

Cycles of Retaliation and Hate

By Haruhiro Fukui

The title of this essay immediately brings to mind several ongoing cases, which all serve to prove and illustrate the degree of intractability of such cycles.

Exhibits

The conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, for example, dates back to the late 19th century, one cycle reaching a peak in the mid-1930s, long before the founding of Israel as an independent Jewish state in 1948. The latest cycle has not only continued right up to today, but has intensified, especially after the onset of the first Intifada in the late 1980s, claiming thousands of lives on both sides.

The recurrent clashes between the Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland date from the Irish uprisings against British colonial rule in the 1910s, long preceding the founding of the semi-autonomous Irish state "Eire" in 1937, and the independent Republic of Ireland in 1949. The latest cycle, triggered by violent clashes in 1969, took a toll of several thousand lives on both sides before it was brought to an end, or so it appeared, by the 1998 peace accord. The advances made by hard-liners on both sides in the November 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections now threaten to unravel the peace accord and lead to yet another cycle of unbridled violence and destruction.

A further example that comes to mind even more readily than either of the above-mentioned cases is the United States' "War on Terrorism." This multidirectional war has now been waged for nearly two decades: against Libya in 1986 following the terrorist bombing of a Berlin disco; against Iraq in 1993 in response to an alleged attempt on former President Bush's life; and against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 in retaliation for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The action taken against Afghanistan and Sudan marked a dramatic shift in U.S. war policy: for the first time, with President Clinton's personal authorization, preemptive strikes were launched against targets within the territories of nations that appeared to have little directly to do with the events triggering those strikes. The new policy was implemented with a vengeance in the wake of 9/11, when U.S. and British forces embarked on a ferocious military campaign against the alleged culprit, Osama bin Laden and his supporters and protectors, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. The coalition forces, however, have not only failed to win a decisive victory in either military theater, but appear to have become bogged down in a war of attrition with steadily mounting costs in terms of their own lives, money and morale, as well as those of their enemies.

Theoretical Explanations and Insights

An endless exchange of fire and destruction should strike most people as totally senseless and irrational. War is, as has been said countless times, a "lose-lose" game. Why, then, do people play the game so often? An intuitively plausible explanation to this paradox would be that people are more emotional than rational and prone to act against their own best interests. If that is the case, war must be accepted as a normal state of inter-human and inter-state relations.

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There are, however, somewhat more scientific, i.e., empirically-tested and proven explanations offered by game theory. In the classic non-zero-sum game known as the prisoner's dilemma (PD), endless retaliation may be in fact theoretically rational. In the simplest form of this game played only once, two players act as an imaginary pair of prisoners arrested for an alleged crime and held in isolation cells. Each is then told that if he confesses to the crime, while his partner refuses to do so, he will be granted an immediate release and his partner will serve 10 years in prison; if both partners confess, each will serve 5 years; if both refuse to confess, each will serve, for lack of evidence, only 2 years. In this scenario, it would be more in the partners' common interest for both of them to refuse to confess, i.e., to cooperate with each other, and share a 2-year prison term, rather than confess, i.e., betray each other ("defect" in the jargon), and end up sharing a 5-year term. Each would nevertheless choose to confess to avoid serving a 10-year term in case his partner confesses, or, if his partner refuses to confess, win his own immediate release and let his partner suffer the consequences. Since both think and act in the same way, both defect and earn a lesser payoff (5 years) than they could have earned had they cooperated (2 years). In a one-off game, this paradoxical result ("solution") is in fact not only a rational one but also the most stable one, known as the Nash equilibrium, in the sense that each player could only be worse off by unilaterally changing his move from defection to cooperation.

If, however, the game is repeated a number of times, mutual defection is not necessarily the most rational and stable solution. According to the results of two series of simulated games played on computers by international groups of game theorists, mathematicians, and economists in the early 1980s, the winning strategy in repeated PD games is not unconditional defection but "tit for tat" (TFT), which begins with cooperation in the first round, then imitates the opponent's previous move in every subsequent round. This strategy leads to cooperation and a mutually more satisfactory result, i.e., a 2-year prison term rather than a 5-year term for both players. If this strategy incorporates additional generosity, so that each player forgives and refrains from retaliating an opponent's unintended defection resulting from an error or incomplete information, it becomes even more successful.

Mutual cooperation is not the Nash equilibrium but a Pareto-optimum, i.e., a condition in which either player may increase his own payoff by unilaterally defecting at his opponent's expense. It is therefore not as stable as mutual defection in a one-off game; it is, however, a realistic condition and generous TFT (GTFT) represents a promising strategy for real-world "games," which are nearly always repeated and in which "players" may, unlike prisoners in isolation cells, communicate with each other.

Exhibits

The 20-year-long civil war between the Buddhist Sinhalese and the Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka may be brought to an end, thanks to the apparent willingness of both sides to employ what amounts to the GTFT strategy. The Tamil Tigers appear to have given up their demand for an independent state of their own in the eastern and northern provinces of the country and the prime minister has agreed to a peace negotiation. There is hope, though only faint one, that a Pareto-optimum solution may be ultimately accepted by both sides to put an end to the vicious circle of mutual defections.

The 20-year-long India-Pakistan war over Kashmir may be also winding down. The Pakistani prime minister's call for a cease-fire along the so-called Line of Control in late 2003 has elicited a positive response from his Indian counterpart. The Indian government is apparently willing to negotiate with militant separatist local groups in Kashmir as well.

Neither the theoretical explanations and insights nor the real-world developments sketched above are entirely reassuring. Nonetheless, they offer us a modicum of hope in a world that seems afflicted almost perennially with endless and senseless cycles of retaliation and hate.

Fukui is president at HPI

Why Multilateralism for North Korea's Nuclear Crisis?

By Sung Chull Kim

In view of the absence of substantial agreement on the North Korean nuclear crisis at the second six-party talk, held in Beijing in February this year, it is easy not only to despise North Korea for its immoral tactics but also to distrust the utility of the six-party talks. It is an obvious fact that North Korea began violating the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework through its alleged clandestine development of a uranium enrichment project and by the reprocessing of the canistered spent-nuclear fuels. In this respect, North Korea cannot escape blame. However, we may recognize the necessity of multilateral approach to the crisis, if we examine why and how the Agreed Framework failed to thwart North Korea's continuing desire for a nuclear weapons project.

The 1994 negotiations between the United States and North Korea that finally yielded the Agreed Framework contained a crucial shortcoming in terms of the structuring of the interactions between North Korea, on the one hand, and countries such as South Korea, Japan, and China on the other that apparently shared security stakes in Northeast Asia. As a framework of negotiation, the American tradition of taking a unilateralist approach in this region underlay the bilateral talks, with the purpose of freezing North Korea's nuclear development. As a result of this approach, Pyongyang strengthened its long-standing perception that the United States represented the main link to solving all of its diplomatic and security-related problems. In fact, however, not only was the North Korean perception wrong in times of changing international relations in the region, but also the U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks precluded the potential capacity of neighboring countries contributing towards the creation of a better security environment. The neighboring countries had no leverage with which to encourage North Korea to comply with the Agreed Framework, which was in itself an inclusive agreement even if not well-documented in its overall implementation.

In particular, despite not having participated in the negotiation process, South Korea and Japan became contributors towards the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which was to provide North Korea with two light-water reactors by a target date of 2003 in return for Pyongyang's freezing of the use of its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors. For different reasons, South Korea and Japan were practicing checkbook diplomacy, and in turn, such diplomatic practice backfired within their own domestic politics.

The American unilateralist approach to the North Korean nuclear issue demonstrated its ineffectiveness from the start. Long before the outbreak of the crisis in October 2002, many observers had foreseen the advent of a crisis. One notable indication surfaced as the United States and North Korea blamed each other for delaying the KEDO schedule for the construction of the light-water reactors. For the United States, North Korea's test firing of a ballistic missile in August 1998 cast doubt on Pyongyang's commitment to the Agreed Framework. The government in Washington entered into a deliberation period in order to develop a comprehensive policy towards North Korea, which was finally publicized in the Perry Report of October 1999. Meanwhile, in South Korea, Japan, and the United States, criticism fermented not only with regard to Kim Jong-il, but also with their own political leaders. This was due to anger on the part of taxpayers in these donor countries who felt that North Korea's missile launch represented a betrayal of their good intentions.

Separating the missile issue from that of the construction of the reactors, North Korea then charged the KEDO member countries in general and the United States in particular with delaying their construction. More importantly, the existence of the bilateral framework between the United States and North Korea led the latter to disregard its own responsibility for the delay. As the situation went contrary to its expectations of progress in the relationship with the United States, North Korea announced that

Washington had not kept to the terms of the agreement's Article 2 whereby the two countries should move towards the "full normalization of political and economic relations." No neighboring country, despite having undoubted security interests in the region, was able to attempt to reverse the deteriorating trend. Due to the fact that it was framed through bilateral talks based on an American unilateralist approach, it was impossible to salvage the agreement even in a situation where its collapse was seemingly imminent.

In this way, the foundations of the Agreed Framework had been eroded even before the Bush administration's declaration of the "Axis of Evil" that discredited the previous Clinton administration's foreign policy in general and the Agreed Framework in particular. In retrospect, the gesture of mutual recognition, signaled by the Joint Declaration made at the time of the visit of Pyongyang's special envoy, Cho Myong-rok, to Washington in October 2000, could not save the agreement in trouble. The reason behind this was that in the late 1990s, North Korea had begun dealing with Pakistan in order to obtain uranium enrichment technology in exchange for missiles. North Korea, with continuing skepticism about American intentions, was pursuing an alternative strategy to secure nuclear development. The United States has strenuously investigated this North Korea-Pakistan link. However, it has neither made a collective effort, nor initiated a multilateral cooperation among Northeast Asian countries to halt it.

Therefore, the breakdown of the Geneva Agreed Framework cannot be simply attributed to individual actions, such as Kim Jong-il's agreement violation and George W. Bush's turn towards a hard-line policy, but it was also due to the absence of a multilateral framework in the region. North Korea paid no attention to neighboring countries, such as Japan and China as well as South Korea, and simply attempted to make big deals with the United States. To Pyongyang, there was no existing legal obligation to these neighbors, whereas for the neighbors themselves, there was no channel through which they could enforce the assurance of nuclear-freeze in North Korea.

The multilateral framework, centered on the North Korean nuclear crisis, is bringing about a change in the relationship between the countries in the region of Northeast Asia. The framework was first sparked at the tripartite meeting held in April 2003, and was brought about at the first six-party talk in August of the same year. China, who has become a significant regional power in comparison to its status in the mid-1990s, has played a pivotal diplomatic role in coordinating the creation of the multilateral talks. In addition, the launching of the six-party talk stemmed from a common perception shared by China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States that if the crisis was not resolved through peaceful means, a dangerous coupling effect could arise. For instance, North Korea's declaration of itself becoming a nuclear state might presumably bring about a military build-up in China and Japan, actual conflict across the Taiwan Strait, and, in the worst case, another disastrous war in the Korean Peninsula; all of which would result in a nightmare for regional insecurity. In other words, despite a variety of divergent national interests, North Korea's neighbors commonly perceived that Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development no longer represented a bilateral issue between the United States and North Korea. This was the lesson that they learned from the past experience of being left behind with neither participation nor responsibility.

It is also noteworthy that the multilateral channel does not represent a panacea for the resolution of the current crisis. The solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis is a time-constrained and complex issue. It is time-constrained in the sense that as time passes, Pyongyang's nuclear capability may reach a level where it is more dangerous than the current situation. In particular, uranium enrichment under a veil of uncertainty, in addition to reprocessing for plutonium production, is an urgent problem that needs to be

quickly resolved. Meanwhile, peaceful resolution involves a time-consuming sequential implementation of two challenging requirements: providing security guarantees for North Korea on the one hand, and dismantling its nuclear projects on the other. If one takes into account the necessity of channeling other participants' domestic demands, for example the Japanese abduction issue, the negotiation may be unexpectedly prolonged. This obviously works against the time-constrained concern.

Nevertheless, all the participants in the six-party talks should be patient in maintaining the multilateral framework. In the meantime, as agreed at the second six-party talk, they should institutionalize a working-level channel as soon as possible in order

to strengthen the degree of coordination about sequential procedures. In this way, any agreement reached through the multilateral framework will have a binding influence which cannot be reversed in an arbitrary fashion. Furthermore, the agreement will empower the domestic coalition for internationalization in each country, including North Korea, the coalition which may reject an introverted nationalist backlash and foster the participants' collaborative potential to yield synergistic effects on other security-related issues, including refugees and human rights.

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HPI's Second Public Lecture Series

The Hiroshima Peace Institute held, at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange, its second public lecture series — ten lectures over two months — between early October and early December 2003. The first series, conducted during the same period in 2002, was a great success, reflected by the fact that many of the original 60 participants enrolled in this second course.

In spring 2003, the Iraq War broke out and at least 10,000 civilians have reportedly been killed by U.S. and British aerial bombing. Since the onset of the occupation of Iraq by the military troops led by these two countries, many more civilians have been killed and injured either by the occupation troops, having been mistaken as "terrorists," or by being involved in the attacks by local rebel groups fighting against the occupation troops. Civilian casualties in Iraq continue to increase. In the Afghan War two years ago, too, many civilians fell victim to warfare, and that war produced more than a million refugees. Modern warfare inevitably causes mass killing and injury of civilians.

Reflecting this reality, in 2003 we formulated a series of lectures under the general theme "War Encountered by Civilians: A Perspective Towards the Establishment of Peace in the 21st Century." The purpose of this series was to critically re-examine modern and contemporary warfare from the viewpoint of civilians and to explore ways of avoiding military conflicts.

At the beginning of this series, we examined how indiscriminate bombing, i.e., the most typical form of modern mass killing, was first used as a major military strategy during World War I, and how it was strengthened and expanded in the European theater of World War II, resulting in the deaths of millions of civilians. We also examined the indiscriminate bombing in subsequent wars — Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, and so on — though indiscriminate mass killing reached a peak with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Pacific War.

In this lecture series, we also discussed the question of why international law — the law of war, humanitarian law, etc. — has been so ineffective despite the fact that it was built on the tragic experiences of modern warfare. Why were the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki never pursued as criminal breaches of the Geneva Conventions? This question was addressed as a classic example of the ineffectiveness of international law.

We also dealt with the topic of U.S. governmental control and manipulation of information regarding not only the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also the nuclear tests repeatedly conducted after World War II in the effort to mold the popular American acceptance of nuclear weapons. A lecture on civilian victims of nuclear tests described the serious damage to the health of islanders and the destruction of their natural environment in the Southwest Pacific where many nuclear tests were conducted over an extended period.

More current issues were addressed as well, including depleted-uranium, small nuclear weapons, the problem of East Timor as a typical example of ethnic conflicts, and the new conflict-prevention

concept called "Human Security."

A new lecture series is planned for October this year, and it is hoped that we will continue to attract many participants.

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

Title and Lecturer

No.1	Oct. 1	"History and Thoughts of Indiscriminate Bombing: Europe." Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.2	Oct. 8	"History and Thoughts of Indiscriminate Bombing: The Asia-Pacific." Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.3	Oct. 15	"Development of Ideas of International Humanitarian Law: From a Viewpoint of the Iraq War." Lecturer:Masahiro Igarashi, professor at Kanazawa University
No.4	Oct. 22	"'Victims' of Regional Conflict: The Case of East Timor." Lecturer:Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor at HPI
No.5	Oct. 29	"Contemporary Wars and Indiscriminate Killing: From Vietnam to Iraq." Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.6	Nov. 5	"Criminality of the Use of A-bombs: Hidden Aspects of the War Crime Issue and the Control of Information." Lecturer:Hitoshi Nagai and Hiroko Takahashi, research associates at HPI
No.7	Nov. 12	"Human Security: Striving for Sustainable Peace Building." Lecturer:Ikuko Togo, assistant professor at HPI
No.8	Nov. 19	"Inhumanity of the Depleted Uranium Weapons: A New Weapon of Mass Destruction." Lecturer:Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI
No.9	Nov. 27	"History and Thoughts of Nuclear Strategies: The Process of Dehumanization." Lecturer:Tetsuo Maeda, professor at Tokyo International University
No.10	Dec. 3	"Sociology of Indiscriminate Bombing." Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI



New Findings about the Lucky Dragon

By Hiroko Takahashi

Half a century has passed since the Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon (Fuku Ryu Maru), was exposed to the fall-out from the U.S. Hydrogen Bomb Test conducted at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954. However, it is only now that certain information relating to the event has finally come to light. This relates to the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigated the Lucky Dragon's crew members on suspicion of espionage.

1. The CIA Investigation into the Lucky Dragon

Sterling Cole, the chairman of the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, declared that it was not inconceivable that the Lucky Dragon crew entered the experimental site with aims other than fishing. In this statement he was hinting that the Lucky Dragon was exposed to radiation due to its having entered the U.S. designated "danger zone" with the intention of spying on U.S. military activities. In the May 1, 1954 issue of the *Chubu Nippon Shimbun*, it was reported that the Japanese police and the Public Security Investigation Agency had examined the political thinking of the crew members of the Lucky Dragon at the behest of the Foreign Ministry. However, according to the same newspaper, the Foreign Ministry declared that it had "never requested the National Police Agency to investigate the backgrounds of the crew members," and that the organization had similarly never received such a request from the U.S. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry went on to insist that it "had no conception of why such an investigation should be deemed necessary" and that "the allegation was totally unfounded."

However, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Documents released in the *Declassified Documents Catalog: 1998* reveal that Lewis Strauss, the chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, requested the CIA to investigate the alleged spying activities of the Lucky Dragon, and that the CIA reported the results of its investigation to him. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Documents consist of a total of five pages: the first being a letter dated April 29, 1954, from Frank Wisner in charge of covert operations in the CIA to Strauss, followed by a three-page summary of the investigation into the Lucky Dragon, and finally a reply from Strauss to Wisner, dated May 7.

The main purpose of the investigation, titled "CIA Investigation of Circumstances of Exposure of Fuku Ryu Maru 'Fortunate Dragon' to Hydrogen Bomb Test," was to determine whether or not the Lucky Dragon had entered the designated "danger zone," and whether the ship had otherwise exposed itself to the explosion intentionally with the object of making observations and taking instrument readings or for the additional purpose of providing a basis for anti-American propaganda.

With regard to the first question of whether the ship was actually outside the danger zone, the report says the following: "U.S. officials did not have the opportunity to check the ship's log, track charts, navigation records, accuracy of navigational instruments, or competency of the ship's navigator, we have not been able to make an estimate of its actual location. However, in addition to the Japanese Government's public announcement that the ship was outside the danger zone, [Sensitive Information Deleted]."

Since the last part of this section is deleted as shown above, it remains unknown whether the Lucky Dragon was actually outside the danger zone. However, according to State Department documents, the Japanese Foreign Ministry submitted copies of the ship's track charts to the U.S. embassy after the Japanese government had made a public announcement on the issue. This indicates that the U.S. had a clear opportunity to analyze the track charts, on the basis of which officials must have reached the conclusion that the Lucky Dragon was outside the danger zone. There is a high likelihood that details were deleted from the report about specific Japanese cooperation and the U.S. analyses of the information that was obtained as a result of this cooperation.

The report also mentions other questions such as: "Was the Japanese doctor in charge of treating the crew politically suspect?" "Is there any evidence of special instruments having been on board?" "Is there any evidence of a rendezvous with a Russian vessel before putting into port?" and "What is the possibility of a substitute vessel having been offered for inspection?" The document concludes that no evidence was found for any of the questions. As a result of the investigation, Wisner emphasized in a letter to Strauss, the CIA found no evidence that the Japanese government had withheld any important information from the U.S.

This document reveals that the Japanese government carried out an

investigation into the alleged spying activities of the crew members of the Lucky Dragon in response to a U.S. request, and that a subsequent CIA investigation confirmed the reliability of the conclusion of the Japanese investigation that the crew members were definitely not spying. This shows that the Foreign Ministry's statement printed in the *Chubu Nippon Shimbun* on May 1, 1954 was in clear contradiction of the facts.

2. Statement by Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

The Lucky Dragon was exposed to radiation from the "Bravo Shot," the first explosion in a series of nuclear tests. This series of tests, code-named "Operation Castle," included six tests in all, which were conducted between March 1 and May 13, 1954. Strauss, who requested the CIA investigation, issued a statement on March 31 on his return to the U.S. following the second test on March 26. He said that the first and second tests had both been successful. He also said that the Lucky Dragon incident had occurred despite careful preparations for the tests, adding that the ship "appeared to have been missed by the search but, based on a statement attributed to her skipper to the effect that he saw the flash of the explosion and heard the concussion six minutes later, it must have been well within the danger area." His explanation suggested that it was not the U.S. but the Lucky Dragon itself that was responsible for the exposure of the ship to fall-out from the explosion. While Strauss admitted that 23 crew members of the Lucky Dragon, 28 American personnel, and 236 residents of the Marshall Islands had been within the area of the fall-out, he said that "None of the American personnel have burns" and that "the 236 natives also appear to me to be well and happy," indicating that there was no sign of any illness caused by the explosion even one month after the "Bravo Shot."

In the series of nuclear tests code-named "Operation Crossroads" conducted on Bikini Atoll in 1946, initially three tests were scheduled. However, the underwater explosion of the second test caused great damage due to radioactive contamination, which led to the cancellation of the third test by presidential order. In sharp contrast, the series of nuclear tests conducted during "Operation Castle" in 1954 went ahead as scheduled, even after the Lucky Dragon incident.

As explained above, the CIA investigation into the Lucky Dragon did not produce the result that Strauss had hoped for. Nonetheless, instead of admitting their own responsibility for what happened to the Lucky Dragon, some U.S. test personnel chose to suggest that the Japanese vessel was a spy ship, and the hydrogen bomb tests actually continued as planned and were ultimately classed as a "success." It is true that the Lucky Dragon incident did spark an international wave of antinuclear public opinion, but at the time this failed to check the accelerating arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

3. The Boundary between Classified and Declassified Information

Thanks to the recent release of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Documents, it has become clear that the CIA investigation into the Lucky Dragon was actually carried out despite the Japanese Foreign Ministry's denial, and that both Japanese and U.S. agencies cooperated in it. However, in seven locations in the documents, equivalent to a total of about 20 lines, sensitive information still remains deleted. One wonders what kind of information is actually concealed in the deleted sections. When I showed the document to Mr. John Taylor, an archivist at the U.S. National Archives and a specialist on OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and CIA material, I received a quite straightforward answer from him. I was told to write and request a more complete copy of the document and to send the letter to the following address, together with the document. The first line of the address is FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Office, the second line is CIA, and the third line is Washington, D.C., 20505.

Especially during and after the Cold War, a great many U.S. government documents have been treated as "sensitive information," a situation which continues to prevent the public from having access to the truth. I am looking forward to hearing from the CIA in order to determine whether the boundary between classified and declassified information is moving to expand the area of declassified information.

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Conflict Prevention Efforts and the Role of Civil Society in Ferghana Valley

By Nobumasa Akiyama

Central Asian countries that gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union have been tackling the challenge of nation-building, based on the principles of democracy and market economics. Their endeavors to date have not been necessarily successful. Rather, particularly in rural areas, the welfare of the people has deteriorated under unstable authoritarian rule. The collapse of the Soviet Union has also created new "international" problems.

The Ferghana region, where the republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan share borders, is an area of concern in terms of the deterioration of economic and social conditions. Batken Province is located in the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana region, surrounded by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; there are also enclaves of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan within the province. It is not unusual for communities neighboring each other to have different ethnic identities.

The region is suffering from the legacies of the Soviet era when state borders were drawn in a complicated fashion, ignoring the ethnic distribution of the population and breaking up milieus of daily life. The central governments of the republics are trying to strengthen border controls in order to establish their own national identities and governance. However, due to their failure to establish firm systems of governance, the region is now harboring anti-government groups and Islamic extremists. These groups can move freely back and forth across the borders because of defective border controls. (In 1999, Japanese geologists in the region were kidnapped by an Islamic extremist group. The author witnessed incompetent customs and border controls between the Kyrgyz and Uzbekistan Republics when he visited the region last October.) Local residents are suffering from a stagnation of the economic activities which used to extend across the borders during the Soviet era, but which are now restricted. They are also failing to receive social services from the central government. Thus the level of socio-economic life in this region is being categorized at the lowest rank, and malnutrition, poverty and unemployment are identified as sources of tensions within communities.

There has also been an increase in disputes between communities over the distribution of resources such as water; this could develop into an ethnic confrontation, and then become an "international" problem. Such a development was seen in a case where communities in Tajikistan were using a water source in the Kyrgyz Republic. According to a survey by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 75% of the local population pointed out that disputes arose in relation to irrigation water and 60% complained about drinking water. The population of the Kyrgyz Republic relies on Uzbekistan for its energy supply, which also causes tensions across the border. Such a deterioration of economic and social conditions may bring about regional conflict.



In terms of settling disputes between local communities, the relationships between the states or central governments have so far proved to be obstacles rather than functioning as channels for dialogue about potential solutions. Intervention by Moscow, which used to be a means of resolving disputes during the Soviet era, no longer exists as an option. Thus, what is necessary for local communities to do is to create mechanisms to resolve disputes in non-violent ways, and for them to build confidence amongst themselves. Local communities must leave behind conventional authority-dependent conflict resolution methods, and build autonomous mechanisms for preventing and resolving conflicts by means of acquiring their own capacities to make decisions and resolve problems. In addition, it is also essential to improve the social and economic environment and people's general welfare in order to eliminate factors triggering conflict.

Naturally, conflict prevention activities in Batken Province focus on the improvement of social and economic conditions. Assistance from foreign aid organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UNDP clearly reflects an external concern for the concept of conflict prevention through community capacity-building and the achievement of economic self-reliance. These organizations also regard local civil society actors such as NGOs as important implementation partners for such aid programs.

Recently, the importance of civil society has come to be recognized in the context of post-conflict peace-building and conflict prevention. In Batken Province, various types of NGOs are active: some are aiming at improving the self-reliance of communities being left behind by the market economy by providing technical assistance for agriculture; others are organizing seminars and sports events to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between different ethnic groups; other NGOs are trying to ease tensions and decrease misunderstanding between different ethnic groups through radio broadcasts in three languages about administrative and cultural matters.

To prevent the outbreak or recurrence of conflict, it is necessary to take steps towards the consolidation of democracy and accepted social norms in order to promote the non-violent resolution of disputes. Local NGOs, with the assistance of international aid agencies, play an advocacy role in order to establish such ideas and norms among the local population and also to increase their capacity to make autonomous decisions. Civil society actors, and NGOs in particular, are also taking part in an emerging mechanism which is providing social and public services in place of the conventional social sectors such as governments, markets and traditional communities in cases where the services provided by these conventional sectors are failing to meet the social needs of the population.

Local governments have come to recognize this potential function of NGOs. At the national level, authoritarian regimes which tend to suppress NGO activities are still in power in Central Asia. However, at the local level, the role that NGOs can play in providing social services has been established as an essential social function. Although there are concerns about NGOs with regard to their fragile financial status and reliance on overseas aid, their increasingly important role in civil society will further the prevention of conflict and easing of tensions between communities and ethnic groups by developing the capacities for self-reliance and problem-solving of the local communities and wider population.

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Coping with America

By Wade Huntley

I was teaching a class of international students here in Hiroshima recently, with the war in Iraq at the front of all of our minds. One of the students asked me: what would be the most effective thing she could do to promote global peace? In today's conflict-ridden world, it is a question we should all consider carefully.

U.S. President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq was both a crude violation of international law and a tragic practical mistake. This action damaged the United Nations, fueled terrorist ambitions and reinforced fears of American arrogance and bullying. Understandably, the U.S. attack has angered and frustrated millions around the world; the ongoing suffering of the Iraqi people sustains rage and exasperation against Bush administration policies worldwide.

If we conclude that America itself has now become a principal obstacle to global peace, my student's question gains focus. The question becomes: how do we cope with America?

To begin: one key lesson of the Iraq War is that the Bush administration has insulated itself from world opinion. By ignoring its failure to gain the explicit U.N. sanction it sought on the eve of the war, the Bush administration disregarded some of America's oldest friends and consummated its increasing unilateralism. Even now, as Iraq descends into the disaster so many critics predicted, the administration still refuses to abide the consensus existing outside the U.S. on the need to reconstitute Iraqi sovereignty immediately and enable genuine international oversight of the country's ongoing reconstruction.

In the face of this insularity from world opinion, some activists have urged a confrontational response. But coping with America today requires not building more walls against it, but building more bridges to it.

The key to this bridge-building is strengthening the global civil society that is flourishing in the 21st century world of fractured sovereignty. America epitomizes this world: today's America is a complex mix of peoples and organizations with innumerable social, economic and cultural ties around the planet. As worldwide anti-war demonstrations showed, the potential effectiveness of a citizen-based global peace campaign is today greater than ever before.

Stronger linkages to like-minded communities in the United States are especially vital. As much as the Bush administration feels unaccountable to world opinion, it is keenly sensitive to U.S. domestic opinion. As Indian political critic Arundhati Roy observed at the height of the Iraq War: "The only institution in the world today that is more powerful than the American government, is American civil society... More than one third of America's citizens have survived the relentless propaganda they've been subjected to, and many thousands are actively fighting their own

government. In the ultra-patriotic climate that prevails in the U.S., that's as brave as any Iraqi fighting for his or her homeland."

Supporting this community is essential. But strengthening linkages between peace organizations in the U.S. and in the rest of the world only begins to provide such support. It is also important to engage America's people more broadly: to find opportunities to convey to average Americans the real detrimental effects of current U.S. policies, and to offer positive alternatives.

A near-term practical focus of such civil linkage strengthening could be the U.S. presidential election now less than one year away. The Iraq War is now likely to be a major issue in this election, which is a dramatic recent shift in American politics. Twelve months ago, most analysts believed that no Democrat who opposed the war on Iraq could be a credible presidential candidate. Now the situation has reversed: opposition to the war made Howard Dean, for a time, a prominent contender for the Democratic nomination, while Senator John Kerry's support of last fall's congressional resolution supporting war on Iraq continues to shadow his candidacy. But public war opposition may abate. The current opportunity may not last very long.

These thoughts were in my mind as I received my student's question. And so my answer to her was this: if you want to work for peace, go to America. But don't just go to Disneyland; go to the hard places in the Midwest and South where the next election will really be decided. Find the working class people, who most need to hear your voice, and talk to them about what peace means to you. I warned her: some of the people you meet will be unmoved. But most will listen, and many will learn. And every single one of them matters (Florida taught us that).

Of course, defeating Bush's reelection will not solve all the problems of current U.S. foreign policy. In the longer-term, beyond the next election, coping with America today means recognizing a fundamental dilemma: U.S. power insulates average Americans from the effects of U.S. foreign policy in the world. As a result, the U.S. president's accountability on foreign policy is intrinsically weak (the Iraq War is making the upcoming election an exception; but it will not be a trend). So long as the U.S. is the preeminent global power, this problem will persist — regardless of who is president.

The only solution is a sustained effort on the part of global civil society, linked with its U.S. counterparts, to keep the American people informed about the consequences of U.S. actions in the world, and to help activate the American public to hold the U.S. government accountable for those actions. Fortunately, that is exactly the kind of work that real peace-building is all about.

Huntley is associate professor at HPI

HPI Research Forum

August 22, 2003



Title: Non-Proliferation, WMD and Terrorism: Do Regimes Matter?

Speaker: Dr. Lawrence Scheinman, Distinguished Professor of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies office in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Scheinman's presentation addressed concerns about nuclear proliferation in the post-9/11 world in which new terrorist threats have become key security concerns worldwide. Dr. Scheinman argued that the prospect of sub-state/transnational groups acquiring nuclear capabilities adds to the long-standing threat of state-level proliferation on which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is focused. However, this combination of threats also presents opportunities for reinvigorating the existing nonproliferation regime and its agenda. Dr. Scheinman observed that the two kinds of threats are "different levels of the same problem." Hence, the existing nonproliferation agenda can serve as a foundation on which to build effective efforts to deal with new nuclear terrorism threats. Dr. Scheinman discussed several possible measures:

Safeguards: The safeguarding of nuclear materials that serves state-based nonproliferation goals can also help counter nuclear terrorism. Currently 47 states party to the NPT have yet to enter into treaty-obligated safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Although these states possess little or no nuclear material, their lack of basic means to detect possible transfers of nuclear material through their territory leaves gaps in the system of global oversight. Closing such gaps could be a straightforward proposition. In addition, serious consideration should be given to making adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition for new nuclear supply

November 14, 2003



Title: What is North Korea the Axis of ?

Speaker: Professor Gavan McCormack, Visiting Professor at the Social Science Research Institute of the International Christian University

At the HPI Research Forum on November 14th, 2003, Professor Gavan McCormack presented a paper on the so-called "North Korean problem," one of the most important foreign affairs issues currently confronting Japan.

Professor McCormack's paper focused not upon the actual socio-political situation in North Korea, but upon the popular image of that country currently held by the majority of Japanese politicians and Japan's general population as a whole. It is his opinion that the popular image of North Korea in Japan is having crucially detrimental effects upon the ongoing changes to both Japan's domestic and foreign policies. This image within Japanese society is, Professor McCormack claims, based upon anger, fear and mistrust of North Korea, as is typically represented by sensational stories in the Japanese media where themes such as "abduction," "missiles," "nuclear programs," "hunger," "refugees," and especially "the violent and corrupt nature of Kim Jong-il" are repeatedly exploited.

When the wave of popular anger and frustration began to rise with the *Nodong* missile test in 1993, the *Taepodong* satellite launch of 1998 and various spy-ship incidents, information about the abductions of Japanese citizens was revealed—a topic which further aggravated Japanese popular hostility towards North Korea. In addition, following the September 2002 visit to Pyongyang by Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the process of normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea reached deadlock when negotiations between the two governments became entangled over the abduction issue. This series of events heightened the level of popular hysteria in Japan, thus creating a phenomenon that can be called

agreements and to extending coverage to include dual use items as well as those on the safeguards trigger list.

Physical Protection: Inherently crucial to effective nonproliferation, physical protection includes not only preventing unauthorized access to nuclear material, but also controlling radiological sources and protecting nuclear facilities against sabotage or attack. These tasks are also crucial to thwarting nuclear terrorism. Dr. Scheinman urged strengthening and broadening the 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to which dozens of states have not yet even acceded.

Export Controls: Agreements among key suppliers on export policies, such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), have been effective components of nonproliferation. Dr. Scheinman warned against loosening restrictions on nuclear transfers to states not under full-scope safeguards, urging instead that activities should be moving toward converting informal understandings among key suppliers into formal, legally-binding obligations.

Dr. Scheinman noted the possibility of enlisting the cooperation of non-NPT states India, Pakistan, and Israel, who could support existing measures in several ways. He cautioned that there are risks involved with enlisting existing nuclear nonproliferation regimes to deal with non-state nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats, and that the contributions from existing regimes will not be panaceas. However, he dissented from the view that these regimes are not suited to dealing with transnational terrorism. Rather, the interrelated and reinforcing nature of the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and the threat of terrorism, coupled with the potentially devastating consequences of the two being joined together, makes the expansion of existing nonproliferation regimes to cope with new proliferation challenges not only appropriate, but vital.

By Wade Huntley, associate professor at HPI

"North Korea Bashing"

Of course, Professor McCormack does not neglect to recognize the fact that North Korea is a totalitarian state, in which various social, political and economic problems, including widespread abuses of basic human rights, deeply affect the lives of North Korean people. He clearly states that "news of the abductions was shocking; the fears over missiles or nuclear works are real." However, it is his opinion that it will be extremely difficult to break the ice between the two countries unless we somehow find ways to change Japan's popular image of North Korea, which is currently formulated upon various assumptions, distortions, lies and multi-layered prejudices, and to approach the "North Korean problem" more rationally.

In relation to the abduction issue, Professor McCormack points out that the Japanese government has itself so far shown little good faith towards the former "comfort women," "slave laborers," or other victims of Japan's colonial rule in Korea, and is continuing to refuse compensation demands from those Korean victims. As far as the nuclear missile development issue is concerned, Professor McCormack also reminds us that Japan has been closely cooperating with the U.S. and firmly supporting its nuclear strategy in Northeast Asia for over half a century. He suggests that it is this nuclear threat that Pyongyang has long faced, and to which it is now responding by attempting to create its own nuclear deterrent. In other words, he critically identifies the fundamental inter-relationship between North Korea's nuclear program and Japan's nominal avowal of the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," while it has actually been supporting a situation of nuclear privilege, in particular with regard to the U.S., and has been opposing nuclear disarmament.

We must seriously consider Professor McCormack's conclusion that in fact the "North Korean problem" is actually partly a manifestation of Japan's own "Japan problem."

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

His full paper is available on HPI's webpage:
<http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/aneu/forum1114e.pdf>

Hello from HPI



Narayanan Ganesan Associate Professor
Dr. N Ganesan joined the Hiroshima Peace Institute in January 2004 after having taught in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore from 1990 to 2003. His teaching and research competence is in contemporary Southeast Asian politics and foreign policy.

Ganesan notes, "It is a delight to join a research institute that promotes the cause of peace internationally. In spite of all the humanistic, artistic and scientific achievements of the past, the world continues to be plagued by conflicts, both domestically and internationally. Hence, it is a great honor to work towards such a noble cause here."

DIARY

November 1, 2003 - February 29, 2004

- ◆**Nov. 5** Hitoshi Nagai and Hiroko Takahashi give lecture on "Criminality of the Use of A-bombs: Hidden Aspects of the War Crime Issue and the Control of Information" in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.
- ◆**Nov. 8** Yuki Tanaka gives lecture on "The Danger of the Use of A-bombs during the Korean War" at 4th session of Hiroshima Peace Forum organized by Hiroshima City and Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation at Hiroshima International Conference Center.
- ◆**Nov. 11-26** Takahashi researches Lucky Dragon Incident at National Archives at College Park and Library of Congress in Washington, D. C.
- ◆**Nov. 12** Ikuko Togo gives lecture on "Human Security: Striving for Sustainable Peace Building" in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City.
- ◆**Nov. 14** Gavan McCormack, visiting professor at Social Science Research Institute of International Christian University, gives lecture on "What is North Korea the Axis of?" at HPI Research Forum.
- ◆**Nov. 16-17** Tanaka attends Inaugural Conference "Training and Human Capacity-Building in Post-Conflict Countries" organized by United Nations Institute for Training and Research and serves as chair of "Partnerships for Training in Post-Conflict Assistance: Opportunities and Challenge" held at ANA Hotel Hiroshima.
- ◆**Nov. 19** Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture on "Inhumanity of the Depleted Uranium Weapons: A New Weapon of Mass Destruction" in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City.
- ◆**Nov. 20** Mizumoto attends as committee member conference of core members for Hiroshima International Peace Forum organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and held at Floracion Aoyama, Tokyo. Nobumasa Akiyama serves as panelist for symposium "Toward a Real International Peace Culture City: Prescription for the Creation of an Attractive City of Hiroshima" organized by Hiroshima Junior Chamber and held at Aster Plaza.
- ◆**Nov. 20-22** Sung Chull Kim participates in open discussion at international symposium "New Century in Northeast Asia: Population Movement and Network Formation in Korean Diaspora" organized by Japan Center for Area Studies of National Museum of Ethnology and held at University of Tokyo.
- ◆**Nov. 20-23** HPI President Haruhiro Fukui attends and participates in discussions at Conference on Regional Integration and Public Goods and planning meeting for 5th Pan-European Conference on Constructing World Orders, hosted by United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Bruges, Belgium.
- ◆**Nov. 21** Mizumoto speaks at "Journalists Forum" workshop at 2nd Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons organized by executive committee of Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly and held at Nagasaki Brick Hall.
- ◆**Nov. 27** Professor Tetsuo Maeda of Tokyo International University gives lecture on "History and Thoughts of Nuclear Strategies: The Process of Dehumanization" in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City.
- ◆**Nov. 30** Takahashi gives presentation on "Nuclear Test at Nevada in 1955 and the Civil Defense Program" at Historical Association of Ritsumeikan University 26th Annual Convention in Kyoto.
- ◆**Dec. 3** Tanaka gives lecture on "Sociology of Indiscriminate Bombing" in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City.
- ◆**Dec. 4** Akiyama serves as panelist for panel discussion "Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century" organized by Henry L. Stimson Center and held at National Press Club, Washington, D.C.
- ◆**Dec. 6** Tanaka gives lecture on "The Current Situation of the Peace Movement in Hiroshima" at HPI to members of Niigata City Adult Education Course, who visited Hiroshima on study trip. Mizumoto gives lecture on "Current

- Global Situation of Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Japan" at 5th session of Hiroshima Peace Forum organized by Hiroshima City and Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation at Hiroshima International Conference Center. Togo attends international symposium sponsored by Aoyama Gakuin University entitled "Legalization and Politics in East Asia" as discussant for "Legalization in China: International Human Rights and Domestic Politics," paper presented by Ming Wan, associate professor of George Mason University, U.S. Takahashi gives lecture on "The Current Situation of Nuclear Weapons" at 4th training course of Hiroshima Peace Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆**Dec. 12** Takahashi gives presentation on "Nuclear Test at Bikini Atoll in 1954 and Its Ripple Effects" at meeting of "Empire and Citizens: American Democracy in Agony" at Kyoto University.
- ◆**Dec. 13** Mizumoto gives lecture on "The Current Situation in Cambodia and Reconstruction Assistance" at 6th session of "Studying for Peace Building" organized by Hiroshima City Citizen & Community Network Foundation and Asian Network of Trust(ANT)-Hiroshima at Hiroshima Women's Education Center.
- ◆**Dec. 17** Nagai gives lecture on "American Studies at Rikkyo University during World War II" at Rikkyo University.
- ◆**Dec. 19** Akiyama gives presentation on "Japanese Support for the Denuclearization of Russia: New Initiative for Disarmament?" at workshop "Issues of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" organized by and held at Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo.
- ◆**Jan. 30** Huntley gives lecture on "Losing North Korea: How the Bush Administration Botched the Nuclear Crisis" at Asia Pacific Research Center, Kobe Gakuin University in Kobe. Mizumoto gives lecture on "Why Nuclear Weapons Are Not Eliminated: To Seek New Role of Hiroshima" in Exchange Gatherings for A-bomb Witnesses, organized by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆**Jan. 30-Feb. 7** Narayanan Ganesan gives lecture on "The Role of Regional Powers in Myanmar's Political Transition" at workshop on "Myanmar Issues and Myanmar Views: Searching for a Unified Perspective" in Yangon, Myanmar.
- ◆**Jan. 31** Mizumoto serves as commentator at 8th session, conference for research paper presentation, of the Peace Club for Junior High and High School Students organized by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆**Feb. 8** Fifth workshop of HPI Research Project "Military Violence against Civilians—A Comparative and Historical Analysis" is held at Toshi Center Hotel, Tokyo.
- ◆**Feb. 14** Fukui serves as coordinator/chair-person at Public Forum on Women and Peace convened by National Women's Committee of U.N. NGOs at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆**Feb. 16-17** Ganesan gives presentation on "The Future Prospects of Interdependence in Southeast and East Asia," at international seminar "Building on Our Success and Investing in Our Future" organized by Fo Guang University, Taiwan and Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia, and held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
- ◆**Feb. 20** Tanaka and Mizumoto attend as commentators integrated study class on "Encounters, Findings and Peace 2003" for 1st year students at Itsukaichikannon Junior High School.

— Visitors to HPI —

- ◆**Nov. 27** Zhou Yongming, Standing Council Member of Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament and 5 other members.
- ◆**Dec. 5** Dr. Sergio Fernando Morales Alvarado, human rights prosecutor in Guatemala.

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