Introduction

Since the inauguration of President Obama who is advocating a “world free of nuclear weapons,” his idealistic image seems to have induced global momentum for nuclear abolition. At the same time however, other people see signs of realistic approaches within the Obama administration, particularly in his Nobel Prize speech in December 2009, the signing of the new US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 2010, and the compilation by the US Department of Defense of the Nuclear Posture Review which also took place in 2010.

Amid a mixture of hope and suspicion, the NPT Review Conference was convened at the UN Headquarters in New York in May, and ended after four weeks of discussions with the adoption of the Final Document. While the latest NPT Review Conference is being regarded as a relative success, it is important to examine the fundamental meaning of the treaty, the historical nuclear circumstances surrounding its development, the achievements made during the recent Review Conference and the future tasks that lie ahead of us.

Efforts for nuclear non-proliferation before the development of the NPT

The first efforts for nuclear non-proliferation began immediately after the Second World War. At the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, which was ten months after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US delegate Bernard Baruch made proposals for, among others, the establishment of the International Atomic Development Authority (IADA), the exclusive control of nuclear material by the IADA, and the prohibition on the production and the abandonment of nuclear weapons.

As this was the era when the US still had a monopoly over nuclear weapons, the USSR opposed Baruch’s proposals, assuming that the US attempt was aimed at nuclear monopolization by itself and the prevention of nuclear development by the USSR. In the second meeting of the Commission, the Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko proposed the prohibition of the possession, production and use of nuclear weapons, and the international control of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, with neither of the two superpowers having any real intention to put an end to their own nuclear development, the discussions ended without any progress and their respective proposals faded away.

In the meantime, there were the initiatives made by non-nuclear weapon states: at the UN General Assembly in October 1957, the then Polish President Adam Rapacki presented a proposal to establish a non-nuclear club,” the member states of which would refrain from manufacturing or introducing nuclear weapons into their territories.

The development of the NPT from a US-Soviet initiative

While all these actions imply that the concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons was already present among both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states by the 1950s, the factor that directly led to the development of the NPT was an initiative on the part of the two nuclear superpowers, the US and the USSR, from 1964 onwards.

In January 1964, during the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament held in Geneva, US President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed an arms control agenda of five points which included the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and international monitoring of nuclear material. He also submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty to the Committee in August 1965. At the same time, Gromyko, who was now the Soviet Foreign Minister, put forward a similar draft of a Soviet version at the UN General Assembly.

At that time, the USSR had intensified its objections to a plan to deploy US nuclear weapons to NATO member states. The rivalry between the US and the USSR was reflected in their differing attitudes towards the transfer of nuclear forces to international organizations such as NATO, an action which the US accepted while the USSR prohibited. However, the US shifted its focus from the deployment of nuclear forces within NATO territories to nuclear non-proliferation, and in October 1966 the US and the USSR agreed to develop a joint draft non-proliferation treaty.

Between August 1967 and May 1968, the two states jointly submitted a new draft and several revisions to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly. Their proposal was then approved at the UN General Assembly in June 1968, was signed on July 1 of the same year, and put into force on March 5, 1970.

The NPT system and NPT Review Conferences

The NPT consists of three pillars: “horizontal” non-proliferation, that is no increase in the number of nuclear weapon states; “vertical” non-proliferation, that is nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapon states; and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

There were also three points which generated dissatisfaction on the part of non-nuclear weapon states. The first of these was an insufficient provision for nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states. The second was the fact that the treaty did not guarantee reliable security against the use of, and intimidation by, nuclear weapons for non-nuclear weapon states. The third was inequality regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

At the same time, a change was made regarding the Review Conference, which the August 1967 draft had set for five years after the effectuation of the NPT, following a strong demand from non-nuclear weapon states, to the effect that it would now be held every five years based upon a proposal from over half of the signatories to the treaty.

Looking at the reactions of individual states to the treaty, France and China, who had conducted nuclear tests in 1960 and 1964...
respectively, were rather critical of the treaty, and these two nuclear weapons states only ratified it in 1992. At the same time, a majority of non-nuclear weapon states such as West Germany and Japan were cautious of acceding to the treaty. The key intention of the US and the USSR, the two states which had initially promoted the treaty, was not nuclear abolition or disarmament, but prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons to those states capable of nuclear development such as West Germany and Japan.

Review Conferences have been held every five years since 1975, as the non-nuclear weapon states demanded. Nevertheless, there were no significant achievements at the conferences in 1975 and 1980, and it was only in 1985 that a Final Document was adopted for the first time unanimously which severely criticized the inactive attitude of the nuclear weapon states towards nuclear disarmament. During the Review Conference in 1990, the year of the end of the Cold War, while the actions towards nuclear disarmament by the US and the USSR received a degree of recognition, states of the Non-Aligned Movement severely criticized the slow progress of negotiations over the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

**NPT Review Conferences since the end of the Cold War**

Since the end of the Cold War, some progress has been made in the NPT Review Conferences.

During the 1995 conference, a decision entitled “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” was adopted and it led to the indefinite extension of the US-only as the nuclear weapon states had demanded. The “Principles and Objectives” emphasized the following items: implementation of Article 6 of the NPT which stipulates the obligation of achieving nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states; completion of the negotiations on the CTBT by 1996; early completion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; systematic and incremental efforts by the nuclear weapon states towards nuclear abolition; expansion of nuclear-weapons-free zones; and negative security assurances (i.e. prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states).

Also adopted during the 1995 conference was a “Resolution on the Middle East” which was aimed at establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and encouraging non-NPT signatories such as Israel to become party to the treaty at the earliest possible opportunity. On the other hand, the Final Document adopted during the 2000 Review Conference contained 13 points of actions to be taken, such as an early entry into force of the CTBT, completion of negotiations on the Cut-off Treaty within five years, and unequivocal commitment to nuclear abolition by the nuclear weapon states. This Final Document seemed to give hope for further progress in nuclear disarmament. However, such optimism was significantly damaged by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the new US nuclear policy based on the policy of the “war on terrorism” advocated by the former US President George W. Bush. As a consequence, the 2005 Review Conference led to no substantial achievements as the US rejected the agreements reached on the two preceding occasions, and ended with no Final Document adopted.

**The 2010 Review Conference: its value and future tasks**

Despite the setbacks of the 2005 Review Conference, nuclear disarmament policy based on international cooperation which has been promoted by the Obama administration since 2009 had brought some optimism when the latest NPT Review Conference was convened in May this year. On May 28, the final day of the conference, the event ended with a Final Document which was adopted unanimously at the UN Headquarters in New York.

The Final Document consisted of 40 pages: the first half contains a Review of the operation of each Article of the NPT, which was presented as argued by the Conference Chair Libran Cabactulan; the second half is entitled “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions.” The conference decided to take note of the former, while the latter was adopted.

One of the significant achievements found in the Final Document is the fact that the “recommendation for follow-on actions,” or Action Plan, assumes the “Principles and Objectives” and the “Resolution on the Middle East,” both adopted in 1995, and the 2000 Final Document as an unquestionable basis, and reflects all of the related decisions and resolutions.

The Action Plan contained in the Final Document consists of 64 items: two of these are related to a “world free of nuclear weapons”; 20 to nuclear disarmament; 24 to nuclear non-proliferation; and 18 to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Apart from the Action Plan, the Document also contains ten items related to the “Resolution on the Middle East” and one on the North Korean nuclear issue.

More specifically, the Action Plan contains issues that have long been of significant importance to many member states, such as early entry into force of the CTBT, early conclusion of the Cut-off Treaty, and accession of India, Pakistan and Israel to the NPT. There are several new targets included in the Action Plan such as the convening of an international conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East and a Fissile Material Cut-off by the nuclear weapon states only ratified it in 1992. At the same time, a majority of non-nuclear weapon states were rejected due to opposition from the nuclear weapon states. These proposals included initiating discussions in 2011 on a commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, and the convening of an international conference in 2014 to consider ways and means to agree on a roadmap for nuclear disarmament within a specified timeframe.

Nevertheless, it is at least safe to say that overall the Final Document can be seen as a success, and it has laid down various actions to be taken towards nuclear disarmament and abolition. Furthermore, the Review contains a number of the most essential points such as the significance of nuclear abolition to be achieved within a specified timeframe, and the need for a nuclear weapons convention.

**What the last NPT Review Conference means to the people of Hiroshima**

The last NPT Review Conference was regarded with high expectation by the people of Hiroshima. There seem to be two contrasting views among them in relation to its results: relief at the adoption of the Final Document and disappointment at the absence of any specific deadline for the road to nuclear abolition. Both views accurately reflect the nature of the last Review Conference.

Nevertheless, the history of the NPT indicates that NPT Review Conferences have been an arena in which non-nuclear weapon states resist the NPT system, which they see as a mechanism originally imposed jointly by the US and the USSR, the former rivals in the Cold War, for the purpose of securing their own monopolization of nuclear power. Although overly optimistic expectations should be restrained, this “arena of resistance” should continuously be utilized and combined with various strategies in order to sustain ceaseless efforts towards nuclear abolition.

Professor at HPI
The Iranian Nuclear Issue and the NPT Regime

Shintaro Yoshimura

On the 17th and 18th of April this year, Iran convened its own conference entitled “International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” which was, according to the Iranian government, attended by representatives of governments and non-governmental organizations from approximately 60 countries. In his opening address, Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated that with wars, aggressions, occupation and the stockpiling of nuclear armaments and weapons of mass destruction, all societies were widely affected by a sense of threat and insecurity.

The Iranian leader then made several proposals, the first of which was to establish an independent international body for planning and overseeing the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which was to be entrusted with full authority not by the UN Security Council but by the UN General Assembly. At the same time, it was also proposed that the membership of the nuclear weapon states in the IAEA should be suspended. Behind this idea is a perception that legitimate applications of the NPT have been obstructed by the nuclear weapon states. Other proposals made during the speech included the revision of the NPT by non-nuclear weapon states, collective efforts to restructure the UN Security Council, the establishment of a working body for a global process of disarmament, and Iran’s active commitment to information disclosure and cooperation.

Iran’s motivation for holding this nuclear conference was partly attributable to the attempt by the US and some European countries to make resolutions imposing further sanctions on the “nuclear suspected” Iran for the fourth time. The recent swift actions of the Obama administration regarding nuclear issues have also accelerated Iran’s moves in this direction. In particular, stronger anti-Americanism during the conference was ignited by the US making Iran, along with North Korea, an exception to its policy of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, based on its suspicion of Iran’s development of nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT. Iran was further displeased when tighter control of nuclear materials was proposed during the Nuclear Security Summit that took place in Washington, D.C. during the same month, in which Iran was regarded as a terrorism-sponsoring state due to its support for Hamas and Hezbollah.

It is debatable whether, amid an intensified nuclear threat on a global scale, Iran’s severe criticism of the NPT and the UN Security Council can be labeled as the illogical defense of a “suspicious nuclear state.” However, it should be noted that Tehran’s claims do actually point out some undeniable contradictions within the NPT.

The NPT assumes that the nuclear weapon states are unquestionable parties whilst forbidding any other state the right to become a nuclear power. The very name of the treaty proves this: it is the Nuclear “Non-proliferation” Treaty, not the Nuclear “Abolition” Treaty. Thoughtless expectation of worldwide nuclear abolition by means of the NPT may be seen as optimistic. In fact, the NPT states hardly question the fact that the nuclear weapon states have continued to conduct research into nuclear weapons with greater destructive and operational capabilities. On the other hand, once a country is suspected of the development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states, that country will become a target of sanctions.

Another “suspected” nuclear and pro-American state, Israel, should also be examined in relation to the NPT. Israel, which is not party to the NPT, has never been questioned for suspected nuclear possession, even by the UN Security Council. This is in stark contrast to India and Pakistan, two South Asian countries which are also non-NPT states, and which have received severe international criticism. This underlines the strong tie between Israel and the US, the nuclear superpower. The NPT allows “exceptions” which reflect international political dynamics, thus it carries an impediment on the way towards nuclear abolition.

There are other cases which suggest contradictions that can be found in the NPT, one of which being North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003. The North Korean issue should be put on the table during the NPT Review Conference in May, together with the issues of the other non-NPT states discussed earlier. It is unforeseeable whether productive discussions and outcomes regarding North Korea can really be expected on this occasion. Notwithstanding this, how the issue will be dealt with is crucial to the universal validity of the NPT. At the same time, as the distinction between peaceful and military use of nuclear power is determined solely by the IAEA, the relationship between an inspected state and the nuclear superpowers which are major member states of the IAEA affects the progress of inspections, as in the case of Iran.

With this unequal “double standard” for the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states and for the NPT and non-NPT states, the NPT can be labeled as an “unequal treaty.” Unless this significant defect can be overcome, it is likely that no reform of the NPT can bear fruit. It should be noted in this discussion that behind the rise of suspicion about Iran’s nuclear development lies this inconsistent character of the NPT, and not the other way round.

What Hiroshima and Nagasaki sincerely call for is the abolition of nuclear weapons. That being so, the people of the two A-bombed cities should not be overwhelmed by the inclination towards nuclear control. The distortions of the NPT must not be overlooked, but should be adjusted within a wider framework of action for nuclear abolition, and this is what the time truly requires.

Professor at Hiroshima University
[Written in April 2010]
HPI Lecture Series for Citizens of Hiroshima (First Term 2010)

Perspectives on the 2010 NPT Review Conference

With the 2010 NPT Review Conference coming up in May, the first HPI Public Lecture Series of the 2010 academic year focused on the NPT and its history, looking at actions taken by the nuclear weapon states, Japanese nuclear policy, and efforts and challenges for the citizens of Hiroshima in working towards nuclear abolition.

Lecture 1 (April 9)
The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The process of its formation and its meaning today
Kazumi Mizumoto, Professor at HPI

The theme of the first lecture was the NPT, specifically its prehistory, formation process and meaning today. The formation of the NPT system can be traced back to the time when, immediately after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the US proposed international controls on nuclear power, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy. During the Cold War period, the NPT system was prepared for the purpose of the monopolization of nuclear power by the US and the Soviet Union, and there was also an intention on the part of the Soviet Union to prevent West Germany from possessing nuclear weapons. In the formation of the NPT, proposals by small countries such as Poland and Ireland also played an important role. Emphasizing the fact that the actual goal of the NPT is not nuclear abolition but non-proliferation, and that the NPT imposes far more obligations on non-nuclear weapon states than on nuclear weapon states, Mizumoto criticized the never-questioned fact that the NPT allows the deployment of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states by nuclear weapon states. Towards the end of his lecture Mizumoto emphasized the importance of solving problems surrounding nuclear weapons in a step by step manner under the NPT system. He stressed that the NPT system may not be an ideal format for nuclear abolition, but it need not be written off as an imperfect system, and instead should be utilized to achieve nuclear abolition.

Lecture 2 (April 16)
"Nuclear Weapon States" and the upcoming NPT Review Conference: The initiatives of President Obama and the US government
Takao Takahara, Professor at Meiji Gakuin University

In the second lecture, Takahara first revisited the history of nuclear development in the five nuclear weapon states, namely the US, the Soviet Union / Russia, the UK, France and China. He then examined the process of the formation of the NPT and the subsequent responses of the Japanese government. Also examined were the nuclear possessions of some non-NPT signatories like India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, although the last two countries are only suspected of possession, as well as US nuclear policy under the Obama administration. According to Takahara, President Obama is taking a more positive attitude towards nuclear disarmament and the 2010 NPT Review Conference represents a promising opportunity. However, he also stressed that it should not be overlooked that the US still clings to nuclear deterrence policy based upon the threat of possible nuclear attacks, and many of the existing nuclear weapons around the world are still ready to be launched within minutes, as was the case during the Cold War period. Lastly, Takahara emphasized that with the slogan “a world free of nuclear weapons” gaining stronger currency in the US, the current era is no longer that of nuclear deterrence, and therefore the “nuclear theology” should no longer be allowed to prevail.

Lecture 3 (April 21)
The NPT Regime transformed: The Indo-US Accord and nuclear South Asia
Osamu Yoshida, Professor at Hiroshima University

The third lecture focused on two non-NPT signatories, India and Pakistan. Yoshida looked at the process of nuclear development in India and the fluctuating positions of India and Pakistan in international society during the Cold War. He then examined the Indo-US Accord, explaining the relations between the two countries after 9/11. In contrast to the deteriorating relations between the US and Islamic countries and to Pakistan’s alarming nuclear possession, India has restored its international status, leading to the conclusion of the Indo-US Accord. Yoshida emphasized the fact that India clings to a position of possessing nuclear weapons and has declared not to join the NPT. However, at the same time the country is an active advocate of nuclear abolition and Indian leaders did have a point when they claimed that the NPT system allows nuclear weapon states to exclusively monopolize nuclear weapons. He concluded the lecture by commenting that the problem is not nuclear weapons per se, but rather the NPT system which does not necessarily lead to nuclear abolition, and which should be replaced with global approaches that can resolve various tensions and the real root causes of conflicts.

Lecture 4 (April 28)
The NPT Review Conference and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles: What should we do? What can we do?
Motofumi Asai, President of HPI

Asai first looked at the character of the NPT which is largely influenced by US nuclear policy, and then examined the importance of the role of non-nuclear weapon states and the equivocal stance of the Japanese government towards the NPT. Reviewing the nuclear policy of the Obama administration, in particular the US’ basic stance to justify war, its adherence to the position as the world’s only superpower, and the great importance that the US attaches to the US-Japan Security Treaty, Asai pointed out that there is a lack of grounds for the recent domestic as well as international trend of high expectation for President Obama and optimism for nuclear abolition, especially since Obama’s speech in Prague in April 2009. Asai also analyzed Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the secret nuclear arrangements between Japan and the US, and he pointed out the Japanese government’s dangerous rhetoric used to justify possible amendment of these Principles by regarding China and North Korea as potential threats. To conclude the lecture, he insisted that “No more Hiroshima/Nagasaki” and “No more war” should be linked together and formed into a call not only from Hiroshima and Nagasaki but from the whole country, and that Japan should leave behind the nuclear umbrella and take responsible international leadership in working towards nuclear abolition.

Despite an irregular schedule, the latest Lecture Series attracted a large audience on each occasion. All the lecturers received many questions which were mostly related to President Obama’s nuclear policy, Japan and the nuclear umbrella, and nuclear weapons and terrorists. Although the Japanese press and public opinion see a hope for nuclear disarmament and abolition from the recent US nuclear policy and US-Russian initiative, the five lecturers equally emphasized the importance of making unbiased judgments on the NPT and insisted that Japanese people, particularly the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, should not rely only on the NPT Review Conference or the leaders of the nuclear weapon states, but should make their own voices heard, keep balanced perspectives and take the initiative in working towards nuclear abolition.

Makiko Takemoto, Assistant Professor at HPI
HPI Research Projects

Below are our recently completed research projects.

**Culture and Collective Memory in Northeast Asia**

This workshop had two aims. The one was to assess collective memory theories of European origin with empirical cases from Asia. How might collective memory scholarship look if it emerged in Asia? I wished to trace integration and diversions between theories and empirical observations. The second was to amend the shortcomings of the forthcoming volume edited by Barry Schwartz and I, *Northeast Asia's Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), which represents the outcome of my previous HPI project “Politics of Regret: Collective Memory in Northeast Asia” (April 2005 - March 2007). The volume is arranged into three separate sections on China, Japan and Korea. This, I am afraid, creates a misleading impression that memories of the three cases exist in isolated locations. I would like to accurately project historical memories interacting with each other over changing social milieu, lingering sentiments, strategic imperatives, geopolitics, etc. Amid reemerging discussions on Asian regionalism, one of the binding ideational commonalities comes from an “entangled memory web.” This project actively includes comparative observations between the West and Northeast Asia, and the dynamic mnemonic interactions between nations and within each nation in the region.

![Image of workshop participants]

**Project period:** April 2009 - March 2010  
**Workshop dates:** February 13-14, 2010  
**Venue:** Athens, Georgia, US

*Project members and paper titles>*

- Youngshik Bong, American University (US)  
  “The Dokdo-Takeshima disputes between Japan and Korea”
- Gary Fine, Northwestern University (US)  
  “Civil society, the state, and memory movement: the biographical encyclopedia of pro-Japanese collaborators under the Japanese occupation of Korea”
- Jeong-Chul Kim, Northwestern University (US)  
  “Civil society, the state, and memory movement: the biographical encyclopedia of pro-Japanese collaborators under the Japanese occupation of Korea”
- Jungsun Han, Korea University (South Korea)  
  “Women as designated weeper in postwar films in Japan: gender and war memory”
- Andrew Hoskins, The University of Warwick (UK)  
  “Memories of the East and West”
- Kyoungwon Kim, Hanyang University (South Korea)  
  “Interaction, integration and diversion: memories of the East and West”
- Yangmo Ku, The George Washington University (US)  
  “Reckoning with historical issues in Japan and Germany: the nature of the ruling coalition and the mobilization of societal groups”
- Seung-Joon Lee, National University of Singapore (Singapore)  
  “Politics, memory and national identity construction of Singapore”
- Seungsook Moon, Vassar College (US)  
  “Korean memory politics and the presidency”
- Barry Schwartz, The University of Georgia (US)  
  “Memory as a cultural construct”
- Jungmin Seo, The University of Hawaii at Manoa (US)  
  “The ancient Kokuryo territory disputes between China and Korea”

*Mikyoung Kim, Associate Professor at HPI*

**The Formation, Development and Issues of “Peace Constitution” Theory in Postwar Japan**

After World War II, the Constitution of Japan (often called the “Peace Constitution”) was promulgated, of which the Preamble and Article 9 are known as “positive pacifist” articles. Since then, the study of the “Peace Constitution” has developed in academic circles. For the present project, I organized a research group, inviting pioneering researchers who have contributed to the development of “Peace Constitution” theory in Japan. We held a series of five workshops from March 24 to 30, 2010, at each of which one of the five researchers gave a presentation, providing insightful perspectives and evaluations as well as raising issues relating to the “Peace Constitution.” While the author participated in all of the workshops as a coordinator, there were also two additional speakers: Hiroshi Ando, a former professor at the Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University; and Eiji Ohga, a citizens groups organizer and former secretary to a member of the House of Representatives.

The five workshops will be transcribed in order to produce research materials. They may further be published in the form of journal articles or a book in order that the valuable knowledge can be disseminated to as many people as possible.

*Workshops and guest researchers>*

1. March 24 (Tokyo)  
   Mutsumi Shimizu (b. 1930), Prof. Emeritus at Chuo University
2. March 25 (Kawasaki)  
   Naoki Kobayashi (b. 1921), Prof. Emeritus at the University of Tokyo  
   Kazuo Ohta (b. 1935), Prof. Emeritus at Rakuno Gakuen University
3. March 26 (Tokyo)  
   Yasuo Sugihara (b. 1930), Prof. Emeritus at Hitotsubashi University
4. March 29 (Sapporo)  
   Tadakazu Fukase (b. 1927), Prof. Emeritus at Hokkaido University
5. March 30 (Sapporo)  
   Akihiro Kawakami, Assistant Professor at HPI

*Akihiro Kawakami, Assistant Professor at HPI*
Yukio Yokohara
The Past 40 Years of the Movement Against A and H Bombs in Hiroshima

The latest interview was conducted with Yukio Yokohara who has served as the Executive Director of the Hiroshima Council Against A and H Bombs (Hiroshima Gensuikin) since 1972 and as the Secretary-General of the body from 1986 to 1996. The interview mainly centered on his activities for the past 40 years and the current situation and tasks ahead for the peace movement in Hiroshima, particularly that related to the campaign for nuclear abolition. Along with this report, his thoughts on peace and Hiroshima can also be found in the journal Heiwa Kyōiku Kenkyū (Annual Report of Researches) vol. 30 (2003) compiled by the Hiroshima Institute for Peace Education.

1. My days at Hiroshima Gensuikin

I was born in Tottori in 1941. I first developed an interest in the issue of nuclear abolition when I was an executive member of the Japan Telecommunications Workers’ Union (Zendentsū the present All NTT Workers Union of Japan) and participated in fund-raising for hibakusha. As I was appointed General Secretary of the Hiroshima branch of Zendentsū in 1973 (later became Chairman), I became involved in Hiroshima Gensuikin. Those whose influence made me decide to come to Hiroshima included Ichiro Moritaki and Yasuo Miyazaki: they were all leading figures in the peace movement in Hiroshima, particularly regarding the issue of anti-A and H bombs. At first I was serving both in Zendentsū and in Gensuikin, but in 1986 I determined to concentrate on the latter and spend the rest of my life in Hiroshima, after receiving a request from Miyazaki and particularly from the charismatic Moritaki. My living would have been much easier had I carried on with the job at Zendentsū, but I decided to devote myself to Gensuikin even at the cost of my living. I think this reveals how motivated I was about the anti-A and H bombs movement.

The first occasion of political schism within the nuclear abolition movement occurred in 1960 when those who were inclined to support the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Socialist Party withdrew from the movement in opposition to Gensuikin’s criticism of the Japan-US Security Treaty. The most crucial factor leading to the political split, however, was the irreconcilable disagreement between those inclined to support the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party Japan, over the issue of the nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union: the former group defended the tests while the latter criticized them. This split had a grave effect on the later movement in two respects. Firstly, it led some prominent scholars and intellectuals, such as Seiji Imahori of Hiroshima University, to leave the movement in order to get away from, or avoid becoming engulfed in, the internal confrontation. This further became a significant psychological burden for all the people involved and led citizens and other scholars also to distance themselves from the movement. Such disaffection still continues today, leaving the movement stagnated. The second consequence was that the internal confrontation also affected other types of movement, similarly leading to internal splits within peace and labor movements. The internal split within the anti-A and H bombs movement might have been unavoidable anyway, but its spill-over effect on to other types of movement, with the intervention of political parties causing and aggravating the split, was a grave sin.

In such an environment, I held two rules for myself regarding how labor unions should participate in the peace movement: collective efforts and not a one-way imposition of policy from the labor unions; and an awareness of and active commitment towards a variety of issues in society with the labor unions’ resources, energy and influence, over and above their own concerns about working conditions. Among many actions I took based upon these rules, I particularly remember two occasions.

The first of these was the sit-in protest held on July 20, 1973, which we embarked on in reaction to the five-in-a-row nuclear tests that France conducted at Mururoa Atoll. The practice of sit-in protest at every nuclear test can in fact be traced back to this occasion. (Note: The first sit-in protest was conducted by Ichiro Moritaki in April 1962 which lasted for 17 consecutive days, protesting against the nuclear tests conducted by the US and the Soviet Union.) We then initiated similar sit-in protests and demonstrations in the city that could bring in many people from outside individual workplaces. As a result, during the time I was at Zendentsū, I believe the peace movement spread widely among ordinary citizens.

The second occasion was “the Hiroshima Action for Peace” held on March 21, 1982. The early years of the 1980s saw an upsurge in anti-nuclear movements across Europe following negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union over the deployment of INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) in Europe, and the Hiroshima Action was a spin-off of this large-scale movement in Europe. The Action succeeded in attracting over 190,000 participants, and further spread to Osaka and Tokyo to increase the total number of participants to more than 1 million.

However, the active involvement of the labor unions in the peace movement went into an abrupt decline as a result of the formation of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) in 1989. Headed by Akira Yamagishi who was a member of Zendentsū, Rengo lost its enthusiasm for the peace movement despite my advocating the active involvement of the labor unions. I said earlier that my decision to concentrate my efforts on Gensuikin came from a sense of mission, but it is surely the case that my criticism of such an attitude on the part of Rengo also played an important role in this decision.

One of the tasks into which I put particular effort during my time at Gensuikin was the internationalization of the anti-nuclear movement. For example, I organized an international forum for hibakusha on August 4, 1985, with Moritaki as the head of the organizing body, to which hibakusha from the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Malaysia and many other countries gathered. It was from around this time that a call arose for the
A similar example can be seen in the drafting of the Peace Declaration which is annually created by Hiroshima City. During the times of former Hiroshima Mayors Takeshi Araki and Takashi Hiraoka, the drafting process of the Declaration reflected opinions of local intellectuals and citizens. In fact, I was told by the scholar and peace activist Seiji Imahori that he used to be involved in the drafting process during the time that Araki was in office. And I myself did the same, as a member of Gensuikin, during Hiraoka’s term. We suggested that it should mention the need for Japan’s aggression to be acknowledged, a conviction which was actually incorporated into the Declaration between 1991 and 1995. It is sensible to gather all the wisdom of local experts of various fields and incorporate it into the Declaration. Nevertheless, this is no longer practiced nowadays.

At the same time, the internal split of the Hiroshima Prefectural Confederation of A-bomb Sufferers Organizations (Hidankyō) should not have happened. They should join hands again before it is too late, especially now that the average age of hibakusha is over 75. What hibakusha should now devote their efforts to is the consolidation of an environment in which they can pass on their activities to second-generation hibakusha. The problem here is that second-generation hibakusha have no well-established idea as to what their activities should be. The lack of discussion that can be found amongst first-generation hibakusha is also true for the second-generation. It is a serious concern that if no improvement can be achieved in the near future, the hibakusha movement will die out.

**Hibakusha’s activities and the peace movement**

It has traditionally been the case that in Hiroshima all peace-related issues are left on the shoulders of hibakusha. However, hibakusha’s activities should constitute part of the peace movement as a whole, and it is not the case that the former equates with the latter. At an early stage, peace activists in Hiroshima used to place hibakusha’s activities in the forefront of the peace movement, based on a recognition that hibakusha’s activities were part of the entire peace movement. Nevertheless, this has changed as time passed and now hibakusha shoulder everything.

It is this overload on hibakusha that has led to the stagnation of the peace movement in Hiroshima as discussed earlier, with no productive discussions on war or on a Hiroshima spirit taking place, but only reiterations of the damages caused by the atomic bombing. In fact, issues closely related to the atomic bombings such as Japan’s war responsibility, reparations and relations with its Asian neighbors used to be taboo in Hiroshima until a certain point in the past. Those issues of Japan’s aggressive side became subjects of discussion from the mid-1980s; nevertheless, they can more often than not be seen as an irreconcilable antonym of Japan’s victimhood even today. What is still avoided is the most fundamental task, which is to have thorough discussions in order to face up to the last war in its entirety.

(Interviewed on April 23, 2010)
Taeko Kiriya, Lecturer

Dr. Taeko Kiriya was born in Yokohama. She obtained a BA from Hosei University in 2003, an MA from Hiroshima City University in 2005, and a PhD in Intercultural Communication from Hosei University in 2009. She then served as a research fellow at the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (April 2007 - March 2009), a part-time lecturer at Hosei University (April 2009 - March 2010), and a member of staff at the Institute for Sustainability Research and Education, Hosei University (October 2009 - March 2010). Dr. Kiriya specializes in intercultural communication, with the topic of the reconstruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as her current research theme.

“I am very glad for the opportunity to join HPI. The incentive for my research on hibakusha came from my personal background with my mother’s family having experienced the atomic bombing in Nagasaki while my father’s side had not, since my childhood. I have always been aware of the serious psychological gap that exists between hibakusha and non-hibakusha. I wrote my undergraduate dissertation on Nagasaki based on my grandmother’s diary. After completing my Master’s thesis on Hiroshima, I incorporated these two works into a Doctoral dissertation that I submitted to Hosei University. For my future research, I would like to examine the reconstruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as seen through the eyes of hibakusha, by comparing and contrasting interviews and archival materials.”

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