CTBT to go nuclear.¹⁹

Matake Kamiya argues, “again contrary to the views of many foreign observers, the decision to go nuclear would only weaken Japan's political power internationally. In fact, Japan has won the respect of other nations for its decision not to go nuclear despite its latent nuclear capability.”²⁰ There are also concerns that Japan would lose its international political reputation as an enthusiastic promoter of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and might jeopardize the prospect for Japan to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.²¹

A nuclear Japan would suffer from economic sanction that would severely damage Japanese interest. It is also afraid that since Japan imports 99.7% of oil and 60% of foods from foreign countries, it would be the most vulnerable state to economic sanctions.²² As Japanese nuclear industry operates strictly under the condition for peaceful purposes in agreements with the United States and other countries, a nuclear Japan would not be able to sustain atomic industry which applies about 34% of all electricity used in Japan.

THE PROBABILITY OF JAPAN GOING NUCLEAR

In order to examine the probability of a nuclear Japan, we have to take into account the third argument that passively opposes a nuclear Japan, in addition to the arguments by positives and active opponents.

First, the United States will never approve of or acquiesce to Japan to develop and possess nuclear weapons. In contrast to the positives' opinions, the majority of speakers on this issue believe that it is unthinkable for the United States to allow a nuclear Japan.

Second, Japan needs no nuclear weapons as long as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is healthy and nuclear deterrence is effective. Many experts have expressed this opinion.

Third, Japan's nuclear forces would be useless because they would not function as a deterrent against the threat from North Korea. Mr. Ogawa argues, "Some say that while U.S. nuclear umbrella will not function against North Korea, Japan's indigenous nuclear weapons can deter North Korea. However, such a view can not be made into a concrete and realistic scenario. If you say that U.S. nuclear deterrence will not work because the leadership in North Korea has a peculiar and irrational way of thinking, then Japanese nuclear forces cannot either."²³

Fourth, it is impossible for Japan to develop and deploy nuclear weapons from a military and strategic point of view because of Japan's geographical nature. It is argued that Japan has its own geographical vulnerability that it can not absorb nuclear damage. As Japan is surrounded by the sea it is difficult to assume the situation like in NATO states where tactical nuclear arsenals are supposed to intimidate massive conventional attacks.

In addition, in Japan there are still strong public opinion that Japan should not develop nuclear weapons because Japan is the only victim of nuclear holocaust and is the only nation that knows their disastrous effects. Many in Japan still completely deny nuclear weapons from the viewpoint of their immorality based on the experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

While some Japanese experts argue for a nuclear Japan, many experts are rather negative not only for the passive reasons that it is not necessary or useful but also for the active reasons that it would damage Japan's security. Taking all arguments above into consideration, the probability for Japan to develop nuclear arsenals seems to be extremely low for the foreseeable future. The reasoning included in the negatives is very convincing, and overall analysis including traditional non-nuclear feelings among Japanese people, Japan's national and security interest, Japan's position in the international society, and technical, military and strategic difficulties leads us to conclude that a nuclear Japan is not likely.²⁴

The members of the Japanese Diet are also very cautious to a nuclear Japan as reflected in recent survey data. Under a survey conducted in August 2003 among the 394 members of the House of Representatives, only one member said yes, 26 said neither yes nor no, and 357 said no to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.²⁵ In the questionnaire of September 2003 to all members of the Diet including Houses of Representatives and Councilors, 1% said that we should examine nuclearization soon, 6% said that we should examine it in the future, 19% said that we might examine according to domestic and international circumstance change, and 68% said that we should never discuss it.²⁶ A questionnaire in November 2003 to the newly elected members of the House of Representatives shows that only one person that is 0.25% statistically demanded to begin the examination soon, 17% said that we might study according to international circumstance change, and 75% responded that we should never examine it.²⁷

Although it is no longer a taboo to discuss the probability of a nuclear Japan, as shown in the results of the questionnaires, the vast majority of the members of the Diet are reluctant even to

discuss this issue, and active promoters are extremely few. We can therefore conclude that Japan will not go nuclear in the foreseeable future.

A nuclear Japan would deteriorate general security environment in East Asia, as it would accelerate North Korean nuclear development, promote further nuclear improvement in China, and possibly lead South Korea and Taiwan to develop their own nuclear forces. In order to avoid these situations from occurring, it is necessary not only for Japan to refrain from going nuclear, but also for the regional states to construct a new security environment that improves regional peace and security.

BACKGROUDS AND FUTURE MEASURES FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY

In order to construct a new security framework in East Asia, it is necessary to survey the backgrounds on which the arguments for a nuclear Japan have emerged and by which regional security has deteriorated, and examine measures to remove or correct the causes and show the ways ahead. It can not be disputed that the first and most direct cause is the threat posed by North Korea. We need a resolution of it as soon as possible. The second cause is the erosion of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and in particular, the weakness in its effectiveness and universality, as well as the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. The issue of U.S. new nuclear policy, and in particular of increasing usability of nuclear weapons should be addressed. The third cause is that Japan is becoming more assertive in military activities in consonance with the militarism and unilateralism of the Bush administration. For a more stable and secure regional circumstance, a cooperative rather than confrontational approach is required.

The Nuclear Threat from North Korea

The situation in East Asia became more urgent when North Korea admitted their program of uranium enrichment in October 2002, and then the relation between the United States and North Korea rapidly deteriorated. While KEDO halted its provision of heavy oil to North Korea, North Korea defreezing its nuclear activities and declaring its withdrawal from the NPT.

Perception among Japanese public of the threat from North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles is heavily influenced by the negative attitude of North Korea's dealing with the abduction issue and the anger to and distrust in North Korea. An image that North Korean regime is extremely inhuman and dangerous resulted from the abduction issue contributed to significantly increase the perception of the nuclear and missile threat.

The first two important articles that called for a nuclear Japan, "Nuclear Declaration for Japan" and "Then, Japan Should Take the Nuclear Option", mainly dealt with the abduction issue, where

they criticized North Korea as well as the Japanese Government, and they recommended for a nuclear Japan to counter North Korea.²⁸

As the threat is the most fundamental cause in instability in East Asia and has triggered the current arguments for a nuclear Japan among Japanese experts, international society and the six-party talks in particular should achieve a peaceful settlement to this issue using both dialogue and pressure.

The following four approaches are conceivable for its resolution; a military solution, economic sanctions, U.S.-North Korea bilateral negotiations, and the six-party talks. A military solution, quite different from the Iraqi case, would be difficult and dangerous because North Korea has considerable military forces and the negative effect to Japan and South Korea would be immense. Although partial measures of economic sanction have been adopted by individual states, we should be cautious to take comprehensive economic sanctions because China would not support them, and even if China supported them, they would lead to military reaction from North Korea and escalate to a major military conflict. In the beginning, North Korea insisted on bilateral negotiations with the United States, while the United States insisted on multilateral talks. As North Korea agreed to the six-party talks, there is no other option than to proceed within the framework of the six-party talks. It will be possible, however, to have a bilateral negotiation within the framework of the six-party talks.

The United States, since the inauguration of the Bush administration, has not engaged in this issue for more than two years. This has resulted in a more dangerous situations of North Korean nuclear development. It is praiseworthy for China to take initiative in acting as a mediator between the two. Nevertheless, as the resolution of the issue heavily depends on the relationship between the two, the United States should engage more positively and take concrete actions in order to resolve the problem.

For Japan, the abduction issue is more important and concerned than the nuclear issue. However, as the central agenda in the six-party talks surely is on the nuclear issue, Japan should make efforts to resolve the abduction issue through a bilateral negotiation with North Korea. As a resolution of the abduction issue is a pre-condition for normalization talks just like nuclear issue, Japan should work hard to resolve the abduction issue.

If the North Korean nuclear and abduction issues are solved, there will be high possibility that the arguments for a nuclear Japan may diminish, and East Asian security condition may be highly improved.

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The health of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is a key to Japanese security as well as East Asian security. Almost all non-nuclear-weapon states signed and ratified the NPT

believing that it was in their interest, on the presumption that all other states would join the NPT and its obligation would be implemented in good faith including nuclear disarmament. However, recent phenomena lead us to question this presumption.

Non-Compliance and Effectiveness

The first is the effectiveness of the NPT, as some states parties to the Treaty seem to be non-compliant with treaty provisions and international society can not take effective measures to deal with the situation. The most prominent example is North Korea, which announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in March 1993, suspended it in June 1993, and then again announced its withdrawal in January 2003. It is believed that the withdrawal became effective in April 2003. Iraq, Iran and Libya, all the parties to the Treaty, have been also suspected that they were not in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

In order to strengthen the effectiveness, the IAEA adopted a model Additional Protocol in 1997. Japan is active to strengthen the IAEA safeguards, and have accepted new burdens by ratifying the Additional Protocol, but many states including those suspected to be non-compliant have not sign or ratify it. This situation, in the short term, produces the feeling of unfairness among the Japanese people. In addition, a way to withdraw from the NPT after violating its obligation with no punishment may be interpreted by Japanese nationalists that even if Japan goes nuclear, criticism would not severe enough.

For a wider acceptance of the Additional Protocol, we should work to increase the supporters of the interpretation that the Additional Protocol is obligatory, and ask nuclear supplier states to make its ratification by a recipient as a condition for their provision of nuclear-related material or technology. We also should work for more strict rules of procedure and substance in order to address possible non-compliance. The measures to address possible non-compliance should not be taken by individual states but by the international society as a whole.

As shown in North Korea and Iran, we should deal with the possibility that a state acquiring nuclear material or technology through Article IV of the NPT and diverting it to military use or withdrawing from the Treaty after violation becomes clear. We should examine the possibility of international control or supervision of the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

Universality

The second is universality of the NPT, as Israel, India and Pakistan stay outside of the NPT and continue to develop nuclear weapons. The fundamental thinking of non-nuclear-weapon states at the time of signature and ratification must be that the number of the nuclear-weapon states would never increase to more than the five provided for in the Treaty. Although Japan was reluctant to accede to the Treaty because of its discriminatory character, it joined the Treaty with the

understanding that the Treaty would be necessary for future nuclear disarmament, while no more than five would be nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear Israel has existed for a long time thanks to U.S. double standard. More pertinent to Japan and East Asia is the nuclearization of India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in May 1998.

Just after their nuclear tests, Japan with the United States strongly criticized their tests by inflicting economic sanctions. Many other states criticized without inflicting sanctions. India and Pakistan are not nuclear-weapon states, because according to the definition provided for in the NPT, they can not be nuclear-weapon states without the amendment of the provision. However, in real international politics, they tend to be treated as if they were nuclear-weapon states. In the United States, there was strong opinion for a lifting its sanction against India for economic interests even before the 9.11 terrorist attacks. Just after the 9.11 incident, the United States removed its economic sanctions against both countries, because the United States needed cooperation from Pakistan in order to initiate anti-terrorism operation in Afghanistan.

Thereafter, many states, in particular the United States have spoken or behaved as if India and Pakistan were nuclear-weapon states. This damages the integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. From the viewpoint of states that voluntarily renounced their nuclear option such as Japan, international society seems unwilling to strictly maintain the regime. This tends to generate the perception that even if you test, you will soon be accepted as a nuclear-weapon state though you will be criticized in the short term.

Kurt M. Campbell analyzes this aspect as follows: Events of the last decade, however, have dramatically weakened this nuclear taboo, with India and Pakistan both detonating multiple nuclear devices in May 1998 (without long-term diplomatic or economic consequences) and further developing their nuclear arsenals since then. The subsequent U.S. strategic embrace of India has left some with the perception that U.S. resolve against nuclear proliferation is weakening, leading more states that have contemplated a nuclear agenda in the past to discount former fears of U.S.-led international isolation and opprobrium.²⁹

We should ask, as a matter of principle, the three non-NPT states--Israel, India, and Pakistan--to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, and also to sign and ratify the CTBT.³⁰ In addition, we should engage them in a negotiation on a FMCT, and ask them to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol while applying safeguards more widely. In particular, nuclear technology proliferation by Pakistan was recently revealed. We should strongly ask them to apply export control guidelines as adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to their own export of nuclear-related material and technology.

Although it is necessary for international society to cooperate technically with India and Pakistan for reasons of nuclear control or security, states should refrain from legally or politically recognizing these states as nuclear-weapon states or according them a privileged status. Otherwise, it would

lead to the collapse of the NPT regime. Although these states are not under any obligation of the NPT because they are not parties to it, all members of the NPT, nuclear- or non-nuclear, are under obligation to treat those three states as non-nuclear-weapon states.

Nuclear Disarmament

The third is the stalemate of nuclear disarmament, as it should be one of the most important conditions for non-nuclear-weapon states to sign and ratify the NPT, as a way to mitigate the discriminatory nature of the Treaty. According to the Japanese Government's formal statement at the time of its ratification, Japan believes that such discrimination must be corrected in the future through nuclear elimination by the nuclear-weapon states, and the Japanese Government strongly urges the nuclear-weapon states that have a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament to take concrete nuclear disarmament measures such as the reduction of nuclear weapons or the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

In the situation where the promise is not fulfilled, the nuclear nonproliferation regime only serve to consolidate the privileged status of the nuclear-weapon states, and security of non-nuclear-weapon states including Japan will deteriorate.

Joseph Cirincione states, "As long as countries such as Japan possess the capabilities to develop a nuclear arsenal, it is critical that the political and diplomatic deterrents to the spread of weapons of mass destruction remain strong and viable. Japan will seriously consider its nuclear options if it comes to believe that the United States and other nuclear-weapon states no longer have any intention of pursuing "Effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament," as required under Article VI of the NPT."³¹

Selig S. Harrison also states, "The bottom line of this analysis is that the continuance of the American nuclear umbrella over Japan will not, in itself, assure a non-nuclear Japan unless accompanied by meaningful U.S. and Russian steps leading to a global process of nuclear disarmament embracing China."³²

The perception that nuclear disarmament is necessary for the viability of the NPT is expressed in its review conferences every five years, where development of nuclear disarmament is evaluated and future measures that should be taken are agreed. For the sustainability and viability of the NPT, therefore, nuclear disarmament is indispensable.

As an interpretation of the Article VI of the NPT, the 1995 NPT Review Conference agreed to the conclusion of the CTBT negotiation in 1996, to an immediate commencement and early conclusion of a FMCT negotiation, and to making efforts for systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament. The 2000 NPT Review Conference adopted a final document that included concrete thirteen measures for nuclear disarmament. However, the United States has since opposed some of these measures, and other nuclear-weapon states are not seriously implementing them.³³

It is fundamentally urgent for the nuclear-weapon states to implement the thirteen concrete measures for nuclear disarmament in order to keep the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Among the thirteen, the most seriously damaged issue is the demand to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policy.

Under the Bush administration, a new Nuclear Posture Review report was submitted in January 2002. Threat no longer comes from Russia but rather from rogue states or terrorists. The basic strategy shifts from a traditional threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach. A new triad consists of non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, defenses including missile defense, and responsive infrastructure. According to the new policy, the importance of nuclear weapons will be significantly reduced and the importance of conventional weapons will be increased, in sharp contrast with the traditional triad – ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.

However, the importance of all nuclear weapons does not seem to have decreased entirely, although the utility of nuclear weapons on strategic level is certainly diminishing due to the decreased threat from Russia. Under the new review, the barrier between nuclear and conventional weapons appears blurred, as they are treated on the same level, implying that the usability of nuclear weapons will increase just like conventional weapons. This tendency is clearly evident in other parts of the report in the context of assigning new missions to nuclear weapons: to attack hard and deeply buried targets or mobile targets, and to limit collateral damage by improving accuracy rates. For these purposes development of new types of nuclear weapons is required and shortening the time needed for test preparation is also recommended.

The U.S. Congress decided to abrogate a law of 1993 that prohibited research and development of nuclear weapons with yield of less than five kilotons, to allow for the development of mini-nukes, and to authorize a budget request for shortening the test preparation time. This situation means that the United States is now preparing to research and develop new types of small nuclear weapons, and preparing for their testing. They are small in size with less collateral damage. They are intended to be usable, in sharp contrast to strategic nuclear forces for deterrence.

In addition, the United States adopted a new National Security Strategy in October 2002, which strongly emphasizes the preemptive use of military forces. The preemptive use of nuclear weapons is not excluded. U.S. nuclear policy under the current administration maintains that nuclear weapons are just as usable against rogue states or terrorists as conventional weapons.

This U.S. tendency sends a message to the world that nuclear weapons are usable and that it is no longer a taboo to talk about using nuclear weapons in just the same way as conventional weapons. This tendency seems to encourage the argument in Japan for a nuclear Japan.

In order to dampen the arguments for a nuclear Japan and improve regional and international security, it is indispensable to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policy.

As concrete ways to diminish the role of nuclear weapons, we should make efforts to accomplish

no-first use pledges and negative security assurances. These two concepts have to be clearly divided because their scope and purpose are different, though sometimes the former is argued including the latter. A no-first use of nuclear weapons presuppose a second use of nuclear weapons among nuclear-weapon states. Negative security assurances means not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT.

Among the nuclear-weapon states, since the confrontation of the Cold War era disappeared, U.S.-Russia relations have improved, and U.S.-China relations are not characterized by nuclear confrontation. The nuclear threat has shifted to rogue states and terrorist groups. As China has long proclaimed its no-first use policy, the United States should make a unilateral no-first use pledge, and then work to conclude a bilateral agreement with China and then with Russia. Eventually, a treaty of no-first use of nuclear weapons should be concluded among the nuclear-weapon states. In parallel with these efforts, nuclear-weapons states must change their deployment and operational policies of nuclear weapons accordingly, and increase transparency to build confidence.³⁴

Negative security assurances should be given to non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT as *quid pro quo* for abstaining from their nuclear options. As a result, beneficiaries must be fully compliant with Article II, and the assurances should cease to apply in the event of an attack on a nuclear-weapon state, carried out by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. Such negative security assurances have already been given as a political statement, but in the light of recent U.S. policy change, it is necessary to make a legally binding treaty on negative security assurances. This would mitigate the discriminatory nature of the Treaty, and prevent many states from going nuclear for their national security.

Japan's Security Policy and East Asian Security

After the 1991 Gulf War, Japan recognized that it should contribute more to international peace and security, in particular by sending personnel, as Japan's financial contribution was not highly evaluated. First, Japan enacted a Law of the Cooperation to the UN Peace-Keeping Operations in 1992, and sent Self-Defense Forces to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993 as a logistic support unit. Thereafter Japan has sent Self-Defense Forces for UN peace-keeping operations to Mozambique, Golan Heights and other regions.

Second, with the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on Security of 1996 as a turning point, new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were elaborated in 1997. In order to implement these guidelines, Japan enacted a Law on the Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan in 1999, which provides for precisely what Japan should do to assist U.S. military action under Article VI of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. During the decade since the end of the Cold War, Japan has clearly taken a more assertive stance in its military role.

Entering into the new century, Japan's military assertiveness has become more visible as the Koizumi cabinet in Japan and the Bush administration in the United States emerged, while 9.11 terrorist attacks occurred in September 2001. Just after the 9.11 attacks, Japan enacted a Law on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures in November 2001 in order to support U.S. anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, and dispatched Maritime Self-Defense Forces to refuel warships of other coalition countries. In June 2003, a Law on Armed Attack Contingency was enacted in order to prepare for a possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In October 2003, in order to support the reconstruction in Iraq after the war, a new Law on Iraq Special Measures was enacted, and Self-Defense Forces were dispatched to Iraq in January 2004.

Japan has emphasized its military role over the past ten years, and in particular under the Koizumi cabinet Japan's military activity is strongly emphasized in its foreign policy by making new laws and sending Self-Defense Forces abroad. This Japanese tendency has a strong connection with the militarism under the Bush administration that preferred an armed attack on Iraq. Both in Japan and in an international society, there is a general tendency to emphasize military power in foreign policy. This general tendency has indirectly influenced the arguments for a nuclear Japan.

Japan's security policy has been based on the following three pillars: i) firmly maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement, ii) moderately building up Japan's defence capability on an appropriate scale, and iii) pursuing diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and stability. As examples of diplomatic efforts, dialogue, exchange, and cooperation with Asia-Pacific nations, as well as promotion of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation are often mentioned. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's military assertiveness has developed mainly in the form of military cooperation with U.S. forces. In particular, this tendency becomes prominent under the Koizumi cabinet. The first two pillars, that is, the U.S.-Japan security arrangement and Self-Defense Forces, have been strongly emphasized, by sending Self-Defense Forces abroad to assist U.S. military operations.

Some experts argue that Japan does not need nuclear weapons so long as the nuclear umbrella is effective, and strongly urge that the Alliance should be strengthened further. Indeed we need both the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and Japan's military force in order to counter the threat posed by North Korea. However, we have to take not only North Korea's threat into account in the short term, but also international security environment surrounding Japan as a whole in the longer term, and take more active diplomatic measures in addition to military ones.³⁵

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and Self-Defense Forces would, on the one hand, enhance Japan's security. However, on the other hand, this might lead to an arms race among the East Asian states, resulting in "security dilemma", that is, the overall deterioration of regional security situation including that of Japan. In order to avoid the situation from happening, positive security dialogue among the East Asian states is imperative. Using the framework of the six-party talks, they should

start examining how to construct a new regional security framework. By strengthening the structure of the summit meetings among Japan, China, and South Korea, we should make efforts to create a cooperative regional security structure.

In addition, Japan should pursue to build up Japanese as well as international security through actively engaging in the efforts of the United Nations. Japan's active participation in UN peace-keeping operations has been highly praised both domestically and internationally. If Japan desires a permanent seat of the UN Security Council, it should remain non-nuclear and contribute more aggressively to international peace and security through mainly diplomatic rather than military measures.

Japan has been working hard for nuclear disarmament in international society, submitting UN General Assembly resolutions on nuclear elimination since 1994, that were adopted by the support of an overwhelming majority. Japan is also very active in the efforts for the early entry into force of the CTBT by serving as a chairman and a coordinator for its promoting process, in spite of the fact that the United States is now opposing the CTBT. Japan is also a strong advocate for early negotiation of a FMCT, holding conferences and seminars for examining its technical aspects. In strengthening the IAEA safeguards, Japan was active in drafting a model Additional Protocol, and became the first country with advanced nuclear industry to ratify it.

However, Japan's efforts have its own limit because Japan is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Since the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is one of the main pillars of Japanese security and is supported by majority of Japanese, Japan, while pursuing total nuclear elimination in a longer term, has no other option but to promote nuclear disarmament under the nuclear umbrella for the short term. Japan has been reluctant to support a no-first use policy because of the threats from the Soviet Union in the Cold War era, from China thereafter, and from North Korea today.³⁶ Japan's reluctance stems from its desire to deter non-nuclear threats as well by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. For the United States, Russia is not a threat anymore and Chinese threat appears not so severe as leading to nuclear confrontation. Japan should support a no-first use agreement between the United States and China as well as Russia in order to diminish the role of nuclear weapons and promote strategic dialogue on nuclear weapons among them. This is consistent with the National Defense Outline of 1995 that says, "Japan depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella against nuclear threat." Japan also should support negative security assurances as mentioned above. The North Korean threat should be dealt with within the framework of the six-party talks.

In addition, once the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, Japan should take an initiative to create a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to crystallize the non-nuclear status of North Korea as well as Japan into a legally binding obligation.

¹ Howard W. French, "Taboo Against Nuclear Arms Is Being Challenged in Japan," *New York Times*, June 9, 2002.

² Terumasa Nakanishi and Kazuya Fukuda, "Nihon Kakubusou Sengen (Nuclear Declaration for Japan)," *Voice* 301 (January 2003), pp.79 and 81.

³ Charles Krauthammer, "The Japan Card," *Washington Post*, January 3, 2003.

⁴ Ted Galen Carpenter, *Options for Dealing with North Korea*, Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing, No.73, January 6, 2003, p.1. Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Armitage commented on these arguments, saying, "Nuclear umbrella traditionally provided by the United States will continue. Japan has no need of nuclearization and I do not worry about it." *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 18, 2003.

⁵ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 17, 2003; *The Age* (Melbourne), February 22, 2003. However, Special Advisor Rice who took part in the same TV program denied the opinion, stating, "There is no evidence that Japan thinks its nuclearization meet its national interest."

⁶ *Kyodo*, March 17, 2003, *Asahi Shimbun*, March 17, 2003, evening edition. On this issue, Yukio Takeuchi, Administrative Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan clearly denied the possible nuclear Japan, stating, "Nuclear Japan is not a realistic option for Japan. The Administration has never examined the issue."

⁷ Terumasa Nakanishi, "Nihonkoku Kakubusoueno Ketsudan (Decision to Nuclear Japan)," *Shokun!* 35(August 2003), pp.22-37. See the English translation, Terumasa Nakanishi, "Nuclear Weapons for Japan," *Japan Echo* 30 (October 2003), pp.48-54.

⁸ Kazuya Fukuda, "Nihon Kakubusou Shikanainoka (Japan has no Other Means than Nuclearization)," *Bungeishunju* 80 (June 2003), p.182.

⁹ Satoshi Morimoto, "Eikokugata Last Resort Kakusenryakuno Susume (Pursue British-Style Last Resort Nuclear Strategy)," *Shokun!* 35(August 2003), p.67-69.

¹⁰ Ito, "No towa Iwanai," p.117.

¹¹ Kamiya, "Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?" *Washington Quarterly*, 26 (Winter 2002-03), pp.67-68.

¹² Yuri Kase, "Japan's Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing Security Environment: Issues, Challenges, and Strategies," *World Affairs* 165 (Winter 2003), p.123.

¹³ Shinichi Ogawa, "Sainensiteiru Nihonno Kakubusouwomeguru Gironnitsuite (On Rekindled Arguments on a Nuclear Japan)," Japan Institute for Defense Studies, *Briefing Memo*, September 2003, p.3.

¹⁴ Kenichi Matsumoto, "Nichibei Doumeiwo Ayaukusuru (It will Put the Alliance in Danger)," *Shokun!* 35(August 2003), p.88.

¹⁵ Yuri Kase, "Japan's Nonnuclear Weapon Policy," pp. 124 and 127.

¹⁶ Mataka Kamiya, "Nuclear Japan," p.69.

¹⁷ Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Nihonno Kakubusouwa Sekaino Konranwo Maneku (Nuclear Japan would Invite World Disorder)," *Shokun!* 35(August 2003), pp.60-61.

¹⁸ Masamori Sase, "Ichiyazukede Hannousuruna (Do not React Hastily)," *Shokun!* 35 (August 2003), p.87.

¹⁹ Tetsuo Maeda, "Kakuhoyuuronshaniha Hontouno Kakugoga Arunoka (Do Promoters Have Real Resolution?), *Shokun!* 35(August 2003), p.77.

²⁰ Kamiya, "Nuclear Japan," p.69.

²¹ Kamiya, "Nuclear Japan," p.69.

²² Toshiyuki Shikata, "Kakuyokusi Igaino Anzenhoshou Seisakuwo (Take Security Policy except Nuclear Deterrent)," *Shokun!* 35 (August 2003), p.101.

²³ Ogawa, "Sainensiteiru Nihonno," p.2.

²⁴ For example, Katsuhisa Furukawa who recently examined the issue enumerates four conditions for Japan to make a decision to develop nuclear weapons: a perceived lack of credibility regarding U.S. extended deterrence; the virtual collapse of

international regimes for arms control and nonproliferation; a significant increase in perceived threat from neighboring countries; and most importantly, the U.S. Government's approval for Japan to go nuclear. (Furukawa, "Nuclear Option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence: In search of a New Framework for Japan's Nuclear Policy," in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, eds, *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p.97.)

²⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 27, 2003.

²⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 28, 2003.

²⁷ *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 11, 2003.

²⁸ Nakanishi and Fukuda, "Nihon Kakubusou Sengen," pp.74-85; Yoshiko Sakurai, Tadae Takubo, and Nagao Hyodo, "Naraba Nihonmo Kakuno Sentaku (Then Japan should Take the Nuclear Option)," *Shokun!* 35 (January 2003), pp.26-40.

²⁹ Kurt M. Campbell, "Nuclear Proliferation beyond Rogues," *Washington Quarterly*, 26 (Winter 2002-03), p.10.

³⁰ Miller and Scheinman analyze that the non-universality of the NPT, and the U.S. view of the nuclear reality in Israel, India, and Pakistan as a situation to be "managed" rather than reversed, weakens the global nonproliferation norm and thus undermines the regime, and demand that they should be involved in the regime as much as possible. (Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, "Israel, India, and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime," *Arms Control Today* 33 (December 2003), pp.15-20; Sokolsky states that the United States and its allies have excused Israel's, India's, and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons as being "understandable," but they would have to actively contest the notion that all states have a natural right to acquire nuclear weapons. (Henry Sokolski, "Taking Proliferation Seriously," *Policy Review* 121 (October-December 2003), p.57.)

³¹ Joseph Cirincione, "The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain," *Foreign Policy* 118 (Spring 2000), p.126.

³² Selig S. Harrison, "Japan and Nuclear Weapons," Harrison, ed., *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996.), p.7.

³³ Mitsuru Kurosawa, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and Nuclear Disarmament: Implementation of the 2000 Final Document," *Osaka University Law Review* 51 (February 2004), pp.1-19.

³⁴ Bracken argues that today, acceptance of no-first-use could offer significant benefits, since conventional forces have a strategic capability, and the United States would be giving up very little compared to its gains. (Paul Bracken, "Thinking (Again) About Arms Control," *Orbis* 48 (Winter 2004), pp.156-157. Feiveson and Hogendoorn argue for an unambiguous U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances, and strong no-first-use commitment by all the nuclear-weapon states following a U.S. lead. (Harold Feiveson and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Nonproliferation Review* 10 (Summer 2003), pp.1-9.)

³⁵ According to the latest public opinion survey on security conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2002, majority highly evaluate diplomatic efforts rather than military one. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ah_chosa/]

³⁶ Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, "New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan And Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy," *Arms Control Today* 30 (July/August 2000), p.23.