US Alliance and Japanese Nuclear Disarmament Policy: Leverage or Constraints?

Naoki Kamimura
Professor, Hiroshima City University

Prepared for Workshop on
"Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament"
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March 11-12, 2004

1. Introduction

Japan occupies a unique position in global nuclear disarmament politics in terms of its historical legacy, alliance relationship, and geopolitical conditions. Since the Allied occupation ended in 1952, the country found itself in a conundrum between a nuclear alliance and nuclear disarmament and the Japanese government repeatedly faced intense pressure from both its nuclear ally and domestic antinuclear actors. On the one hand, Japan is one of the closest allies of the US, the foremost nuclear power of the world. The US constantly pressured Japan into line with the solid Western position in the Cold War struggle, especially regarding nuclear strategy. Japan, on the other hand, has had a strong national antinuclear sentiment and a vocal antinuclear movement, largely due to its legacy of suffering atomic bombings. The Japanese movement advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons and put a strong pressure on the government to pursue a vigorous non-nuclear and nuclear disarmament policy often against the will of the US. Japan's particularly harsh geopolitical environment also complicated this alliance-disarmament dilemma, even after the Cold War's end at the global level. The successive conservative governments of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came to view a close US alliance as the bedrock of the country's foreign and security policy and demonstrated a remarkable ability to resist or defuse the pressure of the domestic antinuclear movement. They gradually established a characteristic Japanese approach to nuclear disarmament, "a practical and progressive approach so as to achieve its objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons," which basically survived the Cold War's end.[1]

This paper focuses on this "dilemma" between Japanese nuclear disarmament policy and the alliance with a foremost nuclear power. The paper analyzes the ongoing role of Japanese reliance on US nuclear deterrence and how that reliance affected Japanese non-nuclear and nuclear disarmament policy-making. The paper also examines some of the

[1] Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's Disarmament Policy* (Tokyo: The Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2003), 24.

Japanese government's efforts to overcome the constraints imposed by the US alliance relationship and influence US nuclear disarmament policy within an alliance framework, especially after the Cold War's end when Japan became a more active player of global nuclear disarmament politics. The paper gives a tentative evaluation of how effective Japanese government policy has been in this regard. By seeking to evaluate Japan's capacity to influence US actions on global disarmament issues by virtue of the alliance relationship, the paper is essentially interested in exploring the conditions in which an ally's policy can influence US nuclear disarmament policy to its favor. In this regard, the paper has a short comparative section in which experiences of some of the other US allies are briefly introduced in view of comparing and contrasting Japanese experience with those of others. In the concluding section, the paper will briefly address the question of whether and how post-9/11 circumstances (including the heating up of the North Korea nuclear crisis) has increased or decreased Japanese capacities to influence US nuclear policies in the region or globally.

2. US Alliance and Japanese Nuclear Disarmament: The Cold War Period

During the Cold War, the Japanese government was a reluctant promoter of nuclear disarmament in spite of its repeated public emphasis on its importance. The Japanese government also had a very limited conception of its capacity to influence US actions on global disarmament issues, or US foreign and security policy in general for that matter. The tenets of Japan's nuclear policy had been established by the late 1960s during the heated national debate on the Okinawa reversion. The core of this official policy was the so-called "Four Nuclear Principles," which was introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1969. The "Four Principles" consisted of nuclear disarmament, reliance on US nuclear deterrence, a peaceful use of atomic energy, and the famous "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," which had been proclaimed by the administration in the previous year.[2] From the beginning, the four principles were not a consistent set of policy guidelines but a bunching together of basic but disparate positions on civilian and military nuclear policy, which tended to conflict with each other, particularly between the nuclear deterrence pillar, on the one hand, and the nuclear disarmament and non-nuclear pillars, on the other. Yet the essence of Japan's nuclear policy has remained remarkably unchanged since then even after the end of the Cold War, so has its contradictory nature.[3]

Among the four, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles became symbolic of Japan's non-nuclear stance but were mired in a national controversy over its implementation. In the first place, the Sato administration introduced the Four Nuclear Principles with an apparent

[2] Akiyoshi Sakuragawa, "Nihon no Gunshuku Gaiko: Hikaku San Gensoku to Kaku Yokusiryoku no Hazama [Japan's Disarmament Diplomacy: Between the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence]," *Kokusai Seiji [International Politics]* 80 (Oct. 1985), p.65; Kazumi Mizumoto, "Nihon no Hikaku-seisaku to sono Kadai [Japanese Non-nuclear Policy and Its Tasks]," in Hiroshi Yamada and Gen Kikkawa, eds., *Naze Kaku wa Nakunaranaino ka: Kaku-heiki to Kokusai Kankei [Why Do We Still Have Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Weapons and International Relations]* (Kyoto: Horitu-bunka-sha, 2000), p.232. The Three-Non Nuclear Principles consists of no possession, no production, and no introduction of nuclear weapons.

[3] Mizumoto, p.232.

political intent to baffle the opposition which sought to codify the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The administration was concerned that its strict codification would jeopardize US strategic interests and, therefore, the US-Japan alliance. The government party, the LDP, was more explicit in giving priority to the US alliance over the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and made repeated efforts to qualify its application by emphasizing the nuclear deterrence pillar.[4] Even though the Sato administration later had to accept a 1971 Diet resolution, during the final phase of Okinawa reversion debate, that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles was not just a policy guideline but a "national principle," the subsequent administrations did not try to enforce it rigorously. They were intent on preserving the integrity of US nuclear deterrence despite various credible reports that the "no-introduction" portion was greatly compromised.[5] Underlying this controversy over the Three Non-Nuclear Principles was the issue of Japanese reliance on US nuclear deterrent.

The LDP government generally sought to avoid addressing this fundamental issue of the alliance directly during the Cold War period, but it became a critical question during the NPT debate in the mid 1970s. There were always strong advocates of a "nuclear free-hand" among the more conservative members of the LDP and the more liberal Takeo Miki administration was hard pressed to present a compelling argument to win over the unconvinced yet indispensable members of the government party. Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa took up the task and compiled an important policy paper in 1975.[6] The paper criticized a nuclear option as an "unwise policy" for Japan because the country did not need to posses tactical as well as strategic nuclear weapons as long as US nuclear deterrence was intact. Indeed, according to the paper, in order to reinforce this security guarantee extended by the US, Japan did need to take an initiative in strengthening mutual trust in the alliance by ratifying the NPT and dispelling US concerns about Japan's independent nuclear ambitions. In an uncharacteristic fashion, the Japanese government presented a highly explicit and systematic argument about the significance of the US alliance with nuclear deterrence at its core even though the paper itself did not succeed in persuading the dubious LDP members.[7]

During the NPT debate, Foreign Minister Miyazawa presented another systematic and potentially significant argument regarding nuclear disarmament, one of the earliest statements of that nature and a rare instance during the Cold War period. In a 1976 parliamentary debate, Miyazawa, citing the merits of an NPT ratification, emphasized that, in return for

[4] In a 1968 policy document, the LDP expressed a qualified support to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles "as long as Japan's security is assured [by U.S. nuclear deterrence]." Sakuragawa, p.66. During the early 1980s when the Nuclear-Free Zone movement was spreading rapidly among Japanese municipalities, the LDP issued in 1982 a stringent warning to prefectural LDP chapters against municipal NFZ declarations, stating that they might entail security risks because some of the NFZ declarations included wordings against the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." For details, see Naoki Kamimura, "Civil Society and Nuclear Disarmament: A Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Experiences during the 1980s and 1990s," in Ryo Oshiba, Edward Rhodes, and Chieko Kitagawa Otsuru, eds., *"We the People" in the Global Age: Re-examination of Nationalism and Citizenship* (JCAS Symposium Series no.18, 2002), p.289.

[5] Sakuragawa, p.66; Mizumoto, pp.234-6.

[6] Foreign Ministry, *Kokusai Josei no Chokiteki Tenbo to NPT Hijun Mondai [Long-term Prospects of International Relations and the Ratification of the NPT]* (1975), quoted in Sakuragawa, p.67.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp.67-8.

losing a nuclear option, Japan would be on a morally higher ground to lead world disarmament diplomacy in both conventional and nuclear arms, could dispel the suspicions of Japan's nuclear acquisition among the Asian neighbors, and would facilitate nuclear disarmament negotiations between the superpowers by self-containing nuclear proliferation. Miyazawa further stated that as the only country suffering the devastation of nuclear bombing, Japan was "in a position and even had an obligation" to lead an effort along with other non-nuclear countries to "establish a forum to urge the US and the USSR toward nuclear disarmament by overcoming [differences in] ideologies and political systems."[8] The subsequent Japanese disarmament diplomacy did not live up to these high hopes, however. As the international security environment rapidly deteriorated after the late 1970s, Japan embarked on extensive efforts to consolidate the US-Japan security alliance and became more closely aligned with the Western position in the East-West struggle. During the 1980s, Japan not only took almost no disarmament initiative but it even opposed or abstained from a series of nuclear arms control and disarmament initiatives presented to the United Nations by Non-Aligned or Eastern countries, such as no-use or no-deployment of nuclear weapons, for the reasons of preserving US nuclear deterrence and therefore the central balance.[9]

In the 1980s, there was a rare instance in which Japanese policy arguably affected US global nuclear policy, not necessarily toward nuclear disarmament, however. During the 1983 Williamsburg summit meeting of advanced industrialized countries, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone secured from his US and other Western colleagues a consent to the Japanese position that the on-going INF negotiation should be resolved from a global perspective and must address not only Europe's but also Asia's intermediate nuclear force lest the Soviet Union would redeploy excessive SS20s from the European theater to the Far East. One of the reasons why the US and other Western powers acceded to a Japanese intervention in a seemingly European or NATO nuclear matter was the Japanese willingness to make a strong political commitment to the Western alliance and align itself firmly in a solid Western position in a global security matter, which was rather unprecedented for the economic giant. Nakasone had actively sought to strengthen US-Japan security relations as well as raising the Japanese profile in international politics and this incident was a culmination of such efforts. Such efforts were severely criticized domestically as a serious infringement on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as well as a dangerous entanglement in US. nuclear strategy.[10] A possible moral that might be drawn from this episode regarding the US alliance and nuclear disarmament could be that, somewhat paradoxically, a greater leverage toward US security policy, and possibly toward US policy on nuclear disarmament, could be obtained only at the expense of a greater commitment to the US nuclear alliance.

Another significance of this episode might be that the Japanese government began to treat arms control and disarmament as an integral part of its security policy. According to

[8] *Ibid.*, pp.69-70.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp.70-2.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp.73-4.

Akiyoshi Sakuragawa, an imminent nuclear threat posed by the possible redeployment of Soviet SS20s prompted such a change and forced the Japanese government to deal with the issue of security and disarmament in concrete rather than abstract terms.[11] In fact, the long-standing government emphasis on the importance of non-nuclear principles and nuclear disarmament had been to a large extent a response to the domestic political reality of nuclear-sensitive popular sentiments as well as to an emotionally charged legacy of atomic bombing. It was not necessarily based on rigorous calculations of the country's national interest and geopolitical reality (with a possible exception of the above-mentioned Miyazawa statement which was a good attempt at integrating idealist and realist elements in Japanese security and disarmament policy). As a result, the successive LPD governments had almost exclusively relied on the US alliance for the country's security and completely subscribed to US nuclear deterrence while paying a lip service to nuclear disarmament and non-nuclear principles without seriously trying to reconcile the contradictions inherent in the Four Nuclear Principles. A logic, however, emerged in the 1980s which connect security policy and arms control and disarmament. According to a statement by a senior Foreign Ministry official in 1984, Japan, in order to maintain its security, had not only to consolidate its defense capabilities and contribute to the maintenance of nuclear deterrence through an effective management of the US alliance but it also had to take the initiative in the promotion of arms control and disarmament in order to create a peaceful and stable international environment.[12] Yet the still rigid bipolar structure of world politics and the Ronald Reagan administration's utmost emphasis on Western unity in the East-West relations precluded any new Japanese initiative in the nuclear field during the 1980s.

3. US Alliance and Japanese Nuclear Disarmament: The Post-Cold War Period

With the Cold War winding down swiftly from the late 1980s, the world experienced an unprecedented movement toward nuclear disarmament, first between the two superpowers and, then, in the multilateral arena toward the mid 1990s. The Japanese government, responding to this rapid dismantling of the Cold War straightjacket, became a more active promoter of nuclear disarmament and arms control within a loosened framework of alliance politics. In this post-Cold War international environment, Japan was pressed to articulate its basic disarmament stance and philosophy, which reveals an evolution of the security-disarmament theme from the mid 1980s. A recent Foreign Ministry document puts it in the following way:

> "Regarding the role of disarmament and non-proliferation for Japan from the security perspective, it is necessary to return to Japan's basic security policy that consists of the following three pillars: the maintenance of the Japan-US Security

[11] *Ibid.*, p.74.
[12] Quoted in *Ibid.,* p.63.

> Treaty, the maintenance of an appropriate defense capability, and the diplomatic efforts to ensure the stability of the international environment surrounding Japan. Because the purpose of disarmament and non-proliferation is to enhance peace and security, they can be considered to be a part of 'diplomatic efforts' in Japan's security policy. In formulating Japan's disarmament and non-proliferation policy, the extent of its contribution to Japan's peace and security should be regarded as an important yardstick".[13]

Japan's new activism was most notable in multinational arenas, especially in negotiations for a CTBT and the NPT review and extension process. The Japanese government also helped organize in 1998, with Hiroshima City, a Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament which sought to build on the achievement of the 1996 report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.[14] The most symbolic and prominent, however, of Japan's nuclear disarmament and arms control activism was a yearly nuclear disarmament resolution presented to the UN General Assembly (UNGA).

The Japanese government first introduced its nuclear disarmament resolution in 1994 in which it called for an "ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons."[15] Even though the resolution had been adopted consistently by the overwhelming majority every year until 1999, the word "ultimate" became a matter of controversy. While peace and disarmament NGOs along with Non-Aligned nations criticized it as a means for putting off a complete nuclear disarmament indefinitely, the Japanese government countered that the resolution was the only realistic way to secure consent from nuclear powers and advance a meaningful disarmament process.[16] Obviously the Japanese government took utmost care to accommodate the concerns of the US, its ally and the foremost nuclear power. The essence of the Japanese stance on nuclear disarmament was an emphasis on "a realistic and progressive approach," as indicated at the beginning of this paper. The 2003 policy paper explains its rationale as follows:

> "Japan's basic stance on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is a realistic and progressive approach and is as follows: because Japan has renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons, the total elimination of nuclear weapons is

---

[13] Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, *Japan's Disarmament Policy*, 22.

[14] Tokyo Forum was a joint endeavor by JIIA, a research arm of the Foreign Ministry, and Hiroshima Peace Institute, a research instrument of Hiroshima City University.

[15] The resolution was entitled as "Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons."

[16] Kazumi Mizumoto, "Nihon no Hikaku-Kakugunshuku Seisaku [Japan's Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policy]," in Hiroshima Peace Institute, eds., *Niju-isseiki no Kakugunnshuku: Hiroshima kara no Hasshin [Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-First Century: A Message from Hiroshima]*, (Kyoto: : Horitu-bunka-sha, 2002), pp.374-5. Yukiya Amano, Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, admitted retrospectively in 2003 that the resolution was "hardly popular" despite "our intentions not to put off elimination indefinitely."
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/kawaguchi/t_meeting/tm_031122c.html#01.

> a prerequisite for the absolute security for Japan. Japan relies on the United State's nuclear deterrent ('the New National Defense Program Outline') so long as nuclear weapons exist. At the same time, Japan has steadily been making efforts through practical disarmament measures to realize a peaceful world free of nuclear weapons, so as to fulfill the responsibility it has assumed as the only country that has suffered a nuclear devastation."[17]

Unconvinced of its capacity, as a non-nuclear power, to compel nuclear powers, especially the US, to move swiftly toward negotiations for an early realization of nuclear abolition, Japanese nuclear disarmament efforts during the 1990s was focused on creating an international environment conducive to reductions by nuclear powers of their arsenals, especially in the area of nonproliferation. The Tokyo Forum was exactly such an effort which was aimed at stemming a tide for further deteriorations of international security environment in the wake of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998. The NPT review process provided for Japan another such occasion, but, somewhat ironically, the 2000 NPT Review Conference revealed a limitation of such an approach.

For the 2000 Conference, Japan "actively made efforts to coordinate preparations" from an early stage and presented at the Conference "the practical 'Eight-item Proposals'" to "advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation" and to provide "the foundation for consensus building."[18] Yet at the final moment of critical negotiations and decisions, Japan was left on the sidelines along with Australia, Canada, and other disarmament-minded allies of the US, such as the NATO-5, while the P-5 nuclear powers were directly negotiating with the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) in closed doors and reaching a final compromise on an "unequivocal undertaking" to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons.[19] The Japanese government rationalized this unexpected and shocking turn of events in the following way: "This undertaking was considered to move Japan's resolution 'Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons' forward, and it is possible to say that Japan's resolution laid the foundation for this progress."[20] But the shock was unmistakable in the Foreign Ministry regarding the US. embrace of the NAC approach which deleted the magic word "ultimate" that had constituted the gist of Japan's "practical" approach. According the Japanese chief negotiator, Disarmament Ambassador Seiichiro Noboru, "despite the fact that the Japan-proposed 'Ultimate Elimination' resolution had been adopted at the UNGA for the past six years, the US consented to treaty texts contradictory to

---

[17] Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, *Japan's Disarmament Policy*, pp.23-4.

[18] *Ibid.*, p.40.

[19] The NAC consisted of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovania, South Africa and Sweden. NATO-5 consists of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands, which "appeared as the European Union's pro-disarmament faction." Mitsuru Kurosawa, "A Step in the Right Direction: An Analysis of the 6th NPT Review Conference," *Hiroshima Research News* 3-1 (July 2000), p.1.

[20] Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, *Japan's Disarmament Policy*, p. 27.

our resolution under the pressure of the NAC, which rendered US into feeling that 'ladders were taken away after we climbed to the second floor' and left US not completely satisfied."[21]

Presumably going through an immediate soul searching, the Japanese Foreign Ministry refashioned its "ultimate elimination" approach and in the 2000 UNGA introduced a newly formulated resolution entitled: "A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons." According to the Foreign Ministry, the resolution:

> "indicated a concrete path based on a progressive and practical approach towards the realization of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with the goal of 'a world free of nuclear weapons.' This resolution contained progressive measures in addition to those in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including further reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to their total elimination, while ensuring an appropriate balance between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation."[22]

Yukio Amano, the current Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, candidly suggested that Japan had no choice but remove the wording "ultimate," a self-imposed restriction, once the "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons" was unexpectedly accepted by the US and the other nuclear powers.[23] The resolution was overwhelmingly adopted at the UNGA with only India opposing it and the US during the final months of the Bill Clinton administration along with the UK supporting it among the nuclear powers (France, Russia, and China abstaining). The coming of the G.W. Bush administration and the 9.11 terrorist attack, however, drastically changed the international security situation and the calculation of the Japanese government regarding the US. alliance and nuclear disarmament. In fact, the inauguration of Junichiro Koizumi's new administration in Japan in April 2001, which has proved to be among the most enthusiastic administrations to promote US-Japan security collaboration, also brought a new dynamic into the alliance-disarmament equation.

4. 9.11 and the Changed Dynamic of Alliance Politics

The coming of the Bush administration in January 2001 greatly complicated the calculation of nuclear disarmament politics by the Japanese government. Japan had just "moved forward" with a new "Total Elimination" UN resolution to accommodate the changed political dynamic after the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Bush administration, however, came to power with unmistakable hostilities toward multilateral security arrangements, including those of nuclear arms control and disarmament, especially the CTBT.

---

[21] Seiichiro Noboru, "2000 Nen NPT Unyo Kento Kaigi wo Furikawru [Looking Back on the 2000 NPT Review Conference]," *Gaiko Forum* No.145 (Sept.2000), pp.38.

[22] Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, *Japan's Disarmament Policy*, pp. 27-8.

[23] http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/kawaguchi/t_meeting/tm_031122c.html#01.

In place of these arrangements, the administration above all relied on the country's unrivaled military strengths to assure the its security. Japanese nuclear disarmament diplomacy immediately run into a trouble with this aspect of the new US. administration's arms control policy. According to the Foreign Ministry, the coordination for the adoption of Japan's "Total Elimination" resolution at the 2001 UNGA was "pursued under severe circumstances, as the US, based on a drastically changed approach from that of the previous US-Russian nuclear arms control regime, emphasized unilateral reduction of its nuclear weapons, and took a passive or negative stance against several multilateral treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation, including the CTBT."[24]

The Foreign Ministry again took utmost care to take US concerns into consideration, according to Kazumi Mizumoto, and decided to drop from the draft resolution the passage on the CTBT which set 2003 as the target year for entry into force of the treaty. This decision was based on the following reasoning among Ministry officials: "in the current Bush administration, the President, the GOP, and the Congress are all opposed to the CTBT. So, the entry into force in 2003 would be impossible. It would deprive the resolution of its credibility if we insisted on something impractical." The Ministry was prepared for a US abstention, but the new US. administration's adamancy was beyond their imagination.[25] The US was among the only two nations voted no to the Japanese resolution along with India. Yet the Japanese side is always good at finding a bright side in a bad situation and commented on the situation as follows: "Despite all these efforts, the US voted against it, stating the resolution referred to an early entry into force of the CTBT. That being said, the US reconfirmed that its stance on nuclear disarmament would remain unchanged when it gave an explanation of its vote."[26]

What had more serious implications for the US-Japan security alliance and ultimately for Japan's nuclear disarmament policy was the Bush administration's alliance policy in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. From the beginning, the Bush administration focused on strengthening the alliance relationship, but it effectively redefined the meaning of alliance in the overall security strategy to suit its strong unilateralist bent. Now formal alliance frameworks do not have as much weight as they used to during the Cold War. The 9/11 terrorist attacks further bolstered an emphasis on military strength and unilateral action. Even though some of the core Cold War alliances, such as the NATO and US-Japan alliance, were redefined to adapt to the Post-Cold War international security environment during the 1990s, in the aftermath of the 9/11 formal allies are not of much significance unless they are actively involved in "common defense" efforts.[27] Moreover, the US now virtually equates

[24] Foreign Ministry, *Wagakuni no Gunshuku Gaiko [Our Country's Disarmament Diplomacy]* (Tokyo: The Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p.29 (The original edition in Japanese language of *Japan's Disarmament Policy*, 2003).

[25] Mizumoto, "Nihon no Hikaku-Kakugunshuku Seisaku," p.382.

[26] *Wagakuni no Gunshuku Gaiko*, p.29.

[27] See, for instance, annual reports to Congress on "Allied Contribution to Common Defense."

"allies" with "friends" in its war on terrorism and appears to prefer a more flexible "coalition" framework in military actions rather than a rigid alliance framework. According to the 2002 Defense Report:

> "America's alliances and security relations give assurance to US allies and friends and pause to US foes. These relationships create a community of nations committed to common purposes. The defense strategy calls for efforts to strengthen America's alliances and partnerships and to develop new forms of security cooperation…And these arrangements are based on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is willing and able to contribute to effective security partnerships and arrangements abroad. The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships mandates a new approach to security cooperation. Security cooperation must be more agile and adaptable, helping not only to enable a sustained, multilateral campaign against international terrorism, but also to posture the US, allies, and friends to respond effectively to surprises when they occur."[28]

Indeed, preexisting alliance frameworks are useful for the US as long as they work as a platform for necessary actions, but they are of little use unless allies collaborate with the US as a "willing" partner for "common purposes." The NATO and its principal allied members, France and Germany on the one hand and the UK on the other, clearly demonstrated this in their contrasting responses to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Bush administration's response was quite instructive. When the NATO was united behind the US in its war on terrorism in Afghanistan, the Bush administration took advantage of an alliance framework, but when France and Germany, along with Russia, "sabotaged" both UN and NATO actions in Iraq, the administration simply assembled a "coalition of the willing" to fight the Iraq War, with the UK functioning as a principal and substantial partner and playing a critical role. Even traditional and loyal allies could be "dumped" unless they demonstrate their use in the "common purposes." Furthermore, the US is dividing the world into "friends and foes" in its larger war on terrorism. This situation has unsettling implications for almost any country in the world, but especially for America's allies. Unless they have other reliable political and security frameworks to depend on, as France and Germany do with the EU, a fairly large number of diverse countries, both allies and "friends," rushed to join the US-led coalition in Iraq, such as Poland and New Zealand.

Japan was also confronted with a "choice" in this respect and the Koizumi administration made a critical decision to stand closely by the US in all phases of the US war on terrorism including the Iraq War. In a parliamentary debate, Koizumi explained the

[28] U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress 2002* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), pp.20-1.

decision as follows:

> "Japan does not intend to have nuclear weapons like France. Nor does Japan have a mutual security treaty like the NATO. The only alliance relationship is with the US. So, [Japan needs to promote both] the US-Japan alliance and international cooperation. How can we refrain from assisting in Iraqi reconstruction? We cannot just leave others to do a dangerous job…The UN is asking Japan and all the member states to assist in Iraqi reconstruction. On an occasion like this, I think the international society expects US to provide financial, material, and personnel assistance, including the JSDF."[29] (translation by the author)

It appears that this sense of certain "solitude" or helplessness and a consequent realization of dependence on US "friendship" and security guarantees may partly explain the Koizumi administration's surprisingly wholehearted embrace of the US war on terrorism and the series of bold initiatives to help US war efforts from Afghanistan to Iraq. If one adds the North Korean situation to this equation, motives behind the current Japanese security policy may become even clearer. Prime Minister Koizumi and other top officials of the administration often refer to the significance of US nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis North Korea, which is presumably intended to impress that country with US-Japan solidarity to gain an upper hand in bilateral negotiations on the abduction and other difficult issues as well as to deter it from "reckless" actions.[30] Indeed, the frequent Japanese reference to US nuclear deterrence was only in general terms during the Cold War, but, rather ironically, its significance to Japanese security appears to be keenly felt by Japanese leaders in the post-Cold War East Asian situation mostly by the impact of North Korean nuclear ambitions.

5. Other Allied Experiences

Before addressing the question of alliance leverage on nuclear disarmament, a brief comparison will be made between instances of other US allies and the Japanese cases discussed in the preceding sections regarding the issue of alliance and nuclear disarmament. First comes the case of the UK. Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Hitoshi Tanaka, a top career diplomat, recently gave a fairly systematic explanation of the issue of alliance leverage by using the UK example:

> "The question is how to influence US policy. Should Japan try to compel the US to change its policy by helping build a multipolar world and create a balance of

[29] Diet Minutes, 158th, Special Committee on Prevention of Terrorism and Iraqi Humanitarian Assistance, House of Representatives, Dec.. 15, 2003.

[30] In the December 16, 2002 Joint Statement of U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, U.S. and Japanese foreign and defense ministers warned the North Koreans as follows: "The Ministers stressed that North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, would have the gravest consequences." http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html.

> power? Or should it try to influence policy internally as a partner like the UK? The answer would be obvious, but Japan does not possess a structure to fight alongside the US like the UK and it cannot share the ultimate decision making…Unlike during the Cold War when Western solidarity was the absolute standard of conduct, there now apparently exist more choices for diplomacy. From this time on, we may encounter various situations in which each country's position is subtly different. Japan should seek to influence US policy within a partnership while at the same time it should pursue, with sufficient resolve, an active and multilayered diplomacy based on its national interest. Of course, both Japan and the US should stick to basic manners as allies, that is, a close consultation."[31] (translation by the author)

Here Tanaka presents a thesis of influence from inside the alliance as well as the need for "multilayered diplomacy." Apparently, the UK is a nuclear power, has shared the most sensitive security information with the US, and, indeed, has a numerous record of fighting alongside the US. Even regarding US nuclear policy, the UK, the original Manhattan Project partner, presumably influenced US arms control and disarmament policy often in critical ways, in such instances as the Test Ban negotiations from the late 1950s and the INF negotiations during the 1980s, often with other NATO allies. In the current situation surrounding Iraq, the Bush administration must have listened to the UK very carefully regarding when and how to start an Iraqi war. Concerns for Tony Blair's expected difficulties in domestic politics, along with Secretary of State Colin Powell's insistence on multilateral approaches, must have played a role in bringing about the UN Security Council resolution 1441 and the subsequent last minutes efforts to secure a more concrete resolution.

If the UK represents an "ultimate" case in the scale of alliance leverage on US security and nuclear policy, the experiences of Australia and New Zealand, two non-nuclear powers and eager promoters of nuclear disarmament (the former being an active US ally and the latter a "former" ally), appear to present certain "medium-level" cases which could offer comparable experiences for Japan. The 2000 NPT Review Conference provides a particularly interesting contrast for the two countries' leverage on the US.[32] New Zealand, its strict non-nuclear policies rejected by the US and virtually expelled from the US alliance during the ANZUS crisis in the mid 1980s, now works outside an alliance framework and closely aligns itself with the other NAC countries in global arms control and disarmament politics. Australia, on the other hand, always intent on balancing US alliance and disarmament needs, currently focuses more on the US alliance framework rather than a

[31] Hitoshi Tanaka, "Gaiko no Konnichi-teki Kadai: Kokusai Kyocho to Domei no Ryoritsu wo Mezashi Nodo-teki Gaiko wo [The Current Task for Diplomacy: Active Diplomacy Now for Making International Cooperation and the Alliance Compatible]," *Gaiko Forum* (Feb. 2004), p.52.

[32] This discussion is based on Naoki Kamimura, "Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of New Zealand and Australia" in Hiroshima Peace Institute, *Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-First Century* (2002), pp. 307-26.

multilateral one after a period of independent-minded intense activism in nuclear disarmament and arms control diplomacy which culminated in the 1996 Canberra Commission Report. As discussed in Section 3 of this paper, it was quite ironic that Australia, just like Japan, sought to influence US policy using alliance leverages among other things yet found itself on the sidelines at the critical moment of decisions. New Zealand, on the other hand, working outside the alliance framework, succeeded in securing unexpectedly large concessions from the US and the other P-5 nuclear powers. Of course, there were too many variables for a simple generalization here, but at least it may be safe to say that an alliance leverage is hard to implement in the case of US nuclear policy. Diplomats might say that things work so smoothly and subtly inside a close alliance that one might not see the working of leverage from outside, but the bitter Japanese experience with the brunt US actions during the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the series of "Total Elimination" resolutions since 2001 might prove otherwise.

6. Conclusion

In the following, preliminary thoughts will be given as a conclusion on the question of alliance leverage on US nuclear disarmament policy as well as the implications of the significant recent developments in Japanese security policy and US-Japan security relations for Japanese nuclear disarmament policy.

Regarding the initial question of whether and how an alliance relationship gives a leverage for a non-nuclear ally, a highly limited examination in this paper may suggest a tentative answer that a nuclear alliance tends to involve more constraints than leverage for a non-nuclear ally in its attempt to influence the nuclear ally's nuclear disarmament policy. Japan may have a significant leverage over US policy regarding regional security matters in general. Moreover, the unprecedented Japanese willingness to involve itself in the US war on terrorism appears to have increased the weight of Japanese opinion and the strong and sincere expression of solidarity with the US and the substantial assistance rendered must have impressed US policy makers in a way that might increase the Japanese profile in the US calculation of global as well as regional security issues. What exact impact this increased Japanese profile has for US-Japan security relations in general and Japanese and US nuclear disarmament policy in particular is difficult to delineate precisely, but it could be argued that an issue linkage between nuclear disarmament and general security issues may be tenuous at best and particularly difficult with the highly unilateralist Bush administration and that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Besides, the Koizumi administration's vigorous cooperation in the US war on terrorism seems to be offset by the North Korean nuclear situation. Obviously, when the international and regional security situation deteriorates, long-standing Japanese reliance on US nuclear deterrence comes into a sharper focus and Japan's capacity, if any, to influence US actions on global disarmament issues by virtue of the alliance relationship may diminish accordingly or at least felt in that way by Japanese leaders.

After all, bilateral alliance leverage has not worked for Japan in influencing US

nuclear disarmament and arms control policy. The Japanese government should take a hard look at whether its "practical and progressive approach" has been really working with the US. Of course, the US-Japan security alliance entails much more than just nuclear issues and Japan should at some point decide how much priority it gives to nuclear disarmament vis-à-vis the US alliance. The government just cannot decide this and a serious national debate is in order. If Japan really believes in what it says about its mission to promote nuclear disarmament as the "only country suffering nuclear devastation," it should act accordingly even at the expense of some of the cordial feelings now prevalent in bilateral security relations. Close allies can differ in important issues. Interests of nuclear and non-nuclear allies seem to coincide to a great extent on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation but not on that of nuclear disarmament. The US opposition to the Japanese UNGA resolutions since 2001 would be a good reminder of this. Japan could start a bolder disarmament initiative within the US alliance framework even if it contravenes some of the critical elements of US strategic interests. The current ambiguous policy stance regarding alliance and nuclear disarmament blurs Japan's national image and identity in the global arena, whether it aspires to be some kind of a "global civilian power" or is just content with being a "pawn" of an imperial power.[33]

If Japan is serious about advancing nuclear disarmament, probably the only meaningful and effective way would be to focus on broadening and enriching Japan's "multilayered diplomacy," as Tanaka has pointed out, in both global and regional arenas since bilateral, alliance-based approaches have not worked. And Japan has to create ingenious ways to move beyond the traditional "practical approach." Japan's multilateral efforts so far have focused on gaining the widest possible support for its disarmament resolution in the UN as well as satisfying US concerns, but such an approach made the Japanese resolutions rather muted in nature. On the global level, Japan could work more closely with both disarmament-minded US allies such as Australia and Canada and non-allied disarmament promoters such as the NAC. The example of Canada, another disarmament-minded close ally of the US, might be particularly relevant here. In the past two years, Canada voted for the NAC resolution on nuclear disarmament in the UNGA, the only US ally to do so, despite the fact that the US opposed the even more muted Japanese resolutions. In fact, it has been a focus of Canada's recent disarmament efforts to work as a "bridge" between the NATO and the NAC. Japanese civil society actors, for their part, have been clamoring for a Japanese support of the NAC resolutions. Japan could very well, as Canada's former disarmament ambassador and senator Douglas Roche suggests, start a serious effort to reconcile the differences with the NAC to merge their two rival resolutions.[34]

---

[33] The phrase "global civilian power" is from the following works: Yoichi Funabashi, *Nihon no Taigai Koso (Japan's International Vision)* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993), pp.163-206; Aspen Strategy Group, *Harness the Rising Sun: An American Strategy for Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power* (Lanham, MD: Univ Press of America, 1993), p.15.. According to the Aspen Group, a global civilian power "pursues its global interests by acting through international institutions, while it allays Asian fears by forgoing a military buildup," *ibid.*, p.15.

[34] Interview with Douglas Roche, March 25, 2004, in Ottawa, Canada. As is well known, Canada has mounted a serious efforts to change NATO's nuclear policy, including its traditional first-use policy, but has been frustrated so far. For the current Canadian policy and its alternative policy proposal, see the following two

On the regional level, Japan should continue to broaden and deepen its engagement in regional security affairs in the broader East Asian region. While Japan needs to deepen the on-going security dialogue with ASEAN countries, for Northeast Asia, Japan could focus its efforts toward a regional nuclear disarmament framework such as a North East Asian Nuclear-Free Zone, as this project on Northeast Asia nuclear disarmament has emphasized. Japan's non-nuclear and nuclear disarmament aspirations could not be addressed through unilateral actions but only through balancing bilateral US-Japan security needs and the region's multilateral needs. An important point is to create a regional multilateral framework in which Japan can engage regional powers in a serious security dialogue including nuclear issues and to help create a condition favorable to nuclear disarmament by the US and other regional powers. In this respect, the North Korean nuclear issue could work as a good starter to engage all the regional powers, including the US, in a serious nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament dialogue. The recently created six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue might serve as an embryonic form of such a framework for this larger purpose.

In the final analysis, a more vigorous and effective civil society activism in Japan might be a key in this respect, for such a societal pressure is the only legitimate way to make the Japanese government bold and creative enough to sometimes offend and provoke the US in nuclear arms control and disarmament issues.

documents respectively: Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1999); The Canadian Pugwash Group and The Middle Powers Initiative, *Building Bridges: The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies: A Policy Paper for the Government of Canada* (Ottawa, March 2004).