

## **Proposal for Peaceful Resolution of Nuclear Crisis**

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### **1. Crisis on the Korean peninsula**

It's so regrettable and shameful that we, Koreans, are facing with another war crisis in stead of the peace process today. Even though the dismantlement of Cold War system at the global level has passed more than 10 years, the cold war system has been continued in the level of Northeast Asia as well as the Korean peninsula.

The president of the United States, George W. Bush said in his first Union Address in 29, January, 2002, "the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." In particular, he named North Korea, Iraq and Iran "an Axis of Evil" pointing out that these countries have been developing weapons of mass destruction.

Since then, the Korean peninsular has faced a complicated situation; South Korea joins the international coalition against terrorism led by U.S. while North Korea was included in an "axis of evil" by U. S. government that is one of potential target of "'war on terrorism". This extremely paradoxical situation on the peninsular would give two Koreas, but one nation, catastrophic results if the Bush administration expanded "war on terrorism", or "preemptive strike" to North Korea.

U.S, hawkish policies against North Korea have intensified the radical tension on the Korean Peninsular. In the early 1994, Korean people were ever shocked at a hidden fact that the U.S. government planed to attack North Korea. Even the current situation is on the brink of the probability of war that may occur on the Peninsula without the Koreans' agreement. The U.S. government still adheres to one of its options, which is a military action against the North Korean nuclear program.

If the war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, South Korean or North Korean or Japanese or U.S troops, anyone, cannot but be free from threaten their lives. According to the war simulation of USFK in 1994, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Korean war might result in the casualties of 50,000-100,000 U.S solders, 500,000 South Korean solders, and millions of South Korean civilians during three months. This figure excluded the North Korean who would be killed the most at war. Besides, the war on the Korean Peninsula is highly possible to go to the nuclear war by the U.S nuclear weapon or North Korea's missile attack on the nuclear facilities in South Korea and Japan. The reason that we should prevent 2<sup>nd</sup> Korean war is clear considering these results.

To the greatest relief, the likelihood of talk among countries involved, two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan, temporarily relieves a concern about the Korea crisis escalating to war. However, it is too early to feel safe about this situation. As the precedence of the crisis in 1993-94 reminds us, starting talks doesn't always translate to a peaceful resolution of crisis. Moreover, we can't be too optimistic about the outcomes from six party talks since both North Korea and the U.S. have taken different lessons from the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework and would most likely demand stronger concession from each other than in 1994.

Therefore, the outcome of forthcoming talks depends on how flexible the U.S. and, North Korea are at the negotiation table and how well South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia play the role of mediator.

## **2. Real Differences between North Korea and Iraq to the Bush Admin**

Above all, it is very important that the Bush administration would awake from the dream of "regime change" in North Korea. In other words, the Bush administration should refocus on the matter of the primary concern of the international community, which is nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, instead of the unfavorable and impossible temptation of regime change.

Contrary to the official announcement of the U.S. government, the difference between Iraq and North Korea for the Bush administration is that while Iraq has been 'a target of occupation', there hasn't been a specific goal toward North Korea. The Bush administration has targeted on Iraq because it has wanted to reorganize the order of the Middle East more favorable to itself and Israel and tighten the control of energy supply by dominating the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest oil-producing country. Therefore, the Bush administration intends to make its hegemony secure in the Middle East. Mr. Bush may also have intention to leave military industries, oil oligarchies, and construction

companies as his powerful sponsors for the 2004 Presidential Election by guaranteeing them to make huge profits.

On the other hand, in case of North Korea, the U.S. doesn't have any 'clear' strategy on North Korea. Hence, the Bush administration's goal toward North Korea has been divided. The Bush administration can't accept willingly the nonproliferation policy of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) that has been the fundamental policy toward North Korea since the dismantlement of cold war. However, if the U.S. ensures Kim Jongil's regime survival in exchange for the North Korea's abandoning its weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. will have to face self-contradiction of guaranteeing the security of one member of the "Axis of Evil" while having been adamant about destroying another member, Iraq. In other words, the Bush administration has gone back and forth between two contradicting principles of nonproliferation and regime change.

The dilemma of the Bush administration is that either military strike, as in Iraq, or blockade and sanctions to induce the collapse of North Korea is not a realistic option. Looking through the course of the Bush administration's actions, it is more likely to use the current crisis to accomplish its military objectives such as establishing missile defense(MD), making mini-nuke, and strengthening the alliance with South Korea and Japan rather than to solve this nuclear crisis by diplomatic means through a positive and serious negotiation.

From now on, the Bush administration should get out of its confused policy by making diplomatic efforts to focus on nonproliferation. In other words, the U.S. must guarantee that North Korea can assure its regime security by recognizing its sovereignty, signing a non-aggression agreement, lifting economic sanctions and normalizing the relation with North Korea. If the Bush administration shows willingness to negotiate seriously with North Korea on the issues of WMD nonproliferation, North Korea will be willing to accept negotiation with the U.S. as the North has already indicated its hope for a simultaneous and package deal in several occasions.

At this point, we have to ask a very fundamental question concerning the Bush's North Korean policy. "Does Mr. Bush really want to remove threats of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea?" Or, "Is it possible for Mr. Bush to continue his new military strategy including the ambitious MD plan without so-called the threat from North Korea?" It may sound like a conspiracy, but we must seek the right answer to this question in order to understand real intention of the Bush's policy on North Korea.

There has been a fundamental tension between the peaceful settlement of weapons of mass

destruction in North Korea and the new military strategies of the Bush administration. As well known, the Bush administration is connected with the military-industrial complex. The Bush administration has a variety of military projects ranging from MD to new nuclear weapon development. From these projects, the Bush administration would guarantee the profit of the defense industries which are the biggest sponsor of the Bush administration, and pave the road to military dominance on the globe and space. Needless to say, these military projects need astronomical budget. In order the Bush to persuade American taxpayers to burden huge military budget, there should be a constant outside threat, something like North Korean threat

In fact, the Bush administration stopped the missile talk with North Korea and announced the deployment of MD, as soon as it launched, even though Collin Powell, the Secretary of State said that there are “some promising factors” in dealing with North Korea. The Bush administration feared that it would lose the biggest rational for MD, if the North Korean missile issue was resolved peacefully.

This case is not merely past. Since the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S in October 2002, the Bush administration has reluctant to negotiate with North Korea. Why? I will explain the reasons by the example of the Bush’s policy toward Japan.

The goal of the Bush administration’s policy toward Japan is to make Japan as “the U.K in Asia”. It means that the Bush administration intends to use Japan like the U.K. in order to strengthen its hegemony in Northeast Asia. By making Japan into the tool of military hegemony, the Bush administration, “if necessary”, will attack North Korea with Japanese help as the U.K played a role in invading Iraq, prevent China from becoming the rival of the U.S, and vitalize Japanese military role in the US led wars as the Iraq invasion shows.

In order to realize this goal, the Bush administration needs a “threat.” If Japanese didn’t feel threatened by North Korea, it would be difficult to pass contingency law, increase military power, and decide to deploy missile defense as soon as possible by purchasing 2 billions dollar-weapons made in the U.S. This is one of the biggest reasons that the Bush administration has preserved and exaggerated “North Korean threat” while refusing to negotiate with North Korea.

### **3. Anticipated Outreaches Triggered by Nuclear Armed North Korea**

Many foreign media and experts have said that South Koreans would not care about North Korea nuclear armament. But it’s not true. Most of South Koreans recognize that the crisis reaches peak

when the nuclear armament of North Korea comes to the reality.

The result of the North's nuclear armament will be catatonic when it fails to agree with the United States. Nuclear weapons of the North cause South Koreans 'fear on nuclear war', since the danger of war on the Korean peninsula has not yet resolved. The U.S, South Korea, and maybe Japan will aim North Korea nuclear arsenal as the first strike target, and practice to block the sea, air, and land around North Korea. The Korean peninsula will be on the brink of war as a military tension increase.

The problem does not stop here. The effect of the North's nuclear weapons on the whole world as well as the Northeast Asia is incredible. The North's possession of nuclear weapons will bring about Japanese nuclear armament of which it already has the capability. South Korea is also to be inclined to develop nuclear programs when Japan produces nuclear bombs together with North Korea. Likewise, it will affect China to increase nuclear power, although it has been slow to do it so far. Furthermore, Twain, India, Pakistan, and Middle Eastern countries are likely to start or expand their nuclear programs, which pose a great danger to the world security and nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Also, North Korean success in nuclear programs will increase its exports of nuclear technology for the economic profits. The expected dangers tell us that nuclear possession of North Korea will accelerate nuclear arms race in East Asia and result in collapse of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty).

The most significant problem to Koreans lies in the fact that the unification becomes impossible when North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. Neighboring countries around the Korean peninsula have complicated interests in the united Korea. However, their common interests stand in 'Nuclear-free Korea'. Given the fact that Korea cannot be united when it faces strong opposition from the neighboring countries, denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is essential for the unification.

In this context, most of Koreans oppose nuclear armed North Korea as well as the U.S strike against North Korea. But there is important point. Nuclear armed North Korea, however difficult, can be reversed, while rebuilding from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Korean war is impossible. This is the biggest dilemma to Koreans and the reason that we should strive hard to resolve the standoff between North Korea and the U.S peacefully by the negotiation.

#### **4. How to break the ice through 6-party talks**

There are three options to take to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis and achieve peace on the peninsula. The ongoing six-party talks, North Korea-US negotiation like the one in 1994 and negotiation between the two Koreas like the one that achieved the 2000 Summit. However, starting a new round of US-DPRK negotiation seems unlikable during the Bush administration and inter-Korean talks has its own limit to cover all aspects of the North Korean nuclear issue and security guarantee for North Korea.

Of course, considering North Korea and the U.S. are the main players to resolve the North Korean issues, we should not completely rule out North Korea-US conversations. And we also should not close door for inter-Korean dialogues despite institutional and political difficulties in case of six-way talks' failure. But, we have to understand that the six-party talks will be the possible best option on the table since the official and substantial framework addressing the standoff between North Korea and the U.S is based on the six-way talks.

It needs to set goals and follow proper procedure to take the six-party talks as an opportunity to establish peace on the Korea and lay the ground for common security in Northeast Asia. The goals can be resolving the crisis on the peninsula through both addressing the North Korean nuclear issue and guaranteeing North Korea its security simultaneously normalizing North Korea-US and North Korea-Japan relations for finishing the cross recognition in Northeast Asia coming up with a framework for a peace system that can replace the current armistice system which has been lasted since 1953 working for common security in the Northeast Asia through creating the nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia and establishing multilateral security cooperation.

To achieve these goals, first, six parties need to reaffirm that the issues should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation and prevent the situation from getting worse. Second, they need to document and announce achievements they make in every talk. Third, they need to pursue a new agreement that can replace the 1994 Agreed Framework as an ultimate step.

(1) How to make North Korea give up nuclear ambition and the U.S. to promise North Korea's security at the same time

There will be no alternative to dealing with the situation except for North Korea's giving up nuclear program and US guaranteeing security of the North Korean regime simultaneously. And this is the solution supported by four countries participating in the 6-party talks as well as many experts.

Also this is why a series of remarks before and after the first round of six-way talks in late August

2003 from US Secretary of State Collin Powell on this issue drew attention. He said that the U.S. is seeking ways to ensure the security of North Korea. The Bush administration, which had been sticking to its unilateral and rigid stance by saying, “there will be no concession unless North Korea abandons its nuclear program completely, verifiably, and irreversibly” hinted that it could discuss with North Korea about guaranteeing security before North Korea completes the whole dismantlement process. In this respect, Secretary Powell said that although it is impossible to give what exactly North Korea wants, the administration is considering an official, written and multilateral security assurance to the regime. The US offer is confirmed by President Bush at the APEC Summit in October, 2003.

It is clearly a positive sign. But we should not be too optimistic about the future, since the U.S. demands North Korea take the first step. Moreover, it is not clear whether the hawks, including vice president Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, are with the upcoming security proposal. Although the Bush administration indicated that it would provide a written multilateral security assurance, it also clarified that the assurance would be provided only after North Korea agreed not to resume its nuclear program and started dismantling its nuclear facilities. It can be interpreted that even though the U.S. shifted its position from “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” as the timing of giving a multilateral security assurance, it still wants to see the beginning of the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program first. Considering that North Korea wants a substantial security guarantee and energy aid in return of freezing its nuclear program, there is a visible gap between the two stances.

To bridge the gap, North Korea’s nuclear disarmament process and security assurance and energy aid plan in return should be developed. Given changes from the U.S. and North Korea, there must be an intersection and in that case, this approach makes a sense. North Korea already made it clear at the end of the first round of six-nation talks that it would dismantle nuclear facilities when the light-water reactor is completed. On December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2003, North Korea said that if the U.S. takes the North’s comprehensive and simultaneous proposal, it will respond with complete abolishment of nuclear program. In other words, North Korea may accept the whole dismantlement of nuclear program. As mentioned above, the U.S. also suggested that it would guarantee the security of the regime before North Korea completely dismantlement its nuclear program. Further discussion will be needed for details, method and procedure, but what the U.S. demands, which is CVID, and what North Korea demands, which is security assurance before nuclear dismantlement, can be achieved at the same time.

In that case, based on the complete dismantlement and security assurance beforehand, what will be the new peace process like? The new process must take three steps: firstly, crisis management to prevent the situation from getting worse and leverage the conversation; secondly, resolution of the crisis and establishment of peace system through joint declaration; thirdly, implementation of the declaration and institutionalization of peace system by signing a new comprehensive agreement that will replace the Agreed Framework.

## (2) First step: crisis management and making the breakthrough

The first step was mostly covered by a statement released by China, the host of the six-party talks, right after the first round of talks. And the statement says about,

- the need to seek peaceful resolution for the North Korean nuclear issue, peace and security on the Korean peninsular
- the need to discuss a wide variety of matters of concerns including nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsular and security of North Korea
- the need to reach a fair and rational resolution that addresses all the concerns of the participants
- the need to avoid any remark or action that may worsen the situation during the negotiation
- the need to continue conversation to build trust and address differences
- the need to recognize the importance of the six-party talks and schedule the next meeting as soon as possible through diplomatic channels

Right after the first six-way conversation, North Korea called the talks useless and made a series of strong statements. North Korea even declared that it would build nuclear deterrent capability. However, the U.S. did not pay much to the statements. In the meantime, there were news about a plan to strengthen the US military forces in Korea including incorporating the patriot advanced capability (PAC-3) missile and a comment from US Defense Secretary about plan to use nuclear weapon against North Korea. Surprisingly, North Korea did not use them to reject six-party talks. These show that no matter how bumpy the road is, the six-party talks will continue as long as there is a road. Why? Failure of the talks will be a great burden both for North Korea and the U.S. In addition to that, other players in the talks such as South Korea and China actively work as a mediator and manager to revive the talks.

Despite all the bright signs, we cannot say the six-party talks is the best tool for crisis management. There are criticism about the usefulness of the six-party talks from hardliners in both North Korea and the U.S. Moreover, the talks do not take place on a regular basis. To make the six-party talks to



become the best crisis management tool, all the parties should acknowledge the usefulness of the talks and meet on a regular basis. Besides, to make the talks a substantial stage for negotiation, the format of it should be reformed to allow bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S.

(3) Second step: resolving crisis and laying groundwork for peace system

The first round of six-party talks failed to come up with a joint announcement. However, future talks must see joint statements about goals, achievements, plans and implementing agreed terms. Because, a joint announcement can not only leverage the next talks, but also prevent the situation from getting worse by putting some sort of political pressure on the six countries. Moreover, a joint statement will make the talks more formal and official.

The six needs stated in the announcement that China released at the first talks cover most of what the joint announcement should mention. Thus, the first priority will be making it a 'joint' announcement agreed by all the participants. But at the same time, the content should be reviewed in a more concrete way. Most of all, the joint statement should be able to set a goal to 'put things back in their place where they were' on the Korean peninsula.

The controversial part in the phrase is 'where'. Many experts think the point should be October 2002 when North Korea and the U.S. clashed over secret nuclear weapons development. However, this claim lacks of fairness and objectivity. Although North Korea sees 'where' as October 2000 when North Korea and the U.S. were about shaking hands, the view does not seem realistic. Now president George W. Bush took the office and he made it clear that he would not take same approaches to North Korea as his predecessor did. This is why we need to take another look at 'where'.

Looking back, there began the signs of crisis when the Bush administration downplayed the achievement made by the Clinton administration. President Bush's "axis of evil" remark and the nuclear posture review (NPR) and national security strategy (NSS) document based on 'pre-emptive' war concept heightened the tension. And finally, the crisis reached its peak in October 2002. In this respect, at the time of "axis of evil" should be the 'where'.

It does not mean that president Bush should take back his words or the NPR and NSS should be reviewed. Those are necessary but not realistic. Moreover, they can't be covered in the joint announcement. Then what should the announcement be about?

First, the announcement must be able to present the goals of the six-party talks in general terms. These can be simultaneous or balanced resolution of both North Korean nuclear issue and security assurance for North Korea completion of cross approval system in Northeast Asia through normalizing ties between North Korea-the U.S., and North Korea-Japan layout for building peace system in the Korean peninsular and recognition of importance of Korean unification peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.

Second, the two main players, North Korea and the U.S., should not provoke each other and speak out their mind clearly to restore trust. In this regard, North Korea should show its willingness to give up its nuclear ambition as well as to address the missile issue. On the other hand, the U.S. should assure North Korea that it has no intention to either invade the country or topple the regime. Also the U.S. should respect the North Korea's sovereignty. In other words, the two should make it clear that their goals can meet through cooperation.

Third, detailed measures to restore trust between North Korea and the U.S. should be reached. North Korea should halt its nuclear program as a first step to dismantle the whole program and allow IAEA inspectors in the country as well as rejoin the NPT. North Korea once defined 'halt' as 'no more nuclear weapons or tests, no more transfer and no more nuclear facility even for peaceful use.' Give the definition, North Korea seems ready to freeze its nuclear program. In return, the U.S. should reward North Korea by lifting sanction, removing its name from the terror support nation list and providing energy aid.

However, the measures may spark controversy. 'No more nuclear weapon' defined by North Korea can be interpreted that North Korea already acquired nuclear weapons and would keep the existing ones. While North Korea mentioned several times about building "nuclear deterrent" capability, it never used the word 'nuclear weapon'. To clear the doubt, North Korea could include 'nuclear deterrent' in the phase of nuclear program dismantlement.

Another big issue is who will take the role of inspector. North Korea has withdrawn from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus, for IAEA to play the role, North Korea will be asked to not only rejoin the treaty but also sign an additional protocol that gives more power to IAEA inspectors. To make it worse, both North Korea and the U.S. do not trust the IAEA with different reasons. North Korea sees IAEA as a US spy while the U.S. is not satisfied with IAEA's inspection system. However, considering there is no alternative, utilizing the IAEA by strengthening its system will be the next-best thing.

Energy aid is not easy, too. The Bush administration made it clear that there would be no reward in exchange of North Korea's freezing nuclear facilities. Therefore, the five participants to the talks except for North Korea should come up with a good method to provide energy aid to the North.

Fourth, the issue concerning highly enriched uranium, or HEU, program should be addressed. Especially, given the stance of US hawks who put the highest priority on the HEU program, the issue can be a big huddle to the ongoing six-party talks. To resolve the issue, North Korea should report its HEU program-related facts to the IAEA while the U.S. should present 'evidence' regarding North Korean HEU program to the IAEA. If necessary, recorded file at the special envoy talks in October 2002 in Pyongyang. For this, the HEU problem should be dealt in "Working Group" that may be composed of the experts.

Fifth, a working group discussed at the first six-party talks should be formed. Although the group with experts from all six countries will not be permanent, it will be effective as long as the talks take place. The main job of the group must be conducting researches on expected issues, analyzing situations and suggesting alternatives. Main agenda should include how to resolve the difference between DPRK-US position about HEU how to guarantee security of North Korea how to inspect North Korean nuclear program how to address energy shortage in North Korea and seek multilateral energy cooperation how to establish peace on the Korean peninsular how to realize nuclear weapon-free Northeast Asia. The organization should be able to provide the outcome of researches and discussions at any time for the six countries to use them as basic material.

Finally, 'the importance of inter-Korean relationship' should be mentioned. Through this, two Koreas will be able to get international support and assurance in maintaining and developing the relations. Moreover, it can work as a foundation to seek a variety of alternatives by expanding political autonomy of two Koreas.

It will be ideal if the next talks come up with a conclusion for all the subjects mentioned above. But step-by-step agreement and statement will be welcomed as well. And ultimately, the six parties should put their utmost efforts to reach a new and comprehensive agreement that will replace the 1994 Geneva framework.

##### **5. A Draft for a New Agreed Framework that would replace the 1994 Agreed Framework**

The following is my proposal for a new agreed framework that could replace the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994. I hope it would offer important insights when you read in comparison to the

Agreed Framework(bellow attached). I welcome all your thoughts and criticisms on this proposal.

Delegations of the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States (U.S.), China, Russia, and Japan held talks to negotiate resolutions on many pending issues including the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and efforts to ensure coexistence in Northeast Asia. The participating nations agreed to uphold the principles of the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed on the necessity to amend some of the articles agreed in Agreed Framework. Moreover, the participating nations affirmed the importance of formulating concrete and comprehensive measures to materialize the DPRK-U.S. joint communiqué and to improve peace and security on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia.

I. Participant nations will amend some provisions of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK that undertook the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) The construction of one of the two LWRs, which were to be completed under the U.S. leadership in 2003, will continue while the other LWR will be replaced with alternative energy supply.

-- The Korean Peninsula energy Development Organization (KEDO) will continue its role as the principle organization of the LWR project and will be in charge of the completion of the first LWR and supply of heavy fuel oil. KEDO will make best efforts to complete the LWR, and the U.S. will provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until its completion. The DPRK will use the received heavy fuel oil for heating and electricity production.

-- The U.S. and the DPRK will assure the progress of the LWR project and conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-- Participant nations will provide measures for supplying non-nuclear energy to the DPRK to resolve its electricity shortage in exchange for the second LWR and will find comprehensive solutions such as improvement of worn-out power lines to ameliorate electricity shortage. For this purpose, the participant nations will organize an international consortium with the participation of all the signatories and the sponsorship of important international financial institutions, including the World Bank.

2) With concrete provisions to complete the first LWR and supply alternative energy to the DPRK, the DPRK will freeze its nuclear facilities and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these facilities.

-- The DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, and the IAEA will be allowed to monitor this freeze. The DPRK will provide full cooperation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for this purpose.

-- The necessity of verifying and inspecting Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program will be decided after examining all documents provided by the U.S. and the DPRK. The nations signing this agreement and IAEA will decide whether to inspect and verify HEU program.

-Spent fuel rods or reprocessed plutonium will be stored safely until they are moved out of the DPRK under the IAEA monitoring, and these will be transferred to overseas as soon as the U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreement is signed. The cost of this removal will be born by the U.S.

-The dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be implemented when the U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreement is signed and key components for the LWR are delivered. Consequently, the dismantlement will come earlier since the completion of the LWR project as stipulated in the 1994 Agreed Framework is no longer required for the dismantlement to begin. In regard to the financing of this provision, participant nations will share the cost fairly.

II. Participant nations will make sincere efforts to promote reconciliation between the ROK and the DPRK, to end hostile relations between the U.S. and the DPRK, and to achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

- 1) The U.S. provides formal assurance against the use or threat of force, including nuclear weapons, on the DPRK. Participant nations will guarantee the assurance internationally.
- 2) The DPRK will discontinue permanently its missiles export, and the U.S. will make arrangements to compensate the DPRK's economic loss due to the discontinuation of missile exports. The principle of the compensation will be the supply of goods, such as food, fuel oil, and so on, instead of monetary payment.
- 3) The DPRK will abandon its development, production, and deployment of ballistic missiles with the range of 300 miles (480km) or longer. The U.S. lifts the DPRK from economic sanctions. The U.S. will also be responsible for providing substitute means for the DPRK to launch its satellites in compensation for abandoning its long-range missile development.

- 4) The DPRK, the ROK and the U.S. will begin negotiation on the arms reduction on the Korean peninsula and reorganization of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK), and participant nations will offer cooperation with this process. The DPRK will be faithful to its obligation as a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and will join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in accordance with the U.S.-DPRK-ROK disarmaments talks.
- 5) The DPRK, the ROK and the U.S. begin full-scale negotiation for elevating the armistice agreement to the peace agreement to terminate the cold war system in Northeast Asia. Participant nations will cooperate with this process.
- 6) The U.S. and the DPRK will open a liaison office in each other's capital and upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.
- 7) The DPRK and Japan will move toward full normalization of their relations as soon as possible.

III. Participant nations will make efforts to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and to promote peace in Northeast Asia.

- 1) The DPRK will return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the treaty. And DPRK will sign IAEA Additional Protocol.
- 2) Upon confirmation of the arrangement to supply electric power and compensate for one of the two LWRs, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.
- 3) The ROK, the DPRK and Japan will sign a nuclear-free zone treaty based on Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and non-nuclear three principles of Japan. In accordance with this, the U.S., China, and Russia will officially guarantee it. To implement this arrangement and to turn Northeast Asia eventually into a nuclear-free zone, Organization for NWFZ in NEA' will be launched .
- 4) Participant nations will recognize that building the Eurasian trans-continental railway by linking the trans-Siberia railway to the inter-Korean railway would contribute to building trust and increasing prosperity in Northeast Asia. Participant nations will support the establishment of the EARO (Eurasian Railway Organization).

**Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 21, 1994**

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 17, 1994, to

negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.

-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.