Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Hiroshima Peace Institute

Gen Kikkawa

Hiroshima is the first city ever to be struck by an atomic bomb. For more than 70 years since the end of World War II, the city has continued to demonstrate the realities of its horrible atomic bombing experience to the rest of the world, under the motto “No More Hiroshima,” thereby making a certain contribution to deterring nuclear war. In the meantime, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) was established in April 1998 to serve as an international center for peace studies. This year, the HPI marks the 20th anniversary of its founding. Its basic concept comprises three pillars: 1) communicating Hiroshima’s historical experience to people around the world, while establishing an intellectual framework toward nuclear abolition; 2) working to achieve a “proactive peace” and to resolve global challenges; and 3) establishing peace studies to be disseminated from Hiroshima, in the quest for a new peace paradigm.

Since the establishment of the HPI, the world has followed a path that is far from Hiroshima’s wishes for the realization of nuclear weapons abolition, global peace, and proactive peace. In retrospect, during the 20 years from 1998 when the HPI was inaugurated, the transient euphoria that came with the end of the Cold War dissipated. The two decades began seeing the international community return to power politics, with optimism about globalization running low. In Asia, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and initiated nuclear weapon development. The Afghan War and Iraq War were waged to overthrow their respective regimes. After the collapse of the dictatorships in both Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the peace-building process has had little success in achieving the expected results. As for the Middle East, the failure of the Arab Spring and the lingering civil war in Syria resulted in a substantial increase in the number of refugees, which eventually exceeded 65 million, setting a new record after World War II. Also in Europe, wars for territorial expansion reoccurred, as exemplified by the Georgia War and the Ukrainian crisis. Meanwhile, serious global environmental problems, including threats of natural disasters caused by climate change and the endless expansion of deserts, have become increasingly critical, giving rise to a pressing need to resolve these issues. Notably, East Asia has not shown much progress in institutionalizing peace and international security. The region has now grown into one of the world’s largest weapons markets, against the background of a nuclear war crisis arising from North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, and arms races driven by China’s expanding role as a military superpower. Moreover, the peace maintained by an East Asian balance of power built on military alliances may be endangered, due to territorial and historical issues.

What are the reasons why nuclear weapons cannot be abolished? Why do efforts for institutionalizing peace in Asia make little progress? To resolve these questions, now we should return to the founding spirit of the Hiroshima Peace Institute and establish peace studies from Hiroshima. Through a curious coincidence, this year, which celebrates the 20th anniversary of the HPI, Hiroshima City University obtained permission to set up a Graduate School of Peace Studies. The HPI is expected to achieve further development, not only to contribute to human security by scientifically analyzing the mechanisms of arms races as well as the structures of national regimes (governance) that oppress people, but also to provide the world with specific guidance toward nuclear abolition.

(Director at HPI)
Background and Overview of the Symposium

On March 17 and 18, 2018, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) held the international symposium entitled “Nuclear Weapons, Governance and Peace in Asia,” co-hosted by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University. This symposium is the first organized by the HPI in about a year and a half since the previous symposium “Security Challenges and Agendas in East Asia: Searching for ‘A World without Nuclear Weapons’” in July 2017.

The previous symposium took place when the uplifting atmosphere produced by the visit to Hiroshima by then U.S. President Barack Obama continued to obtain. Already at that time, we had witnessed North Korea conducting nuclear tests and launching missiles one after another. This situation raised awareness of the issues regarding the ideal and reality of the abolition of nuclear weapons, motivating us to organize the symposium to exchange views, inviting experts from inside and outside of Japan.

This year’s symposium was also held at a time in which similar problems remained to be resolved, but with signs of a major change. In early March 2018, the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea reached an agreement to hold an inter-Korean summit with its South Korean counterpart (the inter-Korean summit at Panmunjom was held on April 27). Furthermore, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expressed its intention to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and refrain from nuclear and missile testing. The DPRK also proposed to hold a summit meeting with United States President Donald Trump, and the United States agreed to it. Although a number of twists and turns are foreseen before the realization of a U.S.-North Korea summit, at present it is expected to be held as scheduled on June 12 in Singapore.

Under these circumstances, this year’s symposium served as a venue for us to enjoy unexpectedly timely discussions in Hiroshima, together with distinguished researchers hailing from South Korea and China. As shown in the program of the symposium, we had the opportunity to discuss various issues regarding nuclear development and disarmament, governance in relevant countries, and the roles played by both international organizations and the regional organizations that sustain regional security.

Articles concerning the above-mentioned discussions will be contributed to a handbook titled “Peace and Nuclear Weapons in Asia 2019” (provisional title), which is due to be published this fiscal year. The handbook is intended to make fixed point observations of the prospects for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Asia, human security and security community initiatives. Therefore, the organizers had asked discussants to prepare research reports that would serve as a basis for compiling the said publication. For the details of papers submitted to the symposium, please refer to those to be included in the forthcoming handbook.

I would like to introduce the outline of research papers presented in any of the three sessions on the following themes: “Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Trends and Issues,” “Human Security and Governance” and “Peace and the Role of International Organizations in Asia.” Due to limitations of space, however, I will present only three reports pertaining to the Korean Peninsula situation, which is becoming a matter of immediate concern.

The North Korean Crisis: Its Characteristics and Future Challenges

In Session I, Professor Kim Sung Chull presented an essential argument about the shift in North Korea’s policy, which has just occurred this spring. Professor Kim examined the context in which the DPRK had begun to cling to nuclear armament. He pointed out that North Korea’s nuclear obsession is closely related to the pre-emptive strike doctrine that emerged in the wake of the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and that the military strategies adopted by the United States after entering this century constitutes the true nature of the threat to North Korea. To conclude his presentation, Professor Kim underscored five points, whose outlines are as follows. First, denuclearization and the establishment of a peace system under the North Korean regime should be considered inseparable and be promoted in a step-by-step manner. Second, the key to success in achieving these goals is to proceed with negotiations by setting a time limit. Third, South Korea should not simply be a mediator between the United States and North Korea, but should act as a facilitator of bilateral communication by reading both countries’ hidden intentions and communicating these intentions to each country. Fourth, verification of denuclearization and the establishment of a peace system should be secured through an agreement via a third party, and needs to be guaranteed by interested countries, including Japan, and by international organizations. Fifth, although North Korea hopes to conduct negotiations by giving priority to easing sanctions on itself, the U.S.-DPRK negotiations must be centered on achieving the two goals of denuclearization and the establishment of a peace system.

China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for Asia-Pacific Security

In his report (in Session I), Professor Lee Seong Hyon discussed the nuclear strategy of China, one of the superpowers that holds
the key to improving the situation in the Korean Peninsula.

He gave an overview of China’s nuclear weapons development history, and analyzed its characteristics. Specifically, China is considered to possess an estimated 270 nuclear warheads—a much smaller number than other nuclear states. This reflects a unique strategy that Mao Zedong employed at the dawn of the nuclear age. Mao is said to have dismissed the atomic bomb as “a paper tiger” and tried to limit China’s nuclear weapons production/maintenance programs to a small scale. This notion has had a lasting influence on China’s strategy till today. However, the fact that China is the only nuclear state that has declared its policy to be no first use of nuclear weapons. That declaration has had a greater effect on the country’s policy of possessing nuclear weapons.

Even so, just like other nuclear powers, China has the intention to develop nuclear missile technologies, including a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and stealth functions. In this sense, it can be said that China is promoting the modernization of nuclear weapons, as is the case with other nuclear states.

In addition to this trend in nuclear development, Dr. Lee pointed out the significance of China’s perception of the world. Specifically, he indicated that the People’s Republic of China has a “revisionist” image of the international order—in the hope of becoming number one in the world by revising the status quo world order led by the United States. The current Xi Jinping administration strongly seeks to grow as a military power and modernize its military forces, as exemplified by its slogan of “China’s dream of building a strong army.” Some of President Xi Jinping’s remarks have proved that nuclear weapons are considered to play a central and revolutionary role in his regime’s military policy. Against the backdrop of prolonging the life of the Xi Jinping government, Dr. Lee argued the need for further research into the characteristics and nature of the policy adopted by a government leader who is influential in formulating the nation’s nuclear strategy.

Finally, Dr. Lee stressed that it was true that China wants the denuclearization of North Korea, but has no intention to pursue it by imposing international or economic sanctions that would bring about the collapse of the North Korean regime. He concluded that China would not abandon North Korea, nor impose economic sanctions that would destroy the Kim Jong-un administration for the purpose of dissuading DPRK from pursuing nuclear weapons. This conclusion is right on the mark, given the fact that it was made before the first visit of Kim Jong-un to China.

**Human Rights Problem and Governance in North Korea**

Professor Son Hyun Jin delivered his research report in Session II. He summarized North Korea’s political structure and domestic political situation from the perspective of human rights, including the issue of defectors from North Korea. He analyzed the background of North Korea, with its distinctive hereditary system and dictatorial government, in terms of the following three aspects: 1) complete control of the citizens; 2) complete interruption of external information; and 3) a mutual surveillance system. His report also analyzed the characteristics of North Korea’s political system based on the provisions of its constitution, and pointed out the importance of the collectivist principle (citing Article 63 of the Constitution of North Korea), along with the Juche ideology and the military-first policy. The principle of collectivism is thought to produce the political structure, which neglects the human rights of individuals, deprives the people of their humanity, and sacrifices the people for a single dictator.

As challenges to be addressed in the future, Professor Son cited the internal issues of North Korea as well as international issues. Specifically, regarding the former, he pointed out the need for structural and policy shifts by the DPRK. As for the latter, Dr. Son referred to the UN Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK and UN Special Rapporteurs on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK, as examples of the international community’s efforts to improve the human rights situation in North Korea. Among other issues he pointed out was how to respond to an outflow of refugees should an emergency arise in the future.
Introduction
It is well known that after World War II, Germany has squarely faced its history of the Nazi period in which it had initiated the Holocaust and large-scale wars of aggression and has continued various efforts to compensate the victims of Nazi persecution, prosecute Nazi crimes, pursue history education and research, develop memorial facilities, and regulate Neo-Nazism. Below I will discuss how these activities, called “coming to terms with the Nazi past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung),” were implemented in the period during which Germany was divided into East and West, and how these activities have been reorganized in accordance with the changes inside and outside Germany after its reunification. Then, I will conclude this paper by considering the future direction these activities will be expected to follow.

Development of Activities for “Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past” in the Period of German Division
Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), adopted a political policy aimed at formulating anti-Nazi norms after World War II while at the same time reintegrating into society the former Nazi who had been punished through war-crimes trials and denazification carried out when Germany was under occupation. Subsequently, from the end of the 1950s to the 1970s, there was an activated groundswell toward proactively confronting the Nazi past, against the backdrop of a mounting protest movement calling for social liberalization and the establishment of the left-wing government of Willy Brandt. In the 1980s, the conservative Helmut Kohl government returned to a politics of memory, which sought to regain a positive national history. Meanwhile, this period also saw the further development of activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past,” because the Greens and the Social Democratic Party advocated the relief of forgotten victims of the Nazi regime—such as Sinti and Roma people, homosexuals, and those who were victimized by the forced sterilization policy. On the other hand, in East Germany, which established a socialist regime, a more thorough denazification of the judicial and administrative organs was implemented, and a greater number of people were convicted in the Nazi criminal trials than in West Germany. However, such practices led to the establishment of the authority of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and was used as propaganda to justify the political system of East Germany as an anti-fascist nation.

New Challenges after Reunification, and Reorganization of Activities for Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past
The reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 and the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the environment surrounding the activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past,” and raised new challenges. First, it became urgently necessary for the reunified Germany to resolve problems that had remained unaddressed—in particular, compensating the victims of forced labor, the majority of whom were from the former Soviet Union or countries in Eastern Europe. Second, Germany has faced the need for integrating the activities to come to terms with its Nazi past, which were separately undertaken under the respective West and East German regimes. Third, there have been mounting calls for recognition of the war damage suffered by Germans, especially the “expulsion” of German residents from the East European region around the end of war, as well as the damage caused by air raids carried out by the Allied Powers. Fourth, as generational change and social multiculturalism proceed, the nation has begun pursuing what the appropriate history education and exhibition ought to be, for young people who have not experienced the rule of the Nazi regime and for citizens who have diverse cultural and historical backgrounds. Fifth, in addition to activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past,” Germany has begun reappraising the dictatorship in the former East Germany (dual approaches for “coming to terms with the past”). Furthermore, each European country has started to shed light on its own involvement in the Holocaust and wartime cooperation with Nazi Germany, and the international community has seen an increasing number of comparative studies carried out regarding various forms of dictatorships and massacres. These facts reflect progress in the Europeanization of Holocaust remembrance and in the globalization of initiatives to address the negative aspects of a nation’s history.

While coping with these new situations and challenges, unified Germany has taken many measures, including the establishment of Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future (2000), an organization that aims to compensate the forced labor victims; the erection of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (also called the Holocaust Memorial) (2005) in the German capital city of Berlin; the opening of the Memorium Nuremberg Trials (2010); and republication of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf (My Struggle), with academic annotations (2016). As the number of people who lived during the Nazi period decreases, among the activities to come to terms with the past, “commemorative culture”—which is a domain related to the formation of historical recognition regarding the Nazi regime and the remembrance of events that had occurred at that time—is assuming greater importance.

Results of Activities for “Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past” and their Future Direction
As stated above, Germany’s activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past” have developed through many twists and turns. These activities can also be understood as a sustainable “learning process.” In accordance with the progress made in these activities, Germany has begun investigating the involvement in Nazi crimes and the responsibilities for that involvement, not only of the suppression organizations—such as the Nazi leadership, SS, and Gestapo—but also of the national defense forces, judicial and administrative organs, universities, researchers, and even “ordinary people.”

Such a critical approach to the German history of the Nazi period has led to reconciliations and improved relations with neighboring countries, and to the creation of a political culture that is sensitive to discrimination and human rights violations, thereby supporting the democratic system of the Federal Republic (former West Germany/the reunified Germany). While some have suggested that Germany should break completely with its Nazi past, the activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past” have taken root. This is because the view that these activities are important and useful for Germany has become widespread. In the international community, “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” in postwar Germany is regarded as an important model of an approach for addressing the negative aspects of a nation’s past.

However, it is uncertain which directions the activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past” will take in the future. In recent years, immigration and refugee issues, widening inequality, the British exit from the European Union, and other matters have helped the right-wing expand its influence in Germany and Europe, shaking the foundations of democracy. As a result of the German federal elections held in the fall of 2017, the right-wing political party Alternative for Germany (AfD) made a strong showing and emerged as the third-largest party in the Bundestag. Politicians belonging to the party have aroused much controversy by making racist and nationalist statements. For instance, in a speech in January 2017, Björn Höcke, parliamentary leader of the Thuringia branch of AfD, criticized the Holocaust Memorial as a “memorial of shame” and asserted that Germans “need to make a 180-degree change in their commemoration policy,” showing a negative attitude toward the nation’s approach to the Nazi past. Now that such a political party has become the top opposition party, the state of activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past” and “commemorative culture” may change in the future.

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In Japan, the second administration of Shinzo Abe started on December 26, 2012. The administration has developed the prime minister’s office-led mechanisms for planning, coordinating and making decisions on Japan’s national security policy, as represented by the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Secretariat (NSS). The second Abe administration has also made major policy and institutional changes in the field of security, by formulating the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, and developing security legislation. These changes are considered, in turn, to have brought about changes in Japan’s foreign policy. This article focuses on the diplomatic policy toward Russia taken by the second Abe administration, and examines the relationships between Japan’s policy toward Russia and the above-mentioned policy and institutional changes.

Regarding Japan’s policy toward Russia, the National Security Strategy drawn up in December 2013 states that “Under the increasingly severe security environment in East Asia, it is critical for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole, in order to ensure its security” (excerpted from the Cabinet Secretariat website: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217/anzenhoshou.html). Worthy of special note here is the fact that the Strategy refers to Japan-Russia cooperation in the field of security. As is well-known, during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union large-scale troops of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force had been deployed in Hokkaido to defend against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In response to the changes in the security environment in the post-Cold War period, the National Security Strategy points out the importance of security cooperation between Japan and Russia (see also “Tenki wo mukaeru nichiro anzenhoshou-kyouryoku [provisional translation: Japan-Russia Security Cooperation Coming to a Turning Point]” by Shinji Hyodo, NIDS Commentary No. 33, 2013).

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond includes more detailed descriptions about the aforementioned Japan-Russia security cooperation. Specifically, these Guidelines set forth “Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including the Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Talks, sub-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen understanding of the intention of Russian military activities and development mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional stability” (Ministry of Defense: http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/index.html). The Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation (“2+2” Ministerial Meeting), newly started by the second Abe administration, was suspended after the first meeting held in November 2013, in the wake of the Ukraine Crisis and for other factors. However, the second Japan-Russia “2+2” meeting took place in March last year. Meanwhile, the Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) was jointly held by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Russian Navy Pacific Fleet in October 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March of the same year. Subsequently SAREX was suspended for about two years, and then resumed in January 2017 (“Nichi-ro kyoudou kunren ninen-sankagetsu buri saikai hatsuka kara [provisional translation: Japan, Russia to resume SAREX on January 20, after an interval of 27 months], The Nikkei Online Edition, January 17, 2017).

Among these bilateral security cooperation activities, dialogues and exchanges, the author pays special attention to the Japan-Russia dialogues through the “NSC channel”—the channel of the (National) Security Councils of Japan and Russia. The second Abe administration appointed Mr. Shotaro Yachi (former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs) as its first Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat. Mr. Yachi can be regarded as a central figure in exerting the leadership of the Prime Minister’s Office in the field of national security. Since Mr. Yachi took office as Secretary General of the NSS, he has held many rounds of talks with his Russian counterpart, Mr. Nikolai Patrushev, who is the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, and one of President Putin’s most trusted aides. Their first talk was held in Moscow in March 2014, immediately before the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. After the Crimean annexation, in May of the same year, their second talk was held again in Moscow (Совет Безопасности РФ: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/812/; http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/815/). Amid the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the United States and EU countries, Secretary General Yachi and Secretary Patrushev have continued to hold dialogues. These were meetings between figures who play pivotal roles in strategy planning and general coordination in Japan and Russia, respectively, and can be said to constitute a “Yachi-Patrushev Line.” These talks are considered to have facilitated smooth communication between the two countries. In September 2017, Secretary Patrushev who was on a visit to Japan, and his Japanese counterpart Yachi concluded a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the Japanese National Security Secretariat (NSS) and the Secretariat of the Russian Federation Security Council (Совет Безопасности РФ: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/2278/), through which the “NSC channel” between the two countries was institutionalized.

Meanwhile, when consideration is given to the institutionalization of the NSC channel, it is also necessary to look at Japan-Russia relations under the regime of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Speaking of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia during the DPJ administration, many people would recall the visit to Kunashiri Island by Dmitry Medvedev, then President of the Russian Federation (in November 2010) as the most impactful event. Among other subsequent moves that should not be overlooked were: the dispatch of disaster relief teams from the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters to the areas affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011; and the establishment of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and other political measures focusing on the Russian Far East, promoted under the second Putin administration. In September 2012, a Japan-Russia summit meeting was held on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Vladivostok. About one month after the summit, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev visited Japan, where he paid a courtesy call to the then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and held talks with Mr. Koichiro Gemba, who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs at that time. Secretary Patrushev and Minister Gemba signed a memorandum between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Secretariat of the Russian Federation Security Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/24/10/1023_05.html). This was considered to have laid the basis for the formation of what later became the so-called “Yachi-Patrushev Line.” In this respect, we can observe a political continuity transcending the change in the administration. (The following book describes the continuity between the Democratic Party of Japan government and the second Abe administration in detail: “Futatsu no Seiken Kotai: Seisaku-wa Kawatta-noka” (provisional translation: Two Regime Changes: Did the policy change?), Harukata Takenaka (ed.), Keiso Shobo in 2017.)

Although the NSC channel between Japan and Russia has been institutionalized, it can be thought that its practical functions are bolstered by the Yachi-Patrushev Line, which is backed by the diplomatic skills, political clout and other capabilities of these working-level leaders in charge of the security councils of their respective nations. We need to continue to look at the future trends of this NSC channel. (Research Fellow, The National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense)
On August 12, 1978—forty years ago—the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, “the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship” or simply “the Treaty”) was signed in Beijing. Then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda watched over the signing ceremony on TV in his official residence. He is quoted as having said that a “suspension bridge” built between Japan and China had now been developed into an “iron bridge,” and that he would like to proactively promote bilateral exchange by carrying a heavy load on this bridge. On October 23 of the same year, then Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping attended a ceremony to exchange the instruments of ratification for the Treaty, held at the Prime Minister’s official residence in Tokyo. At the talk with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping confirmed that various relationships between Japan and China after World War II had been summarized legally and politically, and that, in particular, the peace and friendship between the two countries had been clearly affirmed. Currently, the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship is regarded as one of the four major political instruments between Japan and China, and the Treaty is said to constitute the political foundation for the overall development of Sino-Japanese relations.

Originally, the Treaty was first proposed six years before its conclusion, in the process of negotiations for Japan-China diplomatic normalization. It was explicitly set forth in Article 8 of the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. The Joint Communiqué, announced on September 29, 1972, realized the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations. Its Article 8 reads: “The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.” Considering the fact that Japanese war of aggression against China once occurred between China and Japan, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who stressed the need to conclude a treaty of peace, suggested that the process for normalizing Japan-China diplomatic relations should be divided into two steps: first, the leaders of the two countries would declare the normalization of diplomatic relations in a “joint statement” or “joint communiqué,” and then each government would go through domestic political procedures and enact legislation to conclude a “peace treaty.” It should be noted that the name of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship includes not only the word “peace” but also the word “friendship.” If a “peace” treaty is to attach importance to settling matters related to a “war” in the past, a “friendship” treaty would focus on the future direction and define a long-lasting friendly relationship for the next and future generations. In other words, the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship is intended to inherit the “past,” and usher in and pave way for the “future.”

As for the basic contents of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Japan and China reached an agreement, as early as at the first and second preliminary meetings. The contents included: the development of relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of refrain from the use or threat of force; respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (these were included in Article I) and the further development of economic and cultural relations between the two countries (included in Article III). Additionally, both countries confirmed the basic spirit of signing the Treaty—that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communiqué should be strictly observed. On the other hand, a series of issues regarding Japan-China relations became highlighted in the process of negotiations. These issues were addressed as described below.

The first was the Taiwan issue. China considered this issue to be difficult for the Japanese side to handle. Based on the idea of taking “a politically broader view,” from the initial stage the Chinese government expressed that “the Treaty does not have to refer to the Taiwan issue, if the Joint Communiqué will be reconfirmed in the Treaty.” The second was the historical issue. In this respect again, the Chinese side announced that “If the Japan-China Joint Communiqué will be confirmed in the Treaty and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communiqué continue to be strictly observed in the future, the Treaty does not need to touch upon the issues concerning the termination of the state of war, the responsibility for the damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through the war, and the renunciation of Chinese demand for war reparation from Japan.” In other words, China settled that both the Taiwan issue and the historical issue would not become problematic, when the Japan-China Joint Communiqué was observed. The third was the renunciation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The Japanese side showed a strong interest in this issue and insisted that there was a contradiction between the Japan-China Treaty and the Sino-Soviet Treaty. However, this issue was settled when China confirmed as the government’s official view that the Sino-Soviet Treaty was merely “nominal.” The fourth was the territorial issue. China explained that the incident in which a large fleet of fishing boats appeared in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands (“Diaoyutai” in Chinese) in April 1978 was an “accident.” Regarding this Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands dispute, Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping suggested “leaving things as they are for the next 20 or 30 years,” during a meeting with Japan’s Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda who was on a visit to China. This was the so-called “slewing” solution.

The fifth was what is called the issue of anti-hegemonism, which made the negotiations difficult. From the beginning, neither Japan nor China had any objections to pledging not to seek hegemony permanently. However, friction arose when the Chinese side contended that the provision, “Each (of the two countries) is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish hegemony (in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region),” should be included in the Treaty, but the Japanese side opposed the provision. Eventually, this issue was settled by incorporating this provision into the Treaty as Article II, and also by separately adding the so-called “third country provision” as Article IV, which reads “The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.”

Now, how should we celebrate this “anniversary”? When the Treaty marked its 10th, 20th, and 30th anniversaries, a dazzling array of commemorative events were held. Examples included the issuance of commemorative stamps, passionate commemorative lectures held during mutual visits of the leaders of the two countries, large-scale exchange visits by friendly organizations, events to deepen exchanges, and the performance of kabuki in China and classical Chinese operas in Japan. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship. During the past four decades, we have seen significant changes in Japan-China relations. In short, while economic interdependence in a broad sense has been considerably deepened, political relations have declined from “amicable” to “distrustful.” Under these circumstances, how should we celebrate the anniversary? First of all, the institutionalization of Japan-China relations must be promoted. It is expected that a mechanism for exchanges and discussions at each level and in each field will be established to facilitate better communication on a regular basis. I hope that Japan-China relations will evolve into those resembling Japan-United States relations or the United States-China relations, wherein both countries can deal with each other.

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Overview
◆ Name: Graduate School of Peace Studies, Master’s Degree Program in Peace Studies
◆ Degree: Master of Arts in Peace Studies
◆ Capacity: 10 students
◆ Duration: 2 years
◆ Location: 3-4-1, Ozu-Higashi, Asa-Minami-Ku, Hiroshima, 731-3194, JAPAN
* A Doctoral Degree Program is due to be founded in April 2021 to allow enrolled students to further develop their specialty and credentials after the Master’s Degree Program.

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The Master’s Degree Program of the Graduate School of Peace Studies is classified into three major tracks: “Social Science Concepts and Methods,” “Peace Theory,” and “Global/Regional Governance,” each of which is divided into smaller courses.

◆ Social Science Concepts and Methods
The course “Analytical Approach” teaches fundamental analytical methods, and the course “Hiroshima and Nuclear Issues” introduces the threat of nuclear weapons centering on the atomic bombing experience, heeding the lessons of the history and mission of Hiroshima.
(E.g.) Peace studies, global governance, memories of atomic bombings

◆ Peace Theory
The program consists of courses on peace theory related primarily to international politics and international law, teaching basic analytical approaches as well as analytical approaches effective for solving complex issues facing society during this era of globalization.
(E.g.) Nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control, peacebuilding, journalism studies

◆ Global/Regional Governance
The program consists of courses related to Asian studies, particularly those related to East Asian area studies, through which students can develop insights to grasp the dynamics of international relations and the basic structure of international system and governance in modern Asia, and their relevance in turn to human security issues.
(E.g.) Korean foreign policies and nuclear issues, peace and security policies of Japan, international organizations and international systems, preventive diplomacy

Vision: The Program aims to prepare students to become:
◆ Researchers skilled in qualitative research methodologies and academic knowledge of conventional peace studies and related fields, and who have the ability to disseminate research achievements towards the creation of peace;
◆ International civil servants or international NGOs/NPOs staff capable of planning, investigating and researching international public policy for peacebuilding with outstanding research capabilities, or national/local public officials engaged in domestic public policy and/or international relations;
◆ Journalists or mass media experts who can sharply analyze international/internal conflicts and disseminate analytical perspectives of peace.

http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/department/c00002162/c00006584/peacestudies/

Hello from HPI

SATO Tetsuo
Professor
Dr. Tetsuo SATO was born in Hamamatsu, Shizuoka Prefecture in 1955. After obtaining his LL.B. from the Faculty of Law, Hitotsubashi University and LL.M. from the Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University, Dr. SATO, as a Fulbright Scholarship Grantee, studied and obtained a MALD at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the USA. He also obtained a Ph.D. in Law from Hitotsubashi University in 1994. He taught at Hitotsubashi University as Lecturer, Associate Professor and Professor before arriving at the HPI in 2018. His major publications include Evolving Constitutions of International Organizations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996), The Law of International Organizations (Yuhikaku, 2005, in Japanese) and The United Nations Security Council and Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Yuhikaku, 2015, in Japanese).

Hello! It is my great pleasure to join anew the HPI, Hiroshima City University, after working for 34 years at Hitotsubashi University. I specialize in international law and will teach courses related to international law and the law of international organizations in the Graduate School of Peace Studies to be established next April at this Hiroshima Peace Institute. Since international law provides a basic framework and principles for the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of States and peoples, anyone who would aim to work for peace and cooperation is advised to have a certain level of its understanding. International law, while keeping its decentralized structure, has been greatly transformed by the activities of various international organizations, particularly the United Nations System. I look forward to discussions with you at this newly built Graduate School.
December 1, 2017 — May 31, 2018

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS

Vol.21 No.1 (July 11, 2018)

Published by
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Printed by
Letterpress Co., Ltd.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS

Vol.21 No.1, July 2018

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◆ Dec. 2 Akiko Naono serves as a panelist at the panel discussion, “Nobel Peace Prize to the Call to Ban the Nuclear Weapons” organized by No More Hibakusha Project-Inheriting Memories of the A- and H-Bomb Sufferers, held in Tokyo.


◆ Dec. 9 Naono gives lecture on how to pass on the memories of the atomic bombing to the future generations at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

◆ Dec. 11 Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) delegation (Gen Kikkawa, Takeshi Yuasa, Son Hyun Jin, Xu Xianfen and Makiko Takemoto) visit Sun Yat-sen University, Guanzhou, China, and have a seminar with the experts.

◆ Dec. 12 HPI delegation (Kikkawa, Kazumi Mizumoto, Son, Xu and Takemoto) visit the City University of Macau and Macao Polytechnic Institute, China and conduct seminars with the local experts.

◆ Dec. 14 Kikkawa gives lecture, “Why We Cannot Eliminate Nuclear Weapons” to thirty-seven Ube High School students at the HPI.

2018

◆ Jan. 25 Xu delivers presentation, “China’s Assistance to the Countries of Central Asia” at a meeting of the HPI “Human Security Project” held at HPI.


◆ Feb. 16 Jacobs gives lecture, “Discourses of Nuclear Competence and Catastrophe” in the 3rd HPI Public Lecture Series in English at Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City University.

◆ Feb. 19–21 Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil service on public administration and public policy formulation in Naypyitaw, Myanmar.

◆ Feb. 19–23 Fukui participates in the Committee for the Right of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as an academic observer in the United Nations office in Geneva (UNOG) and exchanges views with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) legal officers.

◆ Feb. 22 Dr. Peter Kagwanja, Director of African Policy Research Institute in Kenya, visits HPI and discusses an academic exchange program in the future with Kikkawa.


◆ Mar. 5–7 Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil service on public administration and public policy formulation in Taungoo, Myanmar.

◆ Mar. 9 Jacobs gives lecture, “The Invisible Nuclear War Hidden Inside of the Cold War” and Son gives lecture, “Legal Status of North Korean Defectors” at the University of Bradford in the UK.

◆ Mar. 12–15 Kikkawa, Mizumoto and Xu visit Northeast Asian Studies College and School of Administration of Jilin University in Changchun, Jilin Province, and Institute of Japan Studies in Liaoning University in Shenyang, Liaoning Province in China, and exchange views with Chinese scholars.

◆ Mar. 17–18 HPI holds the International Symposium “Nuclear Weapons, Governance and Peace in Asia,” co-hosted by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNAA) of Nagasaki University at the International Conference Center, Hiroshima.

◆ Mar. 21 Hitoshi Nagai gives lecture, “The Tokyo Trial: A Case for Reflection on War and Responsibility” to a meeting of the Nagasaki Youth Delegation at the RECNAA, Nagasaki University.

◆ Mar. 26 Mizumoto and Naono attend the annual meeting of the Advisory Research Group of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, held at the Museum.

◆ Apr. 1 Tetsuo Sato is appointed as a professor at HPI. He works on the book review of an English book comprising articles on the Whaling in the Antarctic case of the International Court of Justice (to be published in the Japanese Yearbook of International Law, Volume 61, 2018).

◆ Apr. 7 Takemoto attends the book review meeting on German Peace and Pacifism as an author, held at Komazawa University.

◆ Apr. 14 Fukui reports on the “Interaction with the International Disarmament Law: The Case of Article 36 of Additional Protocol to Geneva Conventions” in the annual meeting of Japan Society for Disarmament Studies at Takushoku University.

◆ Apr. 19 Takemoto attends the first meeting of the Executive Committee of International Youth Conference for Peace in the Future (ICYCPR) 2018, held at Hiroshima City Hall.

◆ Apr. 19 Delegates of the University for Peace in Costa Rica visit HPI and discuss future exchange programs for graduate students with Kikkawa.

◆ Apr. 23–27 Fukui participates in the second session of 2020 NPT Review Conference in the UNOG and exchanges views with Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of The Preparatory Technical Secretariat (PTS), Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

◆ May. 19 Xu delivers presentation, “Several Questions on the Study of the Contemporary Chinese Diplomatic History” at a workshop organized by Toyo Bunko held in Tokyo.

◆ May. 27 Akihiro Kawakami delivers presentation, “An Analysis on Revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in Relation to Peace and Human Rights” at the Hiroshima Conference for Jichiken (Research of Local Government) in Miyoshi City, Hiroshima.