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International Symposium on Nuclear Abolition Attempting to identify future tasks for citizens following the recent NPT Review Conference

Kazumi Mizumoto

On July 31, 2010, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) and the Hiroshima Peace Media Center of the Chugoku Shimbun co-organized an international symposium held at the International Conference Center Hiroshima. The title of the symposium was "What Should We Do to Advance Nuclear Abolition?: Reflections on the 2010 NPT Review Conference." The guests included Hideo Tsuchiyama, a former President of Nagasaki University; Douglas Lummis, a political scientist resident in Okinawa; Sugok Shin, a Korean human resource development consultant resident in Japan; Yumi Kanazaki, a correspondent for the Hiroshima Peace Media Center; and Sung Chull Kim and Robert Jacobs, Professor and Associate Professor of HPI, respectively. The symposium opened with keynote speeches from the first two guests, followed by presentations from the remaining panelists and a question-and-answer session with an earnest audience of approximately 300 people.

Vice-President of HPI

Part I Keynote Speeches

From Obama's Initiative to a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Hideo Tsuchiyama, Former President of Nagasaki University


I would like to discuss three points today.

The first is related to the outcome of the recent NPT Review Conference. On the plus side, the Conference pushed forward what was agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, instead of ending in rupture, as occurred in 2005. However, the Final Document adopted on this occasion contains a number of rather abstract wordings, which is rather disappointing. For example, the Main Committee I of the Conference which focuses on nuclear disarmament discussed the possible achievement of nuclear abolition within a specified timeframe and a proposal was put forward that the UN Secretary-General would call an international conference in 2014. Nevertheless, this proposal was strongly rejected by the nuclear weapon states, and instead it was decided that those states will make progress reports on their commitment to nuclear disarmament at the NPT Preparatory Committee which is also scheduled for 2014. We, ordinary citizens, should not be satisfied with the obscure wordings in the Final Document and should continue to strongly demand the acceleration of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states.

The second point is the feasibility of nuclear abolition based on Obama's nuclear vision. While his efforts to actualize his vision can be observed in the speech he gave in Prague last year and in the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreed between the US and Russia, it is still doubtful whether nuclear abolition can really be achieved based only on Obama's vision. In reality, strengthening the NPT system, the idea

which Obama has been advocating, is not sufficient to settle the nuclear issues of non-NPT states such as Israel, India and Pakistan. At the same time, while Obama is calling for reducing the role of nuclear weapons, he is also stating that the US will maintain its "nuclear umbrella" for its allies such as Japan, and keep its own nuclear weapons unless other nuclear powers abandon their nuclear weapons.

As warnings are heard against the possibility of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists, the only way to achieve nuclear abolition by complementing Obama's vision and incorporating non-NPT states into the international system is through the early adoption of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). This is the third point I want to make today. At the moment, the idea of an NWC is opposed by four of the nuclear weapon states: the US, Russia, the UK and France. This opposition needs to be broken down. Meanwhile, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), which is a joint initiative of the Japanese and Australian governments, announced in a 2009 report that strong efforts to advocate for an NWC were essential. We need to demand that the Japanese government takes a leading role in this. In order to realize the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone advocated by [then] Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, powerful voices from citizens need to reach the Japanese government and then the nuclear weapon states.



Nuclear Weapons as Terror

An important task for a political scientist like me is "to correct terms." British novelist and critic George Orwell once said that when a politician speaks words of obscurity, he is hiding something. Today I would like to discuss what the word "terrorism" really means.

Nine years ago the US declared the "War on Terrorism," but that use of the terms is not correct. Then eight years ago, a friend of mine and I put up an advertisement for a prize competition in a US magazine. It would award \$1,000 to those who could give a clear definition of "terrorism," satisfying the following two conditions: 1) characteristics of terrorism as military strategy to be clarified; 2) US military strategy not to be included in the definition. We received 52 entries, but not one of them was correct because, once you attempt to define the term correctly, you cannot do it without mentioning US military strategy.

Then what is terrorism? The meaning of the term "terror" is derived from the Reign of Terror at the time of the French Revolution that trampled the rule of law. During the 19th century, anti-governmental forces implemented terrorist attacks. The point here is that the term "terrorism" originally referred to "state terrorism."

One characteristic of terrorism is disregard for the law. In war, it specifically refers to disregard of the law of war which prohibits the deliberate killing of non-combatant civilians. Terrorists, for example, throw explosives

Douglas Lummis, Political Scientist and Author

into a restaurant and the whole of society gets disturbed for fear of unpredictable, indiscriminate killing. Terrorist attacks are thus an "effective" tactic to cause great fear among the masses without carrying out mass killings.

In relation to this, airstrikes which were made possible by the invention of aircraft are an interesting case. Before aircraft came into practical use, four standpoints existed regarding airstrikes: 1) only enemy forces can be attacked; 2) arsenals can also be attacked; 3) the economic infrastructure can also be attacked; and 4) indiscriminate attacks on private facilities and civilians are also permitted. The last standpoint was first advocated by the Italian general Giulio Douhet who regarded this stance as the "most humanitarian" way to bring a war to an early end. This idea was expanded into indiscriminate bombings during WWII, and in fact the indiscriminate bombing on Dresden by the British Royal Air Force during that very war was once referred to by the then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill as an "act of terror."

In the same manner, the atomic bombings in Japan were the severest terrorist attacks, and the "nuclear umbrella" is a means of containment by terrorist menace, thus a "terrorist umbrella." If the US wants to reduce the number of terrorist attacks by fighting a "War on Terrorism," it should start from abandoning its own terrorist strategy with nuclear weapons and missiles.



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Part II Panel Presentations

“Nuclear Weapons Can Be Eliminated”

Yumi Kanazaki, Correspondent for the Hiroshima Peace Media Center, Chugoku Shimbun



Observing the latest NPT Review Conference as a correspondent, when it closed with the adoption of the Final Document, I thought to myself “How will the people of Hiroshima perceive this?” as there were no specific proposals towards nuclear abolition left in the Document. During the Conference, I had a strong sense that the nuclear weapon states really hated having a framework imposed on them by other states. On the other hand, the reference to an NWC was included in the Final Document, despite objections from all the nuclear weapon states except China, which would not have been possible without the efforts of NGOs and citizens from around the world and particularly from Hiroshima.

A key factor throughout the latest Review Conference was the “power of citizens.” A room at the UN Headquarters was made into a center for NGOs where government representatives of different countries came to exchange opinions with NGO members. At a session for NGOs during the first week of the Conference, Sumiteru Taniguchi, a *hibakusha* from Nagasaki, presented a testimony of his own experience, following the speeches made by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His presentation received long applause which lasted for over a minute. The idea of an NWC was backed by countries that have established cooperative relations with civil society such as Australia, Norway and Switzerland, and I believe that their backing of an NWC was due to the fact that their philosophies came closer to that of Hiroshima. In contrast, the Japanese government has been passive, saying that it is “too early” to develop an NWC, and for the Final Document it only made proposals that were “easy to compromise on” from the beginning. Therefore Japan merely exposed its limited capability as a country which “relies on the nuclear weapons of the US.” Changing this passive stance requires a concerted call from citizens to resist nuclear weapons. During the Review Conference, the Swiss government presented a report which points out that nuclear deterrence has been overestimated. The Japanese government seems still to be obsessed with the “nuclear fantasy.”

Throughout the Final Document there are signs of efforts to resist the opposition of the nuclear weapon states. While the Final Document is indeed a product of compromise, a source close to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs commented that it is not only the palpable outcome that has meaning; equally important is how many seeds have been sown for the future. A large number of Japanese citizens flew all the way to New York to witness the proceedings of the Conference. We need to water and take good care of these precious seeds.

Americans and Nuclear Weapons at a Time of Declining Empire

Robert Jacobs, Associate Professor at HPI



For the last 100 years the US has been a leader in international politics. But concerning nuclear issues, the US has been leading in the wrong direction. The first nation to build the bomb, the US has primarily led us into a world filled with nuclear weapons and a long and dangerous nuclear arms race. Americans feel empowered by nuclear weapons. We first met the bomb as a savior weapon that seemed to end WWII in a few days. During the Cold War, we felt that these weapons kept the Soviet Union from attacking us. So what will the role of the US be in the movement towards nuclear abolition? In my opinion, that role will be as a follower and not a leader. In fact, I believe that the role of the US will be that of an obstacle.

Nuclear weapons are part of the military economy in the US, resulting in billions of dollars of spending each year. It is my opinion that as long as we in the anti-nuclear community talk about the immorality of nuclear weapons, those in the weapons-producing complex are happy. They don't really argue against us and say that the weapons are moral. That is not why they support nuclear weapons; they support nuclear weapons because of the money. They don't want the US to *use* nuclear weapons; they just want us to *buy* them. This is what I think we need to understand: nuclear weapons are part of the profiteering that is at the center of American militarism. We need to fight to abolish nuclear arsenals, but more directly, we need to attack militarism.

Like all empires before it, only when the American empire begins to crumble and collapse will it rethink its relationship with the other nations of the world. So while I do believe that we will hear more rhetoric from President Obama about nuclear abolition, we will not see concrete steps being taken in that direction. Obama has proven so far that he is a leader who avoids confrontation and seeks compromise. In this case, compromise means not taking on the US military and military contractors. For the US to play a key role in nuclear abolition, we must look to the American people to demand abolition, and not American politicians. Change in the US, as in most countries, comes from the bottom up. We are the people who can make change. We must force our leaders to follow.

Part III Panel Discussion and Q&A

In the panel discussion the keynote speakers and panelists answered some questions from the audience which were presented by the chair, Kazumi Mizumoto, on behalf of the audience.

— Will you explain a bit more about your idea of a retreat from the “nuclear umbrella”?

Tsuchiyama: A retreat from the “nuclear umbrella” will be brought about if we realize a nuclear-free Northeast Asia covering Japan and the Korean Peninsula, and obtain pledges of no nuclear attack from the US, Russia and China.

— What about an NWC? How can it be realized?

Tsuchiyama: There is an organization called the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND) which is a network of lawmakers from around the world who are opposed to nuclear weapons. Collaboration between PNND and NGOs to lobby the governments of the nuclear weapon states can lead to the realization of an NWC.

— Why doesn't the US government apologize for the atomic bombings?

Jacobs: The US apologizing for the atomic bombings will mean not only acknowledging its moral responsibility, but also questioning the reason for possessing nuclear weapons and the reliability of the weapons, both today and in the future.

Lummis: Apologizing for the bombings will mean the promise that they will never do the same again. But the US cannot promise it,

therefore they cannot apologize.

— Are there any calls for an apology amongst US citizens?

Jacobs: There are various opinions within the US, including doubts about the atomic bombings and the possession of nuclear weapons. In the city where I used to live, there is an annual memorial held on August 6, and some people there think that the war crimes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be remembered. But such opinions are not yet reflected in the whole of American society.

— How may President Obama's leadership be assessed?

Kanazaki: It depends on whether Obama's leadership actually refers to the President himself, the Congress, or the US as a whole. The President is making efforts towards, for example, the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but it faces strong opposition in the Senate. Instead of rushing to criticize Obama, people should be aware of the fact that he may be replaced by a hard-line Republican president.

Lummis: The US Congress does not want to ratify a treaty which may limit US sovereignty or rights. Even the ratification of the Genocide Convention took a few decades. US citizens need to

The NPT, North Korea, and Japan: Overcoming Contradictions

Sung Chull Kim, Professor at HPI



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has lately been advocating the creation of cooperative relations among non-nuclear weapon states, particularly between 11 countries including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Germany and South Korea. If such a network could be created, it could exert significant pressure on the nuclear weapon states, and I believe that Japan is in a position to achieve this.

At the same time, however, the Japanese government has also been revealing the limits of its non-proliferation policy. Japan is seeking to conclude a civil nuclear energy deal with India, a country which itself is a nuclear weapon state, having conducted nuclear tests while not being party to either the NPT or the CTBT. Although Japan is demanding India include a statement that it will not conduct any further nuclear tests, India has rejected this on the basis that it has already declared its own moratorium.

Concluding a Japanese-Indian nuclear energy deal will mean that Japan is effectively overlooking nuclear proliferation, as the US did in its own civilian nuclear agreement with India. What is more alarming is that as the US-Indian agreement contained no prohibition on India to conduct further nuclear tests, it is likely that Japan will follow a similar example. Such an approach may present a further bad example to those countries that are also attempting to possess nuclear weapons, particularly North Korea.

An additional problem is the excessive production of plutonium. Japan's nuclear reprocessing facilities, the operations of which entail the production of plutonium, may bring many problems. With as much as 250 tons of plutonium available for civilian use around the world, when the construction of the massive reprocessing facility in Aomori is completed and plutonium is produced there on a significant scale, it could well serve as a psychological driving force towards an intensification of what is already a competitive arms race in East Asia. The US, South Korea and Canada are not conducting nuclear reprocessing and many European countries have abandoned it. Therefore excessive production of plutonium is certainly a factor that could threaten the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

To move towards nuclear non-proliferation, the Japanese government needs to be consistent in its stance and apply tough standards to its own use of nuclear energy. It is only when Japan displays such a stance that more countries will be motivated towards joining the cooperative network of non-nuclear weapon states which Japan has been advocating.

The Peace Movement in Japan: A *Zainichi* Korean Woman's Perspective

Sugok Shin,
Human Resource Development Consultant



My nationality is *kankoku-jin* (South Korean), but I call myself *chōsen-jin* (an ethnic Korean, though more commonly called *zainichi* which literally refers to any foreigners resident in Japan) because in Japanese society the two terms are used in completely different contexts, and the latter more often than not comes under attack. Actually I have a Japanese name, Setsuko Niiyama, which does mean a lot to me, but still I call myself by my more easily-attackable Korean name.

When I first heard the title of the present symposium "What Should We Do to Advance Nuclear Abolition?," I wondered whether I was included in this "we." The reason being, I can sense a fear of the "threat from the North," and a feeling of discrimination against and disturbance about ethnic Koreans behind Japan's desire to possess the apparatus of violence that are called nuclear weapons. It is a fact that Japanese society gets into a panic when it encounters ethnic Koreans. The suspicious money flow from ethnic Korean-run pachinko parlors, the Taepodong missile incidents, and the abduction issues — all these provoked violence and harassment against ethnic Koreans. And whenever this happens, I always think that it is not that Japan never wants to fight a war again, but that it never wants to be a country that *loses* a war again.

Japan provoked the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars at the expense of the Korean Peninsula, and ended up becoming a loser in WWII. During the process of post-WWII reconstruction, this war loser introduced the alien registration system following an Imperial decree, and the Japanese Constitution excluded ethnic Koreans from basic rights. We were also excluded from the recently revised special measures law on the disputed Northern Territories between Russia and Japan. It has been 100 years since the annexation of Korea, but nothing has really changed in Japan's treatment of ethnic Koreans. Every time major disasters occur such as the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923, ethnic Koreans are attacked and that energy is directed towards Japan's armament efforts.

When I have an occasion to give a talk, I am often asked whether I like Japan, and I see in such words an implicit message: "Shut up if you like Japan, go back to the Peninsula if you don't!" With regard to ethnic Koreans, Japanese people cannot unhesitatingly label themselves as "victims" since they have failed to save the ethnic minority within their country. They are supposed to be "victims who were made into aggressors," but they have only faced the past from the standpoint of mere being "victims."

The same can be said for citizens' movements. People call for the preservation of the Japanese Constitution, but actually that very Constitution disregards ethnic Koreans. The struggle for nuclear abolition is a struggle against US war-mongering ideology. However, the US military with its many nuclear weapons is also strong because of the gender equality and diversity in its personnel. In contrast, the leaders of peace movements in Japan are always men, and there is no initiative on the part of women or collaboration with minorities. In such an environment, I believe that cooperative struggle for nuclear abolition will never be possible.

change this passive stance on the part of Congress.

— Do NGOs and citizens' movements within the US that are calling for nuclear abolition have any influence over the government at all?

Jacobs: Their influence is not strong enough to change the government. NGOs are overshadowed within the two-party system of the Republican and the Democratic Parties.

— Is there any compensation from the government for *hibakusha* within the US such as the soldiers who participated in nuclear tests or residents who have been exposed to the nuclear "death ash" while living near nuclear test sites?

Jacobs: Ninety-eight percent of US *hibakusha* receive no compensation at all.

— There are many questions from the audience for Ms. Shin: "Your talk was simply eye-opening," "How do you view Hiroshima?," "What actions can women take?," and so on.

Shin: It is important to go hand in hand with people with whom you can have mutual understanding, however slight. The role of women is "how well to bring up men who will not be an obstacle in women's lives." There is no need for the Japanese people of today to apologize for being "aggressors." The later generations of the past victims and aggressors do not need to shoulder the responsibility of their former generations; what they should think

about is how not to repeat the past and how to solve the tragedies in front of them now.

Hiroshima is a town which has lost its voice. A sea of feelings and thoughts have been repressed, and these feelings and thoughts have been ignored in society or by the state, and have then been lost. This is the suffering of Hiroshima.

— Does the voice of Hiroshima actually reach the world? What is necessary to have this voice heard?

Kim: If the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with their sufferings from the atomic bombings share their pains with the Asian people who have experienced their own sufferings imposed by Japanese imperialism, then the actions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will be truly universal.





Makoto Kitanishi, Professor Emeritus at Hiroshima University

Looking Back Upon the 9th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs

By Motofumi Asai,
President of HPI

The present interview was conducted with Makoto Kitanishi, Professor Emeritus of Hiroshima University, who was deeply involved in the management of the ninth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in 1963. The following is part of the long interview in which he talked about his “only personal perspectives with fading memory,” although he “prepared beforehand by consulting some old records.”

1. Prologue

I was full of rebellious spirit since I was a little kid. I chose the Kyoto Prefectural University of Medicine in 1943 in order to get out of military service of injustice and strict discipline, as medical students at that time received the longest exemption from military service. But after the war, I returned to my hometown where my parents lived and enrolled in the Faculty of Law, Kyushu University, in 1948.

During my time at Kyushu University, I belonged to the class of Professor Tsugumaro Imanaka and was at the same time deeply involved in student movements, then in 1949 I joined the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). My decision to join the Party came from three thoughts. First I had always felt guilty, having got out of military service by a cunning maneuver. Second, I felt a sense of admiration for the Party with its courageous figures such as Kyūichi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga who had held on to an anti-war ideology even during their wartime experience of imprisonment. And lastly I was convinced that war must be prevented not by individual efforts but by collective efforts, with the JCP at the center of this movement.

I finished university in 1951 and started working for Ube Industries, Ltd. where I was highly motivated to work for the renaissance of labor movements after the Red Scare. But I could not get along with my comrades in their activities, so in 1952, recommended by Prof. Imanaka, I returned to a graduate school of Kyushu University as a special research trainee and his “final pupil,” thus entirely placing myself in the academic world. The first connection I had with Hiroshima University was when Prof. Imanaka, who had now moved there, asked me to come to Hiroshima and become a research assistant in November 1954. There was an organization called the Society of University Professors to Protect Peace and Academic Freedom which was established in 1953 under Prof. Imanaka and Prof. Kiyoshi Sakuma of Hiroshima University as Director and Secretary-General of the organization respectively. I joined the organization upon moving to Hiroshima and assisted with its management. It was in August of the following year, 1955, that I worked as a member of staff for the first World Conference Against A&H Bombs, and this experience caused me to become deeply involved in the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuikyo*). In fact, one of the most active parties in the anti-A and H bombs movement in Hiroshima up to the ninth World Conference was the members of the Society of University Professors.

2. The 9th World Conference Against A&H Bombs, and Hiroshima

There was a concern about whether the ninth World Conference Against A&H Bombs in 1963 would really take place due to the severe antagonism that had developed between the faction of socialists and labor union members on one side and communists on the other since 1961. In the end it was decided on August 4, the day before the conference, that *Gensuikyo*, the nation-wide organization which was in charge of the annual World Conference, would give carte blanche to its Hiroshima prefectural chapter (*Hiroshima Gensuikyo*). It was not that *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* exerted its influence to take control of the conference.

The first World Conference was a success, at least partly, as a result of a call from the people of Hiroshima, and it marked the tenth anniversary of the nation-wide signature-collecting campaign against A and H bombs, which first started in 1954. In fact, the *hibakusha* issue had not been a significant concern until it was decided during the first conference that support for *hibakusha* would be one of the two pillars of the entire anti-A and H bombs movement, with the other being opposition to A and H bombs. This decision should not have been possible without the strong initiative of the people of Hiroshima. Nevertheless, *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* had never been given any important role in organizing the conference since 1956, and its influence within the overall anti-A and H bombs movement remained rather limited.

An explanation of the carte blanche of the 1963 World Conference to *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* needs to take into account the complicated circumstances of that time. *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* predominantly consisted of members of the Socialist Democratic Party Japan (SDPJ) and their sympathizers, therefore the SDPJ members and the socialist-leaning General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sohyo*), both of whom consisted of the majority of the members of the national *Gensuikyo*, expected that the carte blanche would give them greater influence over the conference. The decision was then taken by a majority vote. Meanwhile, the executive bureau of the national *Gensuikyo* consisted mainly of capable Communists such as Kasei Yoshida, and this together with the abovementioned circumstances led to the eventual breakdown of the 1963 conference.

Hiroshima Gensuikyo had six board members including Ichiro Moritaki (a professor at Hiroshima University), Kiyoshi Sakuma, and Mansō Hamamoto (an SDPJ member and the Chairperson of the Hiroshima Prefectural Trades Union Congress), and General-Secretary Mitsuru Itō (a professor at Hiroshima University and a leading figure of the SDPJ). Therefore, the executive members of *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* predominantly consisted of, as said earlier, those inclined towards the socialist SDPJ and *Sohyo*, and the number of communists which included Sakuma (though not a JCP member) and myself (Deputy Secretary-General of *Hiroshima Gensuikyo*) was quite limited.

During the process of organizing the conference, *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* faced a most difficult task, that of developing the keynote speech. We held discussions and chose Moritaki, Sakuma

and Itō to be the drafters. However, as Itō was not involved in the actual drafting, the speech was developed by the other two who were both *hibakusha* themselves.

The two drafters presented a draft and a final version at joint meetings of *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* and the conference-organizing group on August 1 and 5 respectively. However, we did not have enough time for thorough discussion. Regarding the question of whose views the speech should represent, some insisted that it should represent the stance of the national *Gensuikyo* while others stressed that it was merely the personal perspective of Moritaki. It was in the end settled in an obscure manner that it would be “a keynote speech developed upon a proposal from *Hiroshima Gensuikyo*” (hereafter the “Moritaki report”).

The two points of argument in the Moritaki report at the aforementioned joint meetings concerned the controversial issues that existed between the socialist and communist factions. The first was the assessment of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (hereafter PTBT) that the US, the UK and the USSR had initialed only on July 25. While the socialist faction together with Hiroshima City welcomed the treaty as a step forward towards nuclear abolition, the communist faction opposed it as they argued that it would permit the nuclear possession by the three superpowers and become an obstacle on the road to nuclear abolition. The other point of argument was the so-called “any states” dispute which had been an unresolved issue since 1961. In this case, the socialist faction advocated a stance to oppose nuclear tests conducted by *any* state, whereas the communist faction demanded that the issue not be put on the table during the World Conference as they regarded the nuclear tests carried out by socialist states as defensive measures, and thus were different in nature from those conducted by the US. In the resultant Moritaki report, the PTBT was assessed in a positive way and the “any states” position adopted regarding nuclear tests, therefore the report was more inclined towards the socialist faction.

Regarding the assessment of the PTBT, I’m still convinced that the perspective of the communist faction was right. As to the “any states” problem, on the other hand, I once wrote in an academic journal: Within *Hiroshima Gensuikyo*, there was a common understanding that our approach to the “any states” problem should be different from that of the national *Gensuikyo*, SDPJ or JCP. But there was no substantial conclusion as to what form that approach should take (*Hiroshima Hōgaku*, December 1978). In fact the Moritaki report states: The Japanese people, especially those who have experienced the atomic tragedies in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, or at Bikini Atoll, could not help crying out for absolute rejection of *all* nuclear tests or nuclear armament of *all* states, simply because of their outrage at, and grief about, the atomic bombings.

That the report says “*all* nuclear tests ... of *all* states” and uses the past tense “the Japanese people ... could not help crying out” implies Moritaki’s heart-rending efforts to indicate *Hiroshima Gensuikyo*’s stance that it would not align itself with either the SDPJ or the JCP. When I first heard the report, I thought it was well thought-out and also better than the hard, inflexible stance taken by the socialist faction which made the issue too crucial a problem and employed an exclusionist stance towards those taking different stances from their own. Nevertheless, to say that the Japanese people “could not” help crying out only implies that it was something that happened “in the past”; therefore it cannot escape from the criticism that it by no means suggests that *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* had established its own philosophy different from that of the two opposing factions, as had been hoped.

Today I still have no answer myself regarding what *Hiroshima Gensuikyo*’s own philosophy should be. Even at that time, I kept telling myself that, as a non-*hibakusha*, I should not place myself in

a leading position in the anti-A and H bombs movement. Developing a keynote speech is no exception to this rule as I thought that a person who had had no personal experience of not only the atomic bombing but even conventional air raids should not overvalue one’s capacity and get involved in the process. After all, since moving to Hiroshima and meeting many *hibakusha* I had developed a sense of awe towards them. Now the problem is that I have no solution ready to the question that such a passive, reserved stance leaves nothing but a vacuum of philosophy when all the *hibakusha* have passed away.

3. Epilogue

I would like to speak about two episodes that occurred after the split of the anti-A and H bombs movement following the ninth World Conference in 1963.

The breakdown of the World Conference was caused by the SDPJ leaving the organization following competition between the SDPJ and the JCP for supporters. At the Standing Committee of *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* held during the World Conference, it was decided that the management of the conference should be returned to the hands of the national *Gensuikyo*. However, just after the closing of the conference on August 7, Moritaki and Itō, who did not attend the closing ceremony, held a press conference at their own discretion and delivered a statement which contained three main points. The first was that they acknowledged that control of the conference had been assumed by a single political party, despite people’s hopes for reconciliation. The second was that the spirit contained in the Moritaki report had been emasculated. And the third was that in order to avoid the collapse of the organization, they, as the leaders of *Hiroshima Gensuikyo*, were determined to rebuild their movement in line with the Moritaki report which expressed the stance to oppose *any* nuclear tests conducted by *any* states and to highly value the PTBT. *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* on August 10 approved the Moritaki-Itō statement by a majority vote. Those who opposed this approval, including me, held a conference to rebuild *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* on June 7 of the following year with the aim of preserving and pressing forward with the tradition of *Gensuikyo*’s movement. At the conference, we appointed executive members: Naokichi Suzuki (Professor Emeritus at Hiroshima University) as President, Sakuma as Director, Noboru Miyake (a JCP member and the Vice-Chair of the Hiroshima Prefectural Trades Union Congress) as Secretary-General, and me as Deputy Secretary-General. Thus, another *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* was established in the Hiroshima Prefecture, using exactly the same name as the original organization.

This chain of pitiful events resulted in losing a significant degree of the trust and hope of *hibakusha* and the people of Hiroshima Prefecture and City. I felt guilty as one of the parties involved in the proceedings, therefore I left the JCP and *Hiroshima Gensuikyo* in 1965 and decided to devote myself to the reconciliation of the two *Hiroshima Gensuikyos*, and also the SDPJ and the JCP.

Another story that I want to relate is what happened to the Society of University Professors to Protect Peace and Academic Freedom. With a majority of the members having distanced themselves from both the SDPJ and the JCP, the split of the two political groups during the World Conference led to paralysis within the Society. It still remains paralyzed to this day, having lost its influence or voice in the overall peace movement in Hiroshima, including the anti-A and H bombs movement. This is a true cause of repentance and grief. For this too, I am one of the parties who bears responsibility.

(Interviewed on August 26, 2010)

Hibakusha, Myself, and Hiroshima City University

Taeko Kiriya

It has been eight years since I commenced my Master's course at Hiroshima City University. Since I moved to there, my impression of Hiroshima had been that it was a city which achieved a dramatic post-war reconstruction. However, during my interviews with *hibakusha* on the post-war history of Hiroshima some of the interviewees confessed their "discomfort" with the "reconstruction" process of the city. In fact, poet Sadako Kurihara and novelist Yoko Ota, both of whom were *hibakusha* themselves, expressed in their works this "discomfort" as seen through the eyes of *hibakusha* during their everyday lives. The existing literature does not cast much light on *hibakusha*'s perspectives on the "reconstruction" under the US occupation during the 1940s when they were in the greatest need of physical, mental and economic support: the narrative of "reconstruction" was related, without any historical account, as if the "miracle of reconstruction" was a spontaneous phenomenon. I thought that to question this one-sided perspective on the "reconstruction" might lead me to face a problem that I have never succeeded in escaping from — the problem of a deep gulf of understanding existing between *hibakusha* and non-*hibakusha*.

Born and raised in Yokohama, when I was ten I was told by my father that my mother's family had experienced the atomic bombing in Nagasaki. My mother, though not a *hibakusha* herself, was not able to say a word when asked about the event but only shed tears. My father confessed that his marriage to her once met with a strong opposition from his family simply because of her tragic background. An enormous fear of early death engulfed this ten-year-old girl. This fear continued to grow and I only wished to escape from it forever.

The subject of the atomic bombing had long been deep in my heart until I decided to face up to it after the time when, during high school, I found my grandmother's old diary and met *hibakusha* in person in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

After receiving my Bachelor's degree with my dissertation focusing on Nagasaki, I began a Master's at Hiroshima City University. This decision was strongly opposed by my mother who said that facing up to the topic would be too much for me. In contrast to the hesitation in confessing my inner struggle in Yokohama, I believed that moving to Hiroshima would bring me some change. Upon

arriving in Hiroshima, I was enthusiastic about talking to old people in the town while walking or jogging. However, I thought that a rain of questions from a stranger might have made the *hibakusha* upset. — So I felt heartache asking them about the atomic bombing.

Reading memoirs written by *hibakusha* stored at the Peace Memorial Museum or local libraries devastated me with the cruel experiences that *hibakusha* had faced and the monstrous power of the bomb depicted there; yet I was always invigorated by *hibakusha* themselves who had gone through such harsh lives. A *hibakusha* once confided her experiences to this perplexed student by a river, and her words gave me sincere encouragement. When I lost confidence about whether I could keep up with my postgraduate studies, I suddenly remembered an A-bombed doctor from Nagasaki, Tatsuichiro Akizuki, whose book had once given me encouragement, so I took a night bus to Nagasaki to see him. I could not speak to him as he was bedridden, however, I still got inspiration from being with him. It was fortunate that on that very visit I was able to see his wife, Sugako, with whom I stayed in touch for years and who always welcomed me with a heart-warming smile every time I visited them. These episodes are only a few of many wonderful encounters with *hibakusha* that I have had both in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Having been caught up in a feeling of hopelessness for the future that only seemed to portend a dark, nuclear age, the lives of *hibakusha* and their existence — which I believe represent their "philosophy" in themselves — gave me a glimmer of hope for our survival through the nuclear age. This can also be found in the works of so-called "A-bomb literature" by *hibakusha* writers such as Tamiki Hara, Sankichi Toge, Yoko Ota and Sadako Kurihara.

I always feel great appreciation for the teaching staff at Hiroshima City University who with patience helped me expand my inner thoughts into academic research whenever I felt overwhelmed by my emotions and thought that I could no longer work on my thesis. I would not be here without my two years at HCU, and it is simply a pleasure to be back in Hiroshima, while I also feel a strong sense of responsibility. The goal of my career as a researcher is to establish a link between Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to build a bridge between *hibakusha* and non-*hibakusha*.

Assistant Professor at HPI

HPI Research Project

State Violence and Regime Transition in East Asia

The project from 2009 to 2010, which concluded with the final workshop held in Seoul on August 5-6, was funded by the Hiroshima City Government (2009) and Hiroshima City University (2010). The project involved a comparative study of the use of violence in eight countries. Two conceptual papers were presented and two discussants spoke at the Seoul workshop, as well as at the preceding one held in Hong Kong in December 2009. The countries and incidents chosen for the project were as follows:

1. China: Tiananmen Incident (1989)
2. Japan: Okinawa Incident (1945)
3. Korea: Kwangju Incident (1980)
4. Burma/Myanmar: Suppression of democracy movement (1988)
5. Cambodia: Khmer Rouge mass killings (1975-1978)
6. Indonesia: Anti-Communist Party violence (1965-1968)
7. The Philippines: Mendiola Bridge violence (1987)
8. Thailand: Red drum murders (1972-1976)

The aim of the project was first to establish the conditions under which violence against civilians occurred. The literature in political science generally identifies the use of state violence during two specific episodes in state evolution. The first is during the early stages of state formation. This is when countries are consolidating their territories and peoples, when violence is used instrumentally to subjugate peoples and spaces. The second stage at which state violence can occur is when states undergo regime transition to a different government or type of government. This form of violence, which is usually referred to as “exemplary violence” in the literature, is meant to demonstrate state power and eliminate enemies, while serving as a lesson to dissenters. Then over time, citizens will become accustomed to the new rules and conform accordingly.

The important central questions that the project sought to answer were as follows:

1. Under what conditions does state violence occur?
2. What accounts for the differences in the state’s use of violence?
3. Is the use of violence ever justified and if so, why?
4. How does a state reconcile itself to the use of violence afterwards?
5. If there is no attempt at reconciliation, why is this the case?
6. What are the common forms of reconciliation?
7. When are punitive justice and retributive justice used against the perpetrators of violence?
8. Does political transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance facilitate the addressing of state violence?

The findings of the most recent workshop and the preceding one in Hong Kong thus far are that the most common examples of state violence occurred during the Cold War and when authoritarian regimes were in power. In fact, the Okinawan case stands out as the only time when state violence was used against civilians in a state of war. In the most sustained and widespread use of state violence that resulted in the largest number of deaths (the cases of Cambodia and Indonesia), there was a change of government as well as of the rules of governance. The Khmer Rouge, which drew its strength from the countryside, was unused to urban areas and therefore vacated them, while carrying out a reign of terror against educated people, artisans, urban dwellers and eventually its own cadres. The Indonesian military, which was responsible for the violence against the Communists, acted in response to an abortive coup attempt that had led to the assassination of six senior military commanders.

There have been two attempts at reconciling previous cases of state violence in East Asia. The first of these took place in South Korea when a democratizing government acknowledged the military’s role in the Kwangju Incident, indicted military officials, and offered compensation to the victims, while erecting a memorial in their honor. In the second case in Cambodia, where the United Nations is currently conducting a tribunal against the main leaders of the Khmer Rouge, a punitive approach to justice is being used. A general survey of the other cases indicates that democratization does not always lead to reconciliation between the state and the victims of state violence. This is especially the case if the incident occurred a long time ago and there is no sustained pressure on the government to address it. On occasion, reconciliation is avoided simply in order to not disturb political calm or create tensions in response to episodes of violence. In fact, there was general agreement among the participants at the workshop that Asian countries tend to lean towards retributive rather than punitive justice. The choice of this form of justice was attributed to a greater need to maintain social and political calm rather than upset the fabric of society based on past conflicts. Western countries, on the other hand, seem to prefer the utilization of punitive justice which is meant to accord some punishment to the perpetrators of state violence in order to achieve justice.

The findings of the workshop will be published internationally in an edited book in order to publicize the research findings widely. In this way other scholars will be able to utilize the knowledge created and to build further upon it. The conveners of the workshop are thankful to the other organizations that have provided supplementary funding and administrative assistance for the project. These are the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), the City University of Hong Kong (CUHK), the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU), and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) of Germany.

Narayanan Ganesan, Professor at HPI

New Publications from HPI


New publications are now available. Both are the products of HPI research projects that were reported in back issues of *Hiroshima Research News*.



Northeast Asia's Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory

Edited by Mikyoung Kim and Barry Schwartz
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

(Based on the 2005-2007 project “Politics of Regret: Collective Memory in Northeast Asia” reported in the July 2007 issue.)



International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism

Edited by Narayanan Ganesan and Ramses Amer
(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010)

(Based on the 2007-2009 project “Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in Southeast Asia” reported in the March 2009 issue.)

- ◆ **Jul. 9** Mikyoung Kim attends a welcome reception for the mock UN General Assembly meetings held at Pukyong National University in Pusan, South Korea.
- ◆ **Jul. 10** HPI President Motofumi Asai attends as a panelist Section I “The Current Situation of Japan-DPRK Relations and Issues” of the 9th International Symposium organized by the Ritsumeikan Center for Korean Studies, held in Kyoto.
- ◆ **Jul. 11** Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture “Current Nuclear Issues: How to Pass on Hiroshima” at a peace study meeting organized by the Hiroshima Chapter of the AFS Japan Association Inc., held at the Hiroshima Youth Center.
- ◆ **Jul. 13** Mikyoung Kim gives lecture “Border Man Genre: A Narrative Analysis of North Korean Settlers in the South” at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, in Seoul, South Korea.
- ◆ **Jul. 17** Asai gives lecture “What to Do Towards Nuclear Abolition Under a New Political Climate” at a public meeting organized by the Hiroshima Association for a Non-Nuclear Government, held at the Hiroshima Green Arena. ▽Mizumoto gives speech “Evaluation of the NPT Review Conference: Toward Nuclear Abolition in 2020” at the 2nd peace study meeting of the Hiroshima branch of New Komeito.
- ◆ **Jul. 18** Asai gives lecture “US Post-Cold War World Policy” at the 19th regular meeting of the Kansai Peace Study Group, held in Kyoto.
- ◆ **Jul. 19** Mikyoung Kim gives lecture “Hiroshima Memory and Japanese Pacifism” at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Beppu, Oita Prefecture.
- ◆ **Jul. 22** Mizumoto gives lecture “Current World Situation of Nuclear Weapons and Hiroshima” at the “Peace Education” Course of Hiroshima International University.
- ◆ **Jul. 23** Mikyoung Kim attends the 24th Research Seminar on the History Between Japan and Korea, with the theme of the Dokdo/Takeshima issues, held at Hiroshima University.
- ◆ **Jul. 24** Asai gives lecture “What is Needed for Nuclear Abolition” at the Anti-A and H Bombs Conference Commemorating the 65th Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings, held in Kochi.
- ◆ **Jul. 25** Asai gives lecture “The Future Peace Movement” at a public meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Bloc of the Japan Teacher’s Union, held in Hatsukaichi, Hiroshima Prefecture.
- ◆ **Jul. 26** Asai gives lecture “The World Situation Surrounding Nuclear Abolition” at a study meeting of the “No Nuke Network from Hiroshima High School and Junior High School,” held at the Hiroshima Youth Center.
- ◆ **Jul. 28** Mizumoto gives lecture “Hiroshima and Peace” for a training course for journalists organized by Hiroshima City, held at the International Conference Center Hiroshima.
- ◆ **Aug. 3** Kazumi Mizumoto and Robert Jacobs give lectures “Hiroshima and Peace” and “Atomic Bombs in America” respectively, at the Peace Seminar 2010 of Bowling Green State University, hosted by the International Center of Hiroshima Jogakuin University. ▽Mikyoung Kim gives lecture “Hiroshima Memory Debates and the Japanese Pacifist Movement” at Hiroshima Prefectural Women’s University.
- ◆ **Aug. 5** Asai participates in a working session of the 2010 World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆ **Aug. 5-6** Narayanan Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim host the workshop “State Violence and Political Transition in East Asia” and present conceptual and comparative papers, in Seoul, South Korea.
- ◆ **Aug. 8-9** Ganesan presents paper “The Democratic Party of Japan’s Impact on Japanese Foreign Policy” at the workshop “Japan Under the DPJ: Regime Shifts and Regional Implications,” held in Manila, the Philippines.
- ◆ **Aug. 12** Mizumoto serves as the Vice-Chair at the 1st meeting of the Exhibition Review Committee of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆ **Aug. 14** Asai attends as a keynote speaker and panelist the 15th anniversary memorial meeting of the Peace Constitution League, held in Tokyo.
- ◆ **Aug. 23-Sep. 3** Ganesan trains NGO workers on public policy formulation and research methods in Yangon, Myanmar.
- ◆ **Aug. 25-27** Mizumoto gives paper “Nuclear Dangers and Disarmament/Non-proliferation Education” during the 22nd UN Conference on Disarmament Issues organized by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, held in Saitama.
- ◆ **Aug. 26** Jacobs presents paper “Nuclear Doomsday and the Origins of the Whole Earth” at the 35th Society for the Social Studies of Science Conference, held at the University of Tokyo, in Tokyo.
- ◆ **Sep. 2** Mikyoung Kim chairs a session “The State and People’s Movements” during the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, held in Washington, D.C., US, during which she is also elected as a co-editor of *North Korean Review* by the Association for Korean Political Studies for the 2011-2012 period.
- ◆ **Sep. 4** Asai gives lecture to a student group of the Minka Economics Study Group, Ritsumeikan University, held at the Aki Ward Community Cultural Center.
- ◆ **Sep. 11** Asai gives lecture “Rethinking the Japan-US Security Treaty” at the Peace Friendship Festival held in Kochi.
- ◆ **Sep. 12** Asai attends a memorial service at the cenotaph commemorating Korean forced labor at the Kobo Dam in Miyoshi, Hiroshima Prefecture.
- ◆ **Sep. 15** Asai gives lecture “Rethinking the Japan-US Security Treaty” at the 14th general assembly of the National Network for US Base Issues, held in Izunokuni, Shizuoka Prefecture.
- ◆ **Sep. 16** Mizumoto gives lecture “How to Live in the International Age: Pursuing Nuclear Abolition and International Contributions from an A-Bombed City” at a seminar on human rights, held at Hatsukaichi-Nishi High School, in Hatsukaichi, Hiroshima Prefecture.
- ◆ **Sep. 18** Taeko Kiriya presents paper “Postwar Reconstruction through the Eyes of Hibakusha” at a conference organized by the Trans-border Research Group, the Japan Association of International Relations, held in Fukuoka.
- ◆ **Sep. 19** Asai gives lecture “Thinking about Hiroshima: Nuclear Abolition and Article 9” to a group from the Kyoto Association for a Non-Nuclear Government, held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆ **Sep. 23** Asai attends as an advisor a discussion session of the “No Nuke Network from Hiroshima High School and Junior High School,” held at the Hiroshima Youth Center.
- ◆ **Sep. 25** Mizumoto gives lecture on the atomic bombs and nuclear issues at the 2nd lecture of the Consortium Kanmon, held in Kitakyushu.
- ◆ **Sep. 27** Mizumoto serves as the Vice-Chair at the 2nd meeting of the Exhibition Review Committee of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆ **Sep. 28** Mikyoung Kim presents paper “Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Pacifism and the Security Reality” at the Jeju Peace Institute, in Jeju, South Korea.
- ◆ **Sep. 30** Mikyoung Kim presents paper “ODA, Public Diplomacy and Korea’s National Strategies for the 21st Century” at an international conference organized by the Korean Association of Area Studies, held at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea.
- ◆ **Oct. 1** Professor Mizumoto is appointed Vice-President of HPI. ▽Jacobs presents paper “Architectures of Annihilation: The Logic of Building Japanese Houses at the Nevada Test Site” at the conference “Cold War Cultures,” held at the University of Texas at Austin, in Texas, US.
- ◆ **Oct. 2** Mizumoto gives lecture on the atomic bombs and nuclear issues at the 3rd lecture of the Consortium Kanmon, held in Kitakyushu.
- ◆ **Oct. 7** Mizumoto gives lecture “Hibakusha and the Danger of Nuclear Weapons” at an accompanying lecture for the exhibition “The Light: Portraits of the ‘Hibakusha,’” held at the Brunei Gallery of the School of Oriental and African Studies, the University of London.
- ◆ **Oct. 10-16** Mizumoto and Ganesan conduct benchmarking on Peace Studies at the Rotary Peace Center at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand, and the Center for Security and Peace Studies at Gadjah Madah University in Jogjakarta, Indonesia.
- ◆ **Oct. 16** Asai gives lecture “Japan’s Nuclear Policy (Reliance on US Nuclear Deterrence) and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Public Sentiments)” at the 6th lecture of the Consortium Kanmon, held in Kitakyushu.
- ◆ **Oct. 17** Asai attends as an advisor a working session “The Making of a ‘War-Mongering Country’ and US Bases, Local Governments and the People” during the 10th national meeting for study on local governance organized by the National Federation of Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Unions, held in Okayama.
- ◆ **Oct. 27** Asai gives lecture “The Senkaku/Daoyu Issue and Sino-Japanese Relations” at a public meeting organized by the Rengo News Agency, held in Tokyo. ▽Mizumoto gives lecture “How to Live in the International Age: Pursuing Nuclear Abolition and International Contributions from an A-Bombed City” at a seminar for international understanding, held at Hatsukaichi High School, in Hatsukaichi, Hiroshima Prefecture.
- ◆ **Oct. 29** Mizumoto gives lecture “Contribution to International Peace” at a training program for Level III Certified Nursing Administrators organized by the Hiroshima Nursing Association. ▽Hitoshi Nagai presents paper “The Philippine War Crimes Trials and Their Aftermath, 1947-1953” at the annual convention of the Japan Association of International Relations, held in Sapporo.

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