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The Historical Significance of the ASEAN Charter
——The Challenge for Japan

By Kimio Kawahara

1. ASEAN's 40th Anniversary

It is 40 years since the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). There is a Confucian saying, "I wavered not at age 40," indicating a certain level of maturity attained. On November 20, 2007, in commemoration of its 40th anniversary, ASEAN held a summit at which all heads of member states signed the historic "ASEAN Charter." ASEAN was formed in 1967, shortly after the United States began its bombing campaign in North Vietnam in an act of intervention in the Vietnamese Civil War. Since its inception, ASEAN has never once resorted to military force when a conflict has arisen between its members. It has always succeeded in resolving problems through peaceful talks. This fact, when faced with the frequent outbreaks of regional conflict and civil strife in many areas around the world in the post-Cold War era—not to mention the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq after 9/11—this "warless" ASEAN Charter has historic significance in itself as it stands as a testimony to the achievement of 40 years of non-recourse to force among ASEAN members.

What is more, the articles of the ASEAN Charter, which lay down future courses of action for member states and peoples, reach out beyond the bounds of ASEAN's peace pact and involve the East Asian Community members and the countries of Eurasia. On three salient points, the ASEAN Charter goes well beyond the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) signed in 1976 following the fall of Saigon.

2. The ASEAN Charter: Three Salient Points

The first point of difference is that ASEAN was originally formed with the intention of strengthening economic ties, in accordance with members' desires to be no longer at the mercy of the superpowers. United under this aim were nations with diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. At the time, the key word was resilience. TAC espoused the strengthening and promotion of national and regional resilience. As ASEAN membership grew to 10 countries and regional coordination expanded to ASEAN+3 and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), member states reinforced their own economic resilience. Thus in drawing up the ASEAN Charter, the focus was on bolstering regional resilience. The emphasis made in articles relating to its purposes and external relations is on relationships and cooperation with partners outside the region, and on the upholding of ASEAN's centrality and leadership role as the key proponent in intra-regional coordination.

The second point of note is that ASEAN inserted two additional articles into the charter that are not spelled out in existing international laws or TAC. These are intended to ensure that member states are not thrown into confusion by the designs and interests of the superpowers. In the wake of 9/11, the pursuit of sole supremacy and trans-boundary preemptive strikes have come to hold sway in the international arena. Thus it has become necessary to include the following precepts in addition to the principles that had been hitherto adhered to: those of non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states; respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; and the renunciation of invasion, threats and intimidation using military force. The first of these two articles concerns respect for the right to be free from interference, subversion and coercion from external parties, and the second concerns restraint from policies and involvement in action that undermines the sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as political and economic stability of member states, including the use of territory. Using the key word ASEAN, this may be regarded as a process of generating political resilience.

In this way, ASEAN is strengthening economic power and improving regional resilience, and to maintain these it is attempting to equip itself with political resilience by means of the ASEAN Charter. What then is the third new pillar of the charter? Since its formation, the focus of ASEAN's resilience has been on the nation and the region as a whole. The ASEAN Charter places a new emphasis on the strengthening of *people's resilience*. The respective objectives of the ASEAN Charter are: to achieve a high quality of life for the people of its member states, to develop human resources to empower the people, to enhance the well-being and livelihood of the people by providing them with equitable access to opportunities, and to promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building.

After World War II, the nations of Southeast Asia emerged from colonial rule and a long history of oppression by powerful nations set out to strengthen regional resilience, which would allow them to stand their ground against the superpowers, through the formation of ASEAN. Now having achieved this 40 year milestone, ASEAN has declared its intention to ensure its people's resilience. Herein lies the greatest historical significance of the ASEAN Charter: to achieve the charter's most important thrust, ASEAN's goal is to establish regional autonomy without resorting to force.

3. The U.S. "Smart Power" Strategy and Beyond

Meanwhile, the United States of America has been caught up in the quagmire of the war against terror for six years since the attacks of 9/11. On November 6 last year, almost coinciding with the signing of the ASEAN Charter, the study *THE CSIS COMMISSION ON SMART POWER: A smarter, more secure America* was published. This was a non-partisan report prepared mainly by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage who are also well-known in Japan. Reputed to have a strong bearing on the diplomatic and defense policies of the future American president, it manifests a grave sense of crisis, stating that overdependence on military might during the past six years has led to loss of confidence in the U.S., even among its old allies. America has the ability to wield both "hard power" and "soft power." The former is typified by military force. The latter is exemplified not merely by cultural assets such as Hollywood movies and American goods but also by political values, the ideas enshrined in the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights, economic and educational systems, active participation in international institutions, the exercise of sovereignty, and above all the success of America itself as a nation. However, the report advocates the need for creating "smart power" that integrates both hard and soft power. No matter who will get to sit in the Oval Office following the next presidential election, the study stresses that hope and optimism should be encouraged, and not fear and anger. It identifies five areas of focus: the revitalization of alliances and partnerships as well as institutions; promotion of global economic growth; diplomacy conducted on a long-term basis; economic integration that includes the disengaged, both nationally and internationally; and technologies and innovations that address issues of energy and climate change.

There is a force at work in this thinking which is in common with that of the ASEAN Charter. America is considering moving away from dependence on military solutions to effect a major policy change. Yet the report's greatest concern is that the most important component, the country's soft power resources, is beyond the reach of the government and is held collectively by the private sector, civil society, bilateral alliances and non-U.S. international organizations. This may well result in significant problems when trying to coordinate these resources. The new elements of the ASEAN Charter should be praised for their historical foresight in proposing a framework which is seeking to assist the strengthening of regional stability with such problems in mind. In this context it is important to consider what political action Japan should take. This is a major challenge facing Japan.

Kawahara is president at Nagasaki Peace Institute

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Interview and editing by **Motofumi Asai**
(Interviewed on December 11, 2007)

1. A-Bomb Experience

I passed the entrance exam to the school of maritime technology in 1941. Although the school normally offered a six-year course, it was shortened as the war intensified. Therefore when Japan was defeated in the war, I had already graduated from school and begun working for a shipbuilding company. Although civilian ships were all carried off by the government for military use in those days, many of them were sunk by torpedoes and fuel for them was scarce. I was not drafted into the military and didn't have to join the troops.

I was 19 when the atomic bomb fell. Prior to this, my older brother had been hospitalized in the Imperial Japanese Army Hospital in Matsue, Shimane Prefecture. Due to the fact that I had received a telegram informing me that he was in a critical condition, I took a few days off from work and decided to go to see him. On the morning of August 6th I bought a ticket to Matsue in Kaitaichi Station, three stations away from Hiroshima Station, and was standing on the platform waiting for a train. At that time I noticed three B-29 bombers flying overhead. Looking up at the sky, I wondered why the air-raid sirens weren't sounding. Then I saw something white falling from one of the airplanes. The next moment a powerful white flash pierced my eyes. Instantly I caught a scent of danger and dived to the ground. I lost consciousness for a short time. After regaining consciousness, I looked around and saw people running away from Hiroshima City. Wondering what had happened, I followed them. Looking over my shoulder I saw a mushroom cloud rising above Hiroshima City. It was not the usual pure black smoke caused by fire but was mixed with red, yellow and purple.

After a while, I had second thoughts and hesitantly walked back to Hiroshima Station so that I could go to Matsue. As I came near Hiroshima Station, I met people whose faces were swollen beyond recognition or whose skin hung down from their bodies. I was worried about my grandfather whose turn it was to go into Hiroshima City to break down buildings so that potential fires wouldn't spread. I tried to enter the city, thinking that I had to save my grandfather who might be suffering like those whom I had just seen. But the soldiers did not allow me to enter the city and the area was filled with fire, so I didn't know what to do. In the end, I had to walk back home, about 10 kilometers from the city. Thus I didn't directly experience the atomic bombing, but was exposed to the residual radiation caused by the atomic bombing on that day.

On August 7, as the Sanyo Line of the Japanese National Railways wasn't running, I walked to Hiroshima Station, where I found that the Geibi Line wasn't running either. There was a train from Yaga Station, one stop north from Hiroshima Station, being used to evacuate A-bomb survivors. So, I took that train together with the A-bomb survivors to Matsue. I arrived in Matsue in the early hours of the 8th and went straight to the hospital to see my brother. (He died on August 15th). I decided to come back to Hiroshima that same day and met a doctor and nurse on the train who were going to Hiroshima to assist with the relief work. They asked me to take them to Hiroshima Teishin Hospital and I agreed. We arrived at Hiroshima Station a little before 11 o'clock on the 9th. It was the first time for me to see the whole picture of Hiroshima following the atomic bombing. What could I say? It was a town of rubble as far as the eye could see. From Hiroshima Station I could even see as far as Ujina Port and Ninoshima Island. I was severely shocked and wondered what kind of powerful bomb it was that could destroy the city so completely.

What shocked me next was the way that people died. There was a bridge called "Enkobashi Bridge" in front of Hiroshima Station. I found several dead bodies there with their arms and legs burned to the bone and their bellies swollen but unburned. They did not appear to be human any more; they were just things. I felt strongly that the bomb had transformed humans into something else. After a while, military trucks carrying dead bodies came to the bank of the River Enko in front of Hiroshima Station. Soldiers started to line up these dead bodies, pour kerosene over them and then cremate them. This seemed a terrible way to cremate people. Besides, it made me wonder how one could distinguish the bones from one another if the dead bodies were cremated that way. The unidentified bones of 70,000 people were placed into the Atomic Bomb Memorial Mound in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in 1955. I guess that the bones gathered on the river-bank that day were also put into the mound. Dead bodies were cremated that way all over Hiroshima City.


Kazushi Kaneko

When I took the doctor and nurse to Hiroshima Teishin Hospital, many A-bombed survivors were lying down on the stone-paved square in front of the gate as if they were fish scattered in a fish market. Their skin was stripped off, their muscles appeared from the inside, maggots bred over their bodies, the blazing sun shone down on them mercilessly and an indescribable stench hung in the air. I felt as if I was hearing the last moaning of tortured people. No one could imagine that they would survive. Until then I had believed that Japan would ultimately win the war. But when I saw that scene, I thought that Japan would surely lose the war.

2. The Hiroshima Council of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations

I became a member of the Hiroshima Council of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations in 1988, responding to a request from the council and saying that I would be happy to help them if I could be of any use. It was shortly after my retirement following 40 years of teaching in school, which I began in 1946. The Chugoku Shimbun Newspaper wrote on its web page that the Hiroshima Council of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations split up because communist-leaning members held their own conference in 1964. But what I learned from senior members of my council was that these members did not volunteer to leave the Hiroshima Council, but were forced to leave, mainly because Mr. Ichiro Moritaki, the then-President of the Hiroshima Council, refused to register communist-leaning people as members in 1964 when the Campaign Against A- and H-Bomb split due to the confrontation between socialist and communist members. As a result, communist-leaning members ended up holding their own conference. Professor Kiyoshi Sakuma of Hiroshima University (who died in 1991) served as the first Director General, followed by Mr. Masanori Ichioka (who died in 1997). I am the third Director General.

When France held nuclear tests in 1995, members of both councils staged a joint sit-in protest in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park for the first time. In the general meeting of each Hiroshima Council in 1997, members of both councils attended the other's general meeting. I called for the unification of the Hiroshima Councils in 1998. Ms. Sakae Ito (who died in 2000), the then-President of the other Hiroshima Council after Mr. Moritaki (who died in 1994), agreed with my idea and showed a willingness to work together. Mr. Tsuboi, who followed Ms. Ito as President, is not anti-communist either. On December 7, 2007, I had an opportunity to talk with him on peace issues in an interview project organized by The Chugoku Shimbun Newspaper and found no major differences between our thinking. We are the same age and both of us retired from teaching work in March, 1986. Since I formally proposed to unite the Hiroshima Councils, each council's representative is supposed to attend and address the other's general meeting. We have bridged some differences that way. However, the Rengo, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation, behind Mr. Tsuboi is rather right-leaning and the relationship between the organization and our council is like a mix of oil and water. Our difficulty in achieving unification might not be unrelated to Mr. Tsuboi's respect for the Rengo. Regarding the prospects for unification, I would like by all

means to achieve it while I am in office as Director General. A-bomb survivors also criticize the Hiroshima Councils, asking why there are two councils and why they are not united. I agree with this opinion. Opposing forces take advantage of the separate peace movements of the two different councils. If the Hiroshima Councils were united as one, we could exert more influence.

3. Local Grassroots Movements

More than 20 years have passed since I retired from work and agreed to serve as president in my neighborhood association in the Senogawa area of Aki Ward. Soon after I began this work, I set up the "Sunflower Peace Group in the Senogawa Area." Anybody can join this group as long as they are interested in honoring peace. We now have several dozen members and collect 300 yen per person each month to fund attendance at various peace movements. The association also helps us to collect signatures and money to join the conference of the Japan Congress Against A- and H- Bombs every year. We send 15 or 16 members to the world conference of the congress every August. We also save money and cover travel expenses for members to attend meetings such as in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture to oppose the reinforcement of U.S. forces there. I have also organized a group of A-bomb survivors who were not previously connected with each other in my neighborhood. We have made a list of A-bomb survivors in the area, chosen board members and now hold a monthly meeting by region. According to the Senogawa Town historical record, 174 people who were forced to go to Hiroshima City to break down buildings were affected by the atomic bombing. We built a memorial to commemorate them and hold a memorial service every year. This service has drawn more people than before, including non-A-bomb survivors. Currently, six groups of women's associations in elementary schools and neighborhood associations also participate in the service. During the service, students make a vow for peace and present the work they have done in peace education classes in school. The service concludes with the students singing a song for peace. We held the 15th service this year.

I believe that the key to stimulating the peace movement in Hiroshima is through grassroots movements. Grassroots movements might not bring about discernible results at once, but they will raise the level of the overall peace movement, while helping people grow to understand the current state of Japanese politics. It is important to make patient efforts to involve more young people and others who are interested in the peace movement, at the same time as pressing ahead with grassroots movements. With this in mind, we have recently established the Senogawa Article 9 Association.

4. Hiroshima City Civil Protection Plan

The Hiroshima City Civil Protection Plan was developed on the assumption that a nuclear weapon will be dropped on this city again. Such a plan is ineffectual and immoral. The plan is meaningless because we have to consider instead what we can do to abolish nuclear weapons. The premise of planning for another atomic bombing is equivalent to an approval of the existence of nuclear weapons. If a nuclear weapon were to be dropped, there is nothing we can do to protect people. It is nonsense to say that one should do this or that to protect civilians. Such a statement is inhumane. Our council is not indifferent to this issue. If both Hiroshima Councils raised a voice in protest, Hiroshima City might have second thoughts about this plan. The Seven A-bomb Survivors' Organizations in Hiroshima need to take up the problem and hold a meeting to raise our voices in protest, which we hope will ultimately lead to nuclear abolition.

Asai is president at HPI

HPI Research Forum

July 18, 2007

Title: When Might Does Not Make Right: The United States Must Be Accountable for International Crimes in Iraq

Speaker: Lennox Hinds, Professor, Rutgers University, U.S.

Lennox Hinds

Hinds is a well-known specialist in international and criminal law, who has been active in human rights movements over many years, both within the U.S. and overseas. He was highly critical of the U.S. policies on Iraq even before the start of the Iraq War. In this forum he gave a detailed analysis of the illegality of the Iraq War that was initiated by the U.S. and Britain.

Hinds views the war, started in 2003 by U.S. President George Bush and then British Prime Minister Tony Blair for the purpose of procuring oil, as an "act of aggression," as stated in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314. Accordingly, he claims that this war was a "crime against peace," pursuant to the Nuremberg Doctrine.

Hinds explained that the U.S. and British governments perpetrated an "armed attack" against Iraq, and thus triggered Iraq's "inherent right" to individual and collective self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51. In other words, Iraq was clearly the victim in the conflict and had a legitimate right under international law to seek U.N. assistance in deterring aggression. Yet, no U.N. member state came to the defense of Iraq. Hinds criticized this U.N. stance, claiming that the situation could be equated to the League of Nations adopting a resolution ratifying Japan's belligerent occupation of Manchuria, Mussolini's belligerent occupation of Ethiopia or Stalin's belligerent occupations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Furthermore, Hinds asserted that Iraq was the first victim of "Preventive Warfare" since World War II, i.e., the same doctrine that was adopted by the Nazi regime in Germany. The U.S. and British governments used this doctrine to justify their action against Iraq. It should be noted that the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected this doctrine when Nazi defendants attempted to use it to justify their invasion of Norway.

If such a preemptive strike without legal justification or evidence was to be repeated worldwide, Hinds warned that it would result in a lawless world, in which no one would be safe and the most reckless warlord could potentially annihilate the people of the earth with weapons of mass destruction.

Hinds concluded that we must initiate a movement to bring Bush, Blair and their lieutenants to trial for committing crimes of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity in order that their "impunity for egregious crimes under international law" will not go unrecognized and unpunished in either international courts of law or public opinion. He suggested that the trial of Augusto Pinochet should be seen as a precedent and a model in this case.

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

HPI Research Project

Engagement with North Korea

"Engagement with North Korea," one of the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI)'s Research Projects in progress, is now in its final stage. This project aims to publish an edited volume that is based on the papers of the participants of the two workshops held at HPI on 11-12 December 2006 and at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University on 8-9 June 2007. As the coordinator of this project, I will briefly introduce the research background, objective and main findings of the research.

Tension between North Korea and the outside world has drastically increased over the past few years. In 2006, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and then a nuclear device; in response, the United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions that sanctioned North Korea for its destabilizing behavior. However, the member countries of the Six-Party Talks—North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan—reached an agreement in February 2007 over initial steps towards the denuclearization of North Korea. This agreement aimed at bringing about the shutting-down and disablement of North Korea's nuclear facilities and the complete declaration of all its nuclear programs, in exchange for aid in the form of the provision of heavy fuel oil. The actual shut-down of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in July and the disablement process of other nuclear facilities that began since November are regarded as the first accomplishments of the five countries' concerted engagement with North Korea, which are seen as leading towards the common goal of the dismantlement of this isolated country's nuclear program.

How to continue to make progress in relation to the denuclearization of North Korea remains a big question, and it is likely that over the coming months the process may undergo setbacks. Furthermore, "progress" differs considerably from the actual completion of the process. For completion, there needs to be a parallel substantive change in international relations centered on the Korean Peninsula, particularly between the United States and North Korea and between Japan and North Korea. Inasmuch as the issue of the denuclearization of North Korea is in itself a complicated and unpredictable exercise, there has been extensive controversy among policymakers and academics over the wisdom and legitimacy of engagement as a strategy used to come to terms with the issue. Critics and defenders of engagement continue to debate the merits and drawbacks of proposed policies towards North Korea.

Despite extensive controversy however, there has in fact been little sustained effort made to explore the theoretical logic behind engagement or to assess whether or not—and if so, in what ways—engagement has actually worked on the Korean Peninsula. The question of engagement is a vital issue for both scholars and policymakers alike: how the world deals with North Korea will have ramifications for both regional and global stability, and it is thus all the more important that policy be adopted and conducted from a sound theoretical and empirical basis.

The purpose of this project is to examine the theoretical basis of engagement as a viable alternative to coercion, and the practical questions related to the five neighboring states' engagement with North Korea. It deals with the nuclear issue as a critical though not sole subject in this discussion. Engagement with North Korea involves negotiations and economic relations between the relevant states anchored by the Six-Party Talks: in particular, economic issues have mattered significantly and will continue to matter in the denuclearization process. Therefore this project deals with the political implications of economic issues as well as North Korea's nuclear issue *per se*.

The principal finding of this research reveals that engagement in general and the Six-Party Talks' engagement following the February 2007 agreement in particular represents a *viable policy alternative* to coercive strategies. According to proponents of coercive strategies, compellence, whether in the form of military action or economic sanctions, raises the costs of provocative behavior and, in turn, modifies a state's behavior. However, in reality compellence has rarely shown itself strong enough to modify destabilizing behavior and has in many cases reinforced that behavior. In contrast, engagement represents a strategy whose main function is to defuse a potentially dangerous situation not by means of threats but through incentives. The distinguishing feature of engagement is the contention that positive inducements and an extension of benefits can produce a change in a destabilizing state's behavior and thereby in the long run transform that state by creating new interests.

In the North Korean case, a policy of engagement was indeed eventually arrived at when it became clear that coercive strategies were unlikely to succeed and were also unlikely to gain the support of critical actors. On the strength of the mostly positive moves of 2007, the potential for a long-term agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK is greater now than it has been in the past five years. The February 2007 agreement and its follow-up meetings which have taken place as part of the Six-Party Talks, including its five working groups, have led to continued, albeit halting, progress. Regardless of what many may think about engagement, it appears to be the only way to facilitate North Korean denuclearization.

Although there are clearly many remaining potential obstacles which could derail progress at any time, it is prudent to consider how best to implement a comprehensive agreement and what the actual details and costs of that agreement will entail. Three potential issues that will require sustained attention over the coming months are: i) the political issues involved in dealing with North Korea; ii) the costs and actual problems in implementing any agreement to decommission nuclear facilities; and iii) the process of institutionalizing the current negotiations to ensure continuing progress even if the nuclear issue is resolved. All three issues will likely prove far more difficult to address than many observers expect and therefore sustained attention and engagement will be critical to ensure continued progress on the Korean Peninsula. The alternative—sliding back into confrontation and once again reversing whatever progress has been made—is a sufficiently dangerous path that all countries would be wise to continue avoiding.

By Sung Chull Kim, professor at HPI

HPI's Lecture Series for Citizens of Hiroshima

"Towards Overcoming Barriers between Japan and Korea: Mutual Understanding and Peace Building between Japan and Korea/*Choson*"

The Hiroshima Peace Institute held its eighth public lecture series entitled "Mutual Understanding and Peace Building between Japan and Korea/*Choson*," consisting of five lectures, from November 1st to 29th, 2007 at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.

The series is a follow-up version of the lecture series held last year which covered various pressing issues between Japan and Korea. However, this year the title was extended from "between Japan and Korea" to "between Japan and Korea/*Choson*." *Choson* is an ancient name for Korea which is used for the official name of North Korea in the Korean language.

In this lecture series we invited Hiroshi Nakao, an expert in the modern history of Japan-Korea relations, as guest speaker to examine the detailed modern history of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The period from *Hideyoshi's* invasion of Korea (during the 1590s) to the dispatch of Korean diplomatic delegations during the *Tokugawa* dynasty (17th-19th century) was covered in the third lecture. The period from the rise of the "conquering Korea" debate in the late *Tokugawa*/early-*Meiji* era (mid-19th century) to the years before the colonization was examined in the fourth lecture.

From HPI, Prof. Sung Chull Kim discussed the issues of the Six-Party Talks for the denuclearization of North Korea in the first lecture. Prof. Mikyoung Kim analyzed the issue of comparative memories of war in Japan and Korea in the second lecture and President Motofumi Asai presented proposals for understanding Japan's relations with North and South Korea in the fifth lecture.

Approximately 60 participants attended the lectures throughout the series, including businessmen, housewives and students, among whom were some Korean residents and also a few citizens from outside Hiroshima Prefecture.

According to the participant survey conducted following the fifth lecture, to the question "Has your understanding of peace issues improved?" 55% answered "very much" and 42% answered "to some degree." This reveals that in total, 97% of the respondents had improved their understanding.

Lecture Summaries

(1) Nov. 1 "Engagement with North Korea: The Japanese Government's Viable Choice" by Sung Chull Kim, Professor at HPI

At the outset, Prof. Kim analyzed in detail the international relations centered on North Korea. He pointed out that all the countries concerned approach North Korea with different objectives. The issue of highest priority differs depending on the country: "Non-proliferation" for the U.S., "the status quo on the Korean Peninsula" for China, "economic interdependence and eventual unification" for South Korea and "the abduction issue" for Japan. For the U.S., the removal of North Korea from its list of terror-sponsoring states cannot be avoided, but for Japan, which is pushing a hard-line policy, this is not acceptable. Prof. Kim proposed that Japan, instead of relying solely on sanctions, should adopt a flexible diplomatic approach towards North Korea, including a forward-looking engagement policy; he stated that "progress in the nuclear issue may lead to progress in the abduction issue, but not vice versa."

(2) Nov. 8 "Peace, War Memories and Museums in Japan and Korea" by Mikyoung Kim, Assistant Professor at HPI

Prof. Kim compared the narratives and thoughts shown in the exhibits of the *Yushukan* War Museum in *Yasukuni* Shrine, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Independence Hall and the *Seodaemun* Prison History Hall. The first two are located in Japan and the other two in South Korea. Prof. Kim also pointed out that, based on surveys of college students from the two countries, whereas Japanese students expressed perceptions of South Korean society as being "hard-working," holding "strong emotions," and "pride," Korean students described perceptions of Japanese society as being "obscene," "cruel" and "ordered," and that this represents a huge gap between the two. Finally, she emphasized that by overcoming ethnocentrism and through the promotion of peace-oriented history education, both societies should endeavor to build mutual trust and collaboration.

(3) Nov. 15 "Why the Quartercentenary of *Chosen Tsushin Shi* (Korean Diplomatic Delegation)? *Jinshin* Invasion and *Chosen Tsushin Shi*" by Hiroshi Nakao, Visiting Professor at Kyoto University of Art and Design

Diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea have broken off in the past due to the two invasions of *Toyotomi Hideyoshi*, brutality during Japan's occupation and the abductions of tens of thousands of Koreans to Japan. In order to restore the relationship, *Tokugawa Ieyashu* took the strong initiative to invite the *Chosen Tsushin Shi* delegation to Japan which was successfully achieved in 1607. An improvement in Japan-Korea relations was necessary for the new *Tokugawa* dynasty to expand its trade with East Asia including China. Prof. Nakao described *Hideyoshi's* invasion plan into the Asian Continent, atrocities committed on the battlefield by Japanese soldiers, negotiations between *Tokugawa* and the Korean government, and various scenes of interchange between ordinary Japanese citizens and Korean delegations during their visits to Japan through the use of video and other historical materials.

(4) Nov. 22 "From Good-Neighbor Diplomacy to the Conquering-Korea Policy: Japan-Korea Relations of the late-*Tokugawa*/*Meiji* Period" by Hiroshi Nakao

Twelve *Chosen Tsushin Shi* delegations were dispatched during the *Tokugawa* period of which the first three were called "*Kaito Sakkan Shi*" which literally means a delegation to respond to Japan's offer and to return abductees kidnapped by *Hideyoshi*. During the *Tokugawa* era a stable Japan-Korea relationship was maintained, good-neighbor diplomacy between the two countries continued and the *Chosen Tsushin Shi* brought various aspects of Korean culture to Japan. However, a group of ideologues who pushed to conquer Korea emerged among the proponents of imperial Japan at the end of the *Tokugawa* period. The new *Meiji* government shifted to hard-line diplomacy towards Korea through actions such as dispatching a warship to *Kanghwa* island in Korea in order to open up its ports for trade. Subsequently, descriptions of *Chosen Tsushin Shi* that symbolized the good relationship between Japan and Korea disappeared from Japan's school history textbooks and then Japan initiated the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War. Prof. Nakao concluded his lecture by casting doubt over "whether the historical recognition shown in the novel *Saka no Ue no Kumo* [*Clouds over the Steep Path*] written by *Ryotaro Shiba* was accurate." The novel describes the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War as marking the starting point of Japan's militarism.

(5) Nov. 29 "Japan and Korea/*Choson*: Invitation to *Tasha Kankaku* (Sense of Otherness) and Imagination" by Motofumi Asai, President at HPI

During its history, Japan has continually looked down on the Korean Peninsula without valid reason, the only exception to this being the *Tokugawa* dynasty. After World War II, Japan and South Korea concluded the Treaty on Basic Relations and the Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation in 1965, by which the Japanese government officially asserted that all historical issues were now settled. In recent years, although the Pyongyang Declaration signed by Japan and North Korea in 2002 maintained that the two countries "would make every possible effort for an early normalization of relations," the Japanese government's position has been that "no normalization of relations will be possible without a solution of the abduction issue." Japan has also not been sincere in dealing with the issue of Korean atomic bomb survivors. What exists in common among these attitudes is a lack of *Tasha Kankaku*, or "sense of otherness" as mentioned by *Maruyama Masao* and the missing "Imagination" expressed by *Oe Kenzaburo*. Finally, HPI President Asai pointed out that even here in Hiroshima, in an atomic-bombed city, we have lacked "Imagination" in the process of creating the Civil Protection Plan.

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI

The Origins of the Dirty Bomb: The U.S. Military and Radiological Weapons

By Robert Jacobs

In May of 2002, the U.S. government arrested Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, on suspicion of being an agent of al-Qaeda and of planning to detonate a "dirty bomb" in an American city. Dirty bombs are "radiological weapons" and are different from nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons trigger a nuclear chain reaction that releases the vast energies contained within atoms. A dirty bomb is a bomb containing conventional explosives that is packed with radioactive substances that are dispersed into the surrounding environment causing widespread radioactive contamination; it does not involve an actual nuclear chain reaction. In this sense, it is a "poison weapon" since it spreads a deadly poison—radioactivity—by means of an explosion. A dirty bomb is unlikely to cause considerable physical impact from the explosion itself, but rather a catastrophic impact from the contamination of a particular urban area with deadly radiation. *Time* magazine reports that, "dirty nukes are what you might choose to build if you're unable to create a real nuclear bomb...the assumption has been that forces who would build a dirty nuke would do so because it's far, far easier." [i]

However, in October of 2007 Associated Press military reporter Robert Burns published a story that shed some light on who has considered using such weapons in the past. Burns describes secret 1948 U.S. plans, "approved at the highest levels of the Army," to use "radioactive materials from atomic bomb-making to contaminate swathes of enemy land or to target military bases, factories or troop formations," or even to assassinate "important individuals such as military or civilian leaders." [ii]

This memo was dated July 1948, not quite three years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During this period, in both Japanese cities the U.S. had set up the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission to study the effects on human beings of radiation exposure. The first year after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. conducted nuclear weapon tests at the Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific. The second Bikini test—Test Baker—involved detonating a nuclear weapon underwater. This test resulted in such high levels of residual radiation in the area that it forced the canceling of a scheduled third test because the levels were so high.

In the official top-secret evaluation of the Bikini tests, written in 1947, we can begin to see a reexamination of the bomb as a radiological weapon by the U.S. military, and the starting point of the memo that Burns discovered:

> "When a bomb is exploded underwater, lethal residual radioactivity assumes an importance greater than the physical damage caused by the explosion...the detonation of a bomb in a body of water contiguous to a city would vastly enhance its radiation effects by creation of a base surge whose mist, contaminated with fission products, and dispersed by wind over great areas, would not only have an immediately lethal effect, but would establish a long term hazard through the contamination of structures by the deposition of radioactive particles." [iii]

This was among the reasons that it was concluded that "the bomb is preeminently a weapon for use against human life and activities in large urban and industrial areas." [iv] The report went on to offer a vivid psychological portrait of the effectiveness of using radioactivity as a weapon:

> "We can form no adequate mental picture of the multiple disasters which would befall a modern city, blasted by one or more atomic bombs and enveloped by radioactive mists. Of the survivors in contaminated areas, some would be doomed to die of radiation sickness in hours, some in days, and others in years. But these areas, irregular in size and shape, as wind and topography might form them, would have no visible boundaries. No survivor could be certain he was not among the doomed and so, added to the terror of the moment, thousands would be stricken with a fear of death and the uncertainty of the time of its arrival."
>
> "Thousands, perhaps millions, of refugees would rush from the city in panic, breaking down remaining transportation facilities, congesting highways, and creating in their flight new hazards to life. Among the refugees, for the moment unidentifiable from the rest, would be numbers whose contaminated clothing and any other goods they carried could establish in others the fear of dangerous radioactivity, thus creating a unique psychological hazard." [v]

It was clear that the military had a vivid grasp of the powers of this new weapon. It saw that the atomic bomb could be effective both as a weapon of devastating impact and also as a radiological weapon, capable of poisoning vast areas beyond its immediate effects of blast and heat. Further, military planners quickly saw the obvious possibility of using radiation as a terror weapon aimed at destroying the enemy's civilian population. The U.S. military would soon develop and test such radiological weapons as "radiological mists" and "radiological sand" separately from nuclear weapons. It was just such weapons that Rep. Albert Gore Sr. (D-Tenn) had in mind when he advocated creating a radioactive "death belt" to "quarantine" North Korea from South Korea in 1951.[vi]

So while current Western fears may paint the dirty bomb as a cheap alternative to "real" nuclear weapons for terrorists, it was the nation in sole possession of the first nuclear weapons that also first designed and built radiological weapons. Perhaps this is just one more of the many examples of "blowback" being experienced as a result of the history of U.S. militarism.

Jacobs is assistant prefesser at HPI



[i] Mark Thompson, "What is a 'Dirty Bomb'?" *Time* (June 10, 2002). <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,182637,00.html>
[ii] Robert Burns, "U.S. Considered Radiological Weapon," *USA Today* (Oct. 8, 2007). <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-10-08-radiological-weapon_N.htm>
[iii] JCS 1691/3, Enclosure D, June 30, 1947, pp. 57-89.
[iv] JCS 1691/3.
[v] JCS 1691/3.
[vi] "Atomic Death Belt Possible," *Science News Letter* 59:17 (April 28, 1951), p. 261.

HPI Research Forums

September 26, 2007

Title: Is Australia Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution to Abolishing Nuclear Weapons?

Speaker: Dr. Tilman Ruff, Associate Professor, the University of Melbourne, Australia

Dr. Tilman Ruff

Ruff is an infectious diseases and public health physician, an adviser to international organizations including UNICEF and WHO on immunization in Australia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. Ruff has shown strong interest in human rights and peace since his youth and was a founding member of the first secondary student group of Amnesty International in Australia. He is former president of the Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia), is a Director of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and Australian Chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). This gives him a wide knowledge, both from a medical and political standpoint, of war and nuclear weapons.

Ruff was highly critical of the double standard in Australian government policies (under then Prime Minister John Howard), which, on the one hand, had supported the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, but at the same time was backing possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, including pre-emptive attacks. The Howard government, which met resounding defeat in the election in November 2007, was one of the first governments to dispatch military forces to Iraq, and subsequently to occupy the country in cooperation with the U.S. and Britain. Howard also expanded military, including nuclear, cooperation with the U.S., such as on destabilizing missile defence. Howard expanded U.S. military facilities, training and exercises in Australia, representing a vital military asset for the U.S. if it were to use nuclear weapons in Asia or the Middle East. Ruff also criticized the Australian government's uranium mining and export policies, claiming that Australia was actually contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons through its export of uranium to many parts of the world, under safeguards which could provide little more than an illusion of protection.

Regarding Australian policies against global warming, Ruff claimed that these were severely deficient, lacking vision and substance for development of a sustainable energy future. In his power-point presentation, he vividly illustrated the devastating environmental destruction and pollution resulting from uranium mining in Australia.

Throughout his presentation, Ruff analyzed various negative factors in Australia working against the ultimate aim of abolishing nuclear weapons. He emphasized the necessity for a change of government in order to reverse this situation and introduce more positive policies. This political change actually came about on November 24, 2007 when a new Labor government was voted into office, committing to withdraw Australian combat forces from Iraq and reverse Howard's plan to sell uranium to India. It has strongly supported the development of a Nuclear Weapons Convention—a comprehensive treaty to abolish nuclear weapons, and reactivation of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

December 6, 2007

Title: Cold War Art and the Bomb in the Exhibition, *The Family of Man* (1955)

Speaker: Dr. John O'Brian, Professor, the University of British Columbia, Canada

Dr. John O'Brian

Among the most successful and influential photographic exhibitions ever presented in the history of modern photography was *The Family of Man* exhibition first presented at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City in 1955 by curator Edward Steichen. This exhibition was eventually seen by over 9 million people in 61 countries (including almost one million people in Japan), and was reproduced in a best selling book in several different languages. Just what was at the core of this powerful exhibition?

Fortunately, for a gathering of citizens and scholars in Hiroshima, the renowned art historian John O'Brian of the University of British Columbia, Vancouver presented a Hiroshima Peace Institute Research Forum on 6 December 2007 to examine the intent and effect of *The Family of Man* exhibition. Richly illustrating his talk with images taken from the original exhibition as well as historical images to provide context, O'Brian examined both the intent and content of the exhibition. He found that throughout the exhibition there was both a presence and an absence of the Atomic Bomb.

"*The Family of Man*," explained O'Brian, "was intended to be a benign demonstration of American political values." This was achieved through the collection of photographs which "conveyed collective emotions" rather than "historically contingent" images. Therefore the exhibit was full of images of families eating, at work and at play, generations interacting with each other and other universally shared human experiences that cut across cultural and racial boundaries, thereby demonstrating the commonalities of the human experience. What the curators intended was to convey a sense of the human family that transcended political, racial, or class boundaries. The exhibition painted a picture of a common family of people around the world who were living lives essentially similar to one another: in this way the "democratic" medium of photography was employed to portray the "democratic" family of man.

The single color image included was that of a mushroom cloud from a thermonuclear weapon test taken in 1952 in the Pacific Ocean. It was one of the few images that did not show human beings. In international presentations of the exhibition, this color image was replaced by a black and white photograph of the thermonuclear test. Another controversial image was a photograph showing the lynching of a black man in the American south. This photograph was also removed, leaving the exhibition without its two most violent images.

O'Brian argues that curator Steichen's intent was to present both the image of the H-Bomb and also the world that it universally threatened to annihilate in order that viewers might grasp the enormity of the threat of nuclear weapons. However, O'Brian concludes that in this regard Steichen failed: "the affirmative thrust of the exhibition smothered whatever potential may have existed for the representation of nuclear tragedy."

By Robert Jacobs, assistant professor at HPI

DIARY

November 1, 2007-February 29, 2008

◆**Nov. 2** HPI President Motofumi Asai gives lecture on "Japan and International Society in the 21st Century" at 150th lecture meeting of "Seminar for Everyone in Yamanobe Town" organized by Board of Education in Yamanobe Town, Yamagata Prefecture.

◆**Nov. 3** Asai gives lecture on "War and Peace" at 2007 commemorative meeting of promulgation of Japanese Constitution on Nov. 3, organized by executive committee of "Meeting for Japanese Constitution" in Okayama Prefecture.

◆**Nov. 5-24** Hiroko Takahashi gathers documents on ABCC at Texas and Wisconsin, U.S.

◆**Nov. 9** Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture on "Hiroshima and Peace" at program "Societies, Development and Environment" of Japan Foundation Middle East Fellowship Program for Intellectual Exchange, at HPI.

◆**Nov.16** Asai gives lecture on "Ideal Peace Education in Nuclear Age" at 34th education meeting organized by and held at Junior High and Senior High Schools of Tsukuba University, Tokyo.

◆**Nov.17** Asai, as panelist, participates in symposium "'Revision' of Fundamental Law of Education and Future of Education" organized by and held at Junior High and Senior High Schools of Tsukuba University, Tokyo.

◆**Nov.21** Mizumoto gives lecture on "International Contribution and Activities for Nuclear Disarmament from Hiroshima" at "World Contact Lecture Meeting" held at Hatsukaichi High School, in Hatsukaichi City, Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Nov.22** Asai gives lecture on "Our Constitution" at meeting organized by Article 9 Association (A9A) Group for Care Providers, in Tokyo.

◆**Nov.22-25** Narayanan Ganesan presents paper entitled "The 2006 Military Coup and Its Impact on Democracy in Thailand" at Third Annual Congress of the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA) held in New Delhi, India.

◆**Nov.23** Asai gives lecture on "Let Us Question New Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Our Current Peace Movement" at lecture meeting organized by executive committee of group against revision of Japanese Constitution in Tokyo.▽Yoshiaki Sato presents paper on "Towards Cosmopolitan Law in East Asia" at 17th New Zealand Asian Studies Society International Conference held at University of Otago, N.Z.

◆**Nov.24** Asai gives lecture on "How to Prevent Japan from Becoming Warmonger State" at meeting of music and lectures to protect Article 9, organized by liaison center of A9A Group in Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Nov.25** Asai gives lecture on "New Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill" at "Union- Nagoya Meeting 11.25 to Express Protest in Enactment of New Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law," organized by its executive committee, in Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture.

◆**Nov.30-Dec. 4** Mikyoung Kim collects data on Northeast Asian security in Tokyo.

◆**Dec. 1** Mizumoto gives presentation on "Recent Trends Surrounding Nuclear Weapons" at public lecture meeting organized by Research Group on Reference Materials of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, held at the Museum.

◆**Dec. 2** Asai gives lecture on "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities" at welfare seminar organized by NPO Aichi Center for People with Disabilities, in Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture.

◆**Dec. 8** Asai gives lecture on "Article 9 of Japanese Constitution and Japanese Diplomacy" at lecture meeting organized by A9A in Onomichi City, Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Dec.10** Mizumoto gives lecture on "Current Situation and Task of Aid in Cambodia" at General Meeting to establish Hiroshima-Cambodia Association, held at Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.

◆**Dec.12** Robert Jacobs delivers lecture titled "Survival in 10 Easy Graphics" at Ritsumeiken University, Kyoto Prefecture.

◆**Dec.16** Asai gives lecture on "'Revision' of Japanese Constitution and Our Tasks" at "Course to Learn Japanese Constitution" organized by Kagawa Trade Union Congress for Peace and Democracy, in Kagawa Prefecture.

◆**Dec.17** Sato gives lecture on "Institutionalization of ASEAN?" at Institute of Social Science Comparative Regionalism Project (ISS CREP) special seminar held at University of Tokyo.

◆**Dec.20** Hitoshi Nagai gives lecture on "Institute for American Studies of Rikkyo University during World War II" at Rikkyo Univerisity, Tokyo.

◆**Dec.28** Takahashi comments at book review meeting of *Hiroshima Dokuritsuron* [*Essay on the Independence of Hiroshimas*] by Takuma Higashi organized by Open City Hiroshima in Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Jan. 4** Ganesan conducts field research in the northern Shan states along the Sino-Burmese border in Myanmar.

◆**Jan.10** Mizumoto gives lecture on "International Contribution from Hiroshima" at "World Contact Lecture Meeting" held at Daimon High School, Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Jan.12** Jacobs delivers lecture titled "Nuclear Weapons in Context" to students from the CIEE program in Tokyo at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

◆**Jan.13** Asai gives lecture on "Peace and Social Security" at "Learning Course of Social Security in Hiroshima" organized by Hiroshima City Employees' Union, in Hiroshima City.

◆**Jan.18** Sung Chull Kim presents paper entitled "Framing Northeast Asian Security" at Sentosa Roundtable on Asian Security organized by and held at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

◆**Jan.20** Mizumoto gives lecture on "Civil War in Cambodia, Reconstruction, and Aid from Hiroshima" at first Lecture Meeting on Cambodia, organized by Hiroshima-Cambodia Association, held at Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.

◆**Jan.27** Asai gives lecture on "Miku, the World, and Japan" at lecture meeting organized by group to enrich medical treatment and child-care for children with disabilities in western part of Hiroshima, in Hatsukaichi City, Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Feb. 7** Asai gives lecture on "To Secure Rights of People with Disabilities" at workshop for workers at facilities for people with disabilities, organized by Association of Institutions for People with Mental Disabilities in Kinki Region, in Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture.

◆**Feb. 9** Asai gives lecture on "World Trend, and Near Future of Peace, Constitution and People with Disabilities" at workshop for facility managers organized by Japan Association of Community Workshops for Disabled Persons, in Osaka Prefecture.▽Mizumoto gives lecture on "Current Global Situation of Nuclear Weapons" at training course for Hiroshima Peace Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

◆**Feb.16** Asai gives lecture on "Japanese Constitution in Our Daily Lives" at lecture meeting on Japanese Constitution organized by Fukuyama Chapter of Hiroshima Bar Association in Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Feb.17** Asai gives lecture on "Peace, Life, and Human Rights" at lecture meeting organized by Suzukake Welfare Institution for People with Disabilities, in Aichi Prefecture.

◆**Feb.22** Asai gives lecture on "To Protect Rights of Children and Create Peace" at lecture meeting organized by executive committee for protecting children in Hiroshima, in Hiroshima City.

◆**Feb.23** Asai gives lecture on "Six-Party Talks and Prospects of Normalization of Japan-North Korea Relations" at lecture meeting organized by Study Group of North and South Korean Issues in Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture.

◆**Feb.24-Mar.5** Mizumoto visits Cambodia as member of Reconstruction Aid Project in Cambodia, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and JICA.

◆**Feb. 29** Sato gives lecture on "EC Secondary Law as Institutionalized Cosmopolitan Law" at workshop on "The Ideal and the Actual in the European Union" organized by General Research Institute and held at Seigakuin University in Saitama Prefecture.

—Visitors to HPI—

◆**Feb.19** Noriko Koide, Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 11 students of Valley Stream Central High School, U.S., and 9 students and Jun Sato, teacher, of Sanyo Girls' School.

◆**Feb.29** Alfred Chunda, Director, Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Zambia.

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