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Overview of Peace (lecture) and Discussion: What does peace mean to you?
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3 Peace Studies

The realist/neo-realist paradigm has influenced and often defined the way that security has been interpreted in the post-Second World War period, but it was not the only interpretation. An alternative strand of thought founded on a different intellectual tradition, known as peace studies, evolved in tandem with the realist-based interpretation. Traditionally, peace has been of little significance to the strategist – the focus has been on the threat, employment and control of military force. Peace is the antithesis of warfare, logically the end result of successful strategy, but largely unexplored as a security issue or a goal in its own right. Moreover, because of the dominance of the realist paradigm after 1945, peace research was marginalized, viewed as ‘essentially an intellectual protest movement’,¹ often dismissed as the remit of bearded, sandal-wearing, bleeding-heart liberals rather than as a serious research area. Yet while often caricatured as utopian, peace studies has evolved over time and it remains anything but a unitary discipline, embracing as it does ‘a family of discourse’ from the Kantian idealist tradition to the hard-nosed scientism of Kenneth Boulding.²

This variety will emerge as we examine the development of peace studies. This chapter charts the development of peace studies, identifying five distinct periods of its history. The first section looks at peace studies and its roots in the idealism of the post-First World War era, reified in the League of Nations and Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points. After idealism’s apparent discrediting by the Second World War, peace studies

adopted the scientism that was *de rigueur* in the social science of the 1950s; this phase was characterized by a fairly narrow approach, and a concern with conflict resolution, arms control, game theory and disarmament. The third section will examine the impact of a more radical social science in the 1960s–70s, which challenged the assumed objectivity of traditional methods, and instead focused on inequalities within the spheres of political economy, social injustice and social conflict. In the 1980s this broader, politicized approach continued, but was somewhat overshadowed by (while contributing to) the burst of popular protest against nuclear weapons and superpower nuclear policy, which formed the main arena for peace research at that time and is the focus of the fourth section. The chapter concludes by looking at the significance and potential role for peace studies in a post-Cold War world, where ideas of critical security seem to overlap with much of the peace studies agenda.

Inter-War Idealism

The roots of peace studies are closely linked with the origins of IR as an autonomous area of research and study in the early part of the twentieth century. After 1918, attempts were made to ensure that there would never again be such a total and destructive war; means were sought – through processes and institutions, to mediate and control relations between states – to prevent war from ever reoccurring. These attempts took shape in US President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, which called for (among other things) free trade, an end to secret diplomacy, arms cutbacks to a minimum level, and national self-determination. Wilson also proposed the establishment of a collective security system, the League of Nations, and called for the perpetuation of democratic systems within states (under the assumption that democratically accountable state leaders are less likely to go to war).

So the main thrust of inter-war idealism was to prevent wars (perceived as irrational and excessively costly in resources and lives) by imposing effective institutions, structures and processes to allow for rational, measured negotiation; in this way, peace was to be a product of 'reason'. Peace as an end-point

and something to work towards rationally amounted to an absence of war, a negative construct. Instead of focusing on peace positively, as a state of social justice and harmony (as later writers did), the inter-war idealists defined it as the situation that exists when there is no formal state of war.³

Different writers focused on different strategies – for example, a world government with powers of enforcement,⁴ an international police force, or disarmament. A common theme was that supranational structures would be adopted, so some state sovereignty would have to be surrendered.⁵ There was a shared belief in the Kantian rationalist argument that people are perfectible and institutions reformable, rejecting the realist claim that a Hobbesian state of nature is inevitable. Through the institutionalization of peaceful means of conflict resolution, and the consequent socialization of people and states into non-violent forms of interaction, it was believed that peace would be attainable.⁶ Reason demanded 'a reformist commitment to perfecting the political organization of the world', which echoed the Kantian notion of the categorical imperative, presenting an external standard of 'the good' which, if applied, would bring about universal justice and perpetual peace.⁷ This was embodied in the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928, which sought to outlaw war as a legitimate form of state policy.

Thus inter-war idealism focused on reducing wars and keeping wars limited, as well as on restructuring the world system by reducing the power and autonomy of states in the interest of greater systemic stability. Ostensibly, this was a very radical departure from the tenets of realism, but the policies proposed did not, epistemologically, differ radically from the realist agenda. To start with, the analysis was state-centric. In both discourses, states were the key units of analysis, reified as the main actors, and depicted as able to adapt their behaviour to the external environment. Second, this focus offered a hierarchical and militarized conception of power and security. Realism and idealism were concerned with hierarchical structures, with power exercised over others (for realists, more powerful states dominating within a balance of power; for idealists, supranational institutions imposing order). In neither was there scope for bringing in a broader range of actors or challenging the idea that security is achieved through dominance. Finally, realists and idealists envisioned

security and peace as negative constructs, as entailing an absence of war rather than a more positive condition.

This sheds light on the weaknesses of inter-war idealism as a manifestation of peace studies. Like realism, it focused on symptoms – the immediate and observable phenomena of the international system, atomized into nation-states, and the use of warfare as a state tool – rather than the underlying causes of warfare and the structure of the system.⁸ And the key products of this phase of idealism are now generally referred to as failures – for example, the League of Nations proved impotent against the Nazi move into Central and Eastern Europe, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, and the Japanese march into China during the 1930s.

The concept of 'peace' in early peace studies is somewhat one-dimensional, ignoring any analysis of the underlying dynamics of structural violence and inequality that may be significant factors in the downward spiral that leads to war. 'Peace' fell within the domain of high politics, imposed on states by supranational institutions as the product of a hierarchical power relationship, and consonant with an external, categorical notion of 'the good' for international actors. With the perceived failures of the 1930s, this belief system was discredited. For the best part of forty years after the Second World War, the orthodoxy was realism, which defined itself in opposition to idealism. Writers such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau wrote in disdain of misplaced utopianism, and sought instead to depict the world as it is.⁹

Peace Studies Post-Second World War: Realism Resurgent

Carr and Morgenthau, among others, argued that violent conflict was inevitable and that history had disproved the key thesis of idealism, namely that people were rational and peace was possible via international institutions. Key policy-makers perceived the bipolar politics of the early Cold War as demonstrating the unavoidability of constant tension, expedient alliances, a balance of power, and a quest for dominance. Yet the notion of peace as achievable, and as a realistic goal of state policy, managed to survive, albeit at a low level.

The peace studies of the 1950s was shaped in relation to the pre-eminence of realism and to the social science positivism then emerging. Peace studies was characterized by defensiveness and an attempt to present a scientifically authentic and rigorous argument. The discipline moved away from idealism's normative rhetoric, focusing instead on the empirical and factual. This positivist slant was evident in the creation of the Centre for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan and the Centre for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, California, with Anatol Rapoport and Kenneth Boulding. These research programmes merged perspectives from social psychology, economics and sociology with quantitative techniques in conducting the study of war. This research cloaked itself in science and was deliberately free of any explicit taint of ethics.¹⁰ A key work was *A Study of War* by Quincy Wright, a quantitative analysis that attempted to determine scientifically the causes of war through history.¹¹

In this way, peace research adapted to what was politically acceptable at the time – particularly what was acceptable in the US, the dominant power. It was only through 'scientific', 'value-free' analysis that peace research could attract funding and gain academic credibility. This American school held a fairly narrow conception of peace, claiming that war and peace could be separated from other social problems and explained quantitatively. It focused on observable and measurable institutions and processes, and the agenda was primarily practical, as befitted a technocratic approach.¹²

Outside the US, an alternative locus for peace studies was developed in Norway by Johan Galtung. Originally a mathematician and sociologist, Galtung shared the behaviourist slant of the American school and rejected the speculative, *a priori* tendencies of earlier idealism.¹³ In the US the main focus was on conflict resolution, seeing conflict as inevitable to a certain extent, while Galtung was more concerned with peace *per se*. And he saw peace research as vocational, applying a necessary ethical code to the conduct and analysis of the international system, developing 'a scientific analysis of conflict which would provide the basis for developing peace proposals that would be free of the taint of ideology and national bias'.¹⁴

To some degree this school paralleled Boulding and

Rappaport in the US, in exploring deterrence, arms control and game theory, much like the military strategists of the day. But for the peace researchers, especially Galtung, the aim was not to help manage the status quo to the advantage of one side or the other, but to change it.¹⁵ In terms of method, this particularly included empirical studies of attitudes to disarmament, statistical research on arms procurement, and so on. The key distinguishing features of the Scandinavian approach were the assumptions that humanity has a tendency towards empathy and solidarity, and that the nation-state was transitory and need not be the ultimate focus for research.¹⁶

These ideas were developed at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo and propounded in its *Journal of Peace Studies*. In the first issue, Galtung laid out the premises on which he based peace research.¹⁷ First came the empirical claims that humanity has the ability to empathize (countering the realist view that humanity is inherently evil) and that increasing levels of integration were unavoidable. Just as even warfare was constrained by established and accepted rules and limitations, so peace research must focus on this inherent potential for co-operation rather than on violent conflict. Next was the extension of the agenda to cover more than war and conflict, shifting away from the state-centric approach of idealists and the American school.¹⁸ Instead of peace as an absence of war, Galtung construed it positively, as the pursuit of goals such as co-operation and integration, aiming for a 'better' world.

The Radicalization of Peace Research

Despite this normative bent, Galtung was very much within the traditional, positivist school. This made him a target of accusations from the newly energized left in the 1960s that he endorsed notions of objectivity that had the effect of reinforcing preservation of the existing system. The political turbulence of the late 1960s in the US and Europe had a considerable impact on the social sciences, which were seen as ripe for radicalization. With the development and widespread adoption of neo-Marxism and dependency theory in IR,¹⁹ Galtung's notion of peace research came under sustained

criticism, particularly for its assumption of progressive integration and harmony and its view of the peace researcher as science-bound rational technocrat. At a Peace Research Society international conference on Vietnam in the US in 1969, a group of European rebels argued that by focusing on levels of arms and violent conflict, and so on, peace research amounted to little more than a discussion of US strategy, implying its legitimization. The critics of Galtung and Boulding called for exposure of the global dynamics of exploitation and, if necessary, their resolution by revolution, a strategy that was anathema to the process of rational transformation envisaged by Galtung. Writers such as Krippendorff, Lars Dencik and Gunder Frank identified capitalism as the key source of war and violent conflict. The nation-state was a product of an international capitalist system, and unless the class character of the state changed, the dynamics of violence would continue.²⁰ Traditional peace research was seen as embracing the dominant conception of power, presenting Western development as the ideal model of progress, and doing little more than tweaking the power balance underlying the status quo. It resulted in abstract mathematical models rather than grounding peace research in the reality of social relations. For the radicals, only revolution and the overthrow of class society – not technocracy and pacifism – would end systemic patterns of exploitation and violence and bring about peace.²¹

Hence peace research began to shift away from its almost exclusive concern with the strategic relationship of the superpowers and the logic of deterrence, towards the dynamics of the North–South relationship. According to the neo-Marxist perspective, the capitalist world market has systematically disadvantaged Asia and Africa. Under the dominant division of labour the South supplied raw materials in return for manufactured goods. This rendered the South dependent as raw materials declined in relative value and the North dictated the production and trade of commodities.²² Thus, it was argued, a dynamic of economic exploitation was established, reinforced by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Third World countries borrowed large amounts of capital in the 1960s–70s in an attempt to industrialize and develop, but the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crises in 1973 and 1979, heavy spending and costly pharaonic

projects, plus high levels of variable interest, combined to impoverish the poorest states of the South even further.²³ This was interpreted as a form of neo-colonialism: a structural economic version of imperialist control, oppression, and racism, denying autonomy and hence meaningful security to the colonized.²⁴ And these patterns of oppression are seen as replicated within states as well, for example by the development of the bourgeoisie in the South, who establish their own positions of power as agents of neo-colonialism. In this understanding, then, the focus of attention shifts away from simply the nation-state, to take on board the class and power dynamics at an intra-state and transnational level as well.

Recognition of a structural version of economic oppression and insecurity resulted in mainstream peace studies adopting a more radical political direction. This was best articulated in Galtung's article 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' in 1969, where he developed the idea of structural violence.²⁵ This represented a radicalization of his peace research, rendering it an essentially critical activity replacing his positivist, analytical approach. While Kenneth Boulding saw such a shift as a damaging move away from the traditional focus on immediate, direct conflict and conflict resolution, it marked the development of a less immediately obvious and more conceptually imaginative notion of peace.²⁶

In this seminal article, and some of his later work, Galtung expanded the ontology of peace research, distinguishing between direct and structural violence. Direct violence can be crudely defined as A physically assaulting B with the intention of causing harm, pain or suffering. Such a definition covers armed acts of war. However, violence need not involve a direct physical assault. There may be policies which deliberately or knowingly result in the deaths or suffering of others from starvation or disease. Such policies can be described as a form of structural violence, acting via the impact of unequal and oppressive power relations.²⁷ Structural violence is built into basic social structures and results in life expectancy of less than a human being's biological potential due to oppression, poverty, pollution, and so on.²⁸ Violence causes the difference between potential and actual life expectancy. When life expectation is low (for example, with a death from TB in the 1850s when there was little in the way of prevention or cure) there is

no violence. If the harm was avoidable (for instance, a death from TB in a wealthy society today with high levels of medical effectiveness) then there is violence, as the death could have been prevented; and with this kind of violence there is, therefore, no peace.

According to this analysis, violence takes various forms, from physical – hurting to the point of killing – to psychological – for example, via brainwashing and indoctrination, limiting and diminishing mental potentialities – to structural. If people starve when this is avoidable, if life expectancy for the wealthy is more than twice as high as for the poor, then violence is occurring, even with no specific individuals carrying out an assault.²⁹ Traditionally in peace studies the focus has been on personal rather than structural violence: personal violence is obvious, sudden and dramatic whereas structural violence is static and hidden. A lack of personal violence is not a positive condition, but instead amounts to a negative peace (peace as an absence of direct violence). But the elimination of structural, latent violence creates positive peace in the form of social justice and a redistribution of power and resources. For Galtung, peace must mean more than the absence of intentional physical violence; otherwise many unacceptable social orders would be theoretically compatible with a state of peace.³⁰ For him, then, peace requires the elimination of patterns of structural domination.³¹ Moreover, these two sorts of peace and violence are interdependent and can develop dialectically – for example, structures of violence may easily breed direct violence or a regime of social injustice may be maintained by force.³²

This development of the concept of peace, beyond the absence of war, marked a shift away from the state-centrism that had dominated realist and idealist thought and post-1945 peace studies. By locating peace and war within exploitative and unequal socio-economic processes this approach depicted peace and security as holistic, multidimensional and indivisible concepts. Key issues of concern were the relationship between rich and poor states, and the rich and poor within states, the links between arms and underdevelopment and the recognition that, in terms of security for individuals, the relevance of arguments by nuclear strategists was often marginal at best, when the primary concern might be to get enough to

eat to survive for another day. This suggested that the established mode of international politics – sovereign states operating in anarchy – was itself problematic, as it provided limited security and short-term peace.³³

This, then, presents a very different concept of security from that provided by realism. A realist concept of security depends on the maximization of national power and/or security – that is, security is defined in terms of the capabilities (primarily military) of the nation-state unit, and its strategic position as regards the threatening capabilities of its neighbours. In contrast, in this later Galtungian notion of security, security is the result of a state of positive peace – that is, security is defined not in terms of nation-state might, but in terms of a holistic understanding that moves beyond the currency of military power, with states as key actors. Instead, economic and social processes are given greater prominence, and the analysis fully embraces individuals and communities, thereby qualitatively transforming the traditional nation-state approach. Another key divergence is the use of power here – while the notion of power is of central significance to both realism and peace studies (as it is in all fields of politics), it is clearly differently constructed in the two. For realists, power is a hierarchical model; and the objective is to be at the top of the pyramid, wielding power over others. For radical peace theorists, power is defined in terms of empowerment and enabling; and power and security depend on equality and justice, not superiority.

In this exploration of the concept of positive peace, and the elimination of structural violence, Galtung endorsed the view that differing rates in mortality were due to exploitation and social injustice. Yet he sought to draw a clear distinction between his ideas and those of a Marxist position.³⁴ He agreed with neo-Marxists that structural violence could be found in international economic relations that resulted in unequal power and life chances, but also argued that in socialist societies which were undemocratic and politically oppressive individuals could be crippled by a lack of freedom. The difference between potential and actual self-realization, achievement and freedom meant violence was at work.³⁵ Thus, for Galtung, peace embraced the left's goal of equality with the right's goal of freedom and personal growth – human rights were crucial to a positive understanding of peace and had to be accessible to

everyone. As a consequence, peace studies is concerned with the liberation of individuals from *all* dynamics of violence, however insidious, and all impediments to self-realization, and the individual is a more significant unit of analysis than the state, a collectivity or a class.³⁶

This interpretation had the effect of factionalizing the peace research movement during the 1960s–70s. Boulding and the more traditional American school continued to focus on disarmament and arms control, while others followed Galtung to focus on eradicating structural violence.³⁷ Then in the 1980s, the emphasis shifted again. Although the concept of peace as an academic tool was still undecided and there was increasing acceptance of Galtung's approach, in the 1980s international politics moved disarmament to centre stage and the anti-nuclear movement became the key focus.

Peace Studies and the Anti-Nuclearism of the 1980s

In the late 1970s–80s, the superpower arms race reached unprecedented levels of intensity and technical potency, and US–Soviet relations descended into a 'Second Cold War'. For the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis, a nuclear war appeared imminent as new flexible weapons were deployed. On 12 December 1979, NATO decided to deploy ground-launched Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, giving NATO a new medium-range strike capability, with nuclear forces based on land, at sea and in the air, giving the alliance a secure second-strike capability.³⁸ Meanwhile, the escalation of international tension, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution in 1979, subversive US action in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the election in 1980 of the strongly anti-communist Ronald Reagan, was almost tangible. Given this, the burgeoning of the peace movement was unsurprising. This was exacerbated by the commitment of many Western governments at the time to reducing public spending while strengthening defence – for example, as Britain developed Trident and its general defence posture, resources were diverted from public services into defence. Government

policy prioritized national security, while the broader notion of economic and societal security was less important. By explicitly connecting these two levels of security – the strategic and the economic/social – the peace movement and peace studies broadened their agenda and the conception of 'peace'. The term was contextualized and deepened, and sited at individual, community and societal levels of analysis, rather than being limited to the more abstract level of nation-state power relations.

As a consequence of the high-risk, tension-ridden super-power nuclear politics of the 1980s, peace studies became more visible, vocal and significant. Fear of the likelihood of nuclear war – especially the possibility of Europe as a theatre for US and Soviet tactical strikes – meant that nuclear disarmament and nuclear freeze movements grew rapidly.³⁹ For many in the peace movement, the national nuclear arsenals were a threat to the citizens they were intended to protect⁴⁰ – mere possession of nuclear weapons held the possibility of accidents, massive radiation, or a pre-emptive strike from an opposing nuclear power, and represented a massive drain on domestic resources. For example, while the Thatcher government saw the primary threat to Britain as the Soviet Union, the peace movement felt that a far greater threat was the nuclear build-up itself: the government saw its nuclear policy as a defensive measure, while the peace movement argued that individuals might well survive foreign occupation but not a nuclear war.

The peace movement may have had little electoral impact, but it had some resonance, simply by raising the level of debate and boosting popular awareness of the nuclear threat. The key argument of peace theorists was that by adding 'nuclear' to strategy, rationality was abandoned – they claimed that 'nuclear war' and 'nuclear strategy' were paradoxical and meaningless terms because they implied national suicide rather than the apparently rational, Clausewitzian pursuit of policy by other means.⁴¹ By continuing to focus solely on weapons and defence of the state, strategic understandings of security failed to deal with the destructive power of nuclear weapons, which ultimately transcended nation-state boundaries. For the peace protestors, as destructive power increased, overall security – at the state and other levels – was diminished.

During the 1980s, the peace movement expanded both in numbers of people involved and in the range of issues and concerns addressed. Before the 1980s, apart from selected academics, much of the energy in the Western peace movement came either from committed pacifists with a strongly moral stand or from communist sympathizers who saw the Soviet Union as a force for peace. The two groups did not fit easily together and in terms of practical protest; the movement largely consisted of small active groups rather than an all-embracing, potent organization.⁴² But in the 1980s, a range of other groups and interests joined the movement, such as women's groups, environmentalists and specific professions (for example, physicians against the bomb who would present clear descriptions of the medical consequences of nuclear war; or lawyers against the bomb who focused on the illegality of nuclear possession). This opened up the debate and range of interests represented by the peace movement and peace studies to the importation of feminist arguments on the patriarchal nature of nuclear strategic thinking or to environmentalists' calls for a focus on the well-being of the planet.⁴³

One branch developed the notion of 'alternative defence', of defence without nuclear weapons.⁴⁴ This started from the premise that security is indivisible – any attempt to improve the security of one nation-state at the expense of another merely accelerated the arms race via the security dilemma (whereby even defensive actions may be interpreted as offensive and threatening). A possible solution, it was argued, would be to base national strategy and security solely on explicitly defensive premises, to reduce the possibility that another state posed a threat.⁴⁵ Mainstream security theorists saw Europe as secure since 1945 because of the superpower nuclear umbrella. However, this ignored the particular destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and assumed deterrence to be fail-safe. Traditional strategists took conflict in international politics as a given, instead of seeing it as a factor that promoted insecurity by institutionalizing military tension and distorting perceptions.⁴⁶ And this concept treats security as an end product, the consequence of no war, rather than as a process on various levels, from the individual to the systemic. Alternative defence theorists refused to accept the nuclear stalemate status quo, and took a long-term approach, con-

sidering other possibilities and highlighting the threats to security that the possession of nuclear weapons posed (such as that to the environment).⁴⁷

A central argument of peace campaigners and alternative defence theorists during the 1980s was that insecurity was largely a matter of perception and an inability to accept difference. It was argued that an awareness of this would transform the nature of defence policy and IR as a whole. Offensive weapons and nuclear weapons can be seen as a threat because of their potential for destruction; and they invite pre-emption, generating endemic instability and insecurity.⁴⁸ This line of thought mostly developed outside established government institutions and processes, but an important exposition of some elements was the report of the Palme Commission (1982), which called for 'common security'⁴⁹ and contended that since 'all nations would be united in destruction if nuclear war were to occur', avoiding war was a shared responsibility.⁵⁰

With the end of the Cold War this focus on nuclear disarmament largely dissipated, but peace research continued. Without the intensity and drama of Soviet-US relations and the immediacy of the nuclear threat, the popularity of peace campaigning subsided. Some might argue that in an increasingly interdependent world, where large-scale military force and traditional strategic thinking have minimal utility, where economic transactions take priority and where integration is a global trend, peace studies is redundant. Without the immediate threat of war, ongoing arms races, or the dominance of nationalistic military thinking, why bother with peace studies any more? In a sense the pacifists have won, as the Cold War ended without massive conflict or violence.

The Galtungian notions of positive peace and the elimination of structural violence remain powerful critiques of dominant economic patterns and their impact on security in the Third World.⁵¹ Even though parts of the Third World have rapidly developed, a substantial swathe (especially in Africa and parts of South Asia) remains tied down by massive international debt. In addition, strands of anti-nuclear arguments that surfaced in the 1980s, such as the feminist and environmental arguments, are now pursued and developed independent of peace studies, expanding the subject's ontological agenda and challenging traditional epistemological assumptions.⁵² Most

importantly, idealist notions of collective security, and Galtung's recognition of human rights as a requisite to peace, have been reactivated in various forms, from the New World Order of the 1991 Gulf War through UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia to the West's (admittedly sporadic) references to the significance of human rights in foreign policy, which extend the security agenda beyond the integrity of states to take on board the freedom and security of individuals. These examples suggest that the peace studies agenda continues to be pertinent for the security challenges and the developing security discourse of today. Indeed, at times it seems that most of our thinking about security now is more in line with the agenda of peace studies than with strategic studies. The classical realist focus on the nation-state can be seen as somewhat anachronistic and inflexible in a globalizing, interdependent world. The breadth and range of peace studies, its shift away from state-centric and institutionalist 'solutions', its recognition of the holistic and indivisible nature of security, and its development of a positive concept of peace have many links with the post-Cold War security agenda currently being developed.

Peace Studies: The New Agenda

As is evident from other chapters in this volume, the concept of security, and the discipline of security studies, have changed substantively. There appears to be a converging of agendas among security studies, IR and peace studies. The new contributions of critical theorists, postmodernists and feminists have challenged the traditional ontological assumptions of IR. As a consequence, there is a much wider range of argument about what issues and questions should be included in the meaning of security, many of which have been advocated by peace studies. These issues and questions include environmental security, gender-aware security, Third World security and the development of critical security, the ideas of structural violence, the incorporation of non-state actors, the recognition of multiple levels of security which incorporate the political and societal, and ideas of individual emancipation and positive peace.

The end of the Cold War has opened up the concept of security: the preoccupation with being armed to the teeth against an 'enemy' is now challenged, and oppositional structures based on demonization of the 'other' are questioned, with alternative perspectives gaining in credibility.⁵³ The continuing significance of conflict resolution and positivist peace studies (for example, as explored in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*) can be seen as being played out in practical terms in the increasingly interventionist and mediatory policies of the UN. Indeed, to a certain extent even such traditional security concerns as NATO and armed international intervention have dramatically changed in terms of their agenda and character. The notion of NATO as a tightly bound, defensive structure in opposition to an aggressive Soviet empire has been disintegrated by the process of expansion and inclusion, depicting instead a dynamic of holistic rather than relative security. That is, the idea of security being promoted has more in common with that developed within peace studies than the security of realism; in fact, it can even be seen as containing echoes of the early idealist project of collective security. More contemporary, social constructivist ideas of NATO take this on board – that in the post-Cold War world, the character of NATO has changed, to one concerned with issues of belonging and identity as well as the more obvious ones of military defence. Feminist perspectives looking at human relationships and needs rather than institutions and organizations, and at kinship rather than hierarchical organization, can present an alternative, inter-relational, web-like notion of power and security.⁵⁴ A neo-Marxist or Coxian interpretation of structural violence can be used as a means of understanding problems of security in the Third World where economics appears to be the primary determinant of who has security and who does not.⁵⁵

Because of the broad range and diverse history of peace studies, it is difficult to come up with a simple definition of its key referent object, and its key agent of threat. Whereas this is relatively straightforward for realists (the referent is the state, and the threat is other states' capabilities), for peace studies it depends on your starting point. For the inter-war idealists, for example, a state-centric analysis remained pre-eminent; in the scientific approach of Boulding, this continued, with the threat defined in military terms. It was only with the radicalization of

the peace studies agenda that the focus of analysis really began to be opened up. For neo-Marxists, the referents to be secured were the victims of unequal and oppressive class relations, against national and international capitalism. Galtung developed this further: his unit became the individual, to be protected against direct violence (from the state or individuals) and structural violence. This in turn can be developed into Booth's neo-Kantian view of security as emancipation – a development of the Galtungian idea of peace as freedom from physical, structural, political and psychological violence or oppression.

As in other areas of security studies, the positivist tradition of peace studies has been challenged by the newly fluid nature of the post-Cold War world. Old bipolar oppositions and identities are being deconstructed, which, it might be argued, leaves peace studies with less to address now. But while the positivist tradition none the less continues, the state-centric arguments and positivist number-crunching of post-1945 peace studies have less hold. The 'factual' correctness of this tradition's findings was undermined by examples such as Galtung's assertion in 1984 that the most 'secure' countries in Europe included Yugoslavia and Albania, while the most at risk were in NATO and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).⁵⁶ The idea that 'security' and 'peace' are observable, quantifiable, measurable units according to objective, generalizable laws is under assault from the post-positivists. Security theory increasingly recognizes the significance of perception, and the elimination of fluid, insidious dynamics of violence which may be inter-state, or intra-state, inter- or even intra-personal. The shifting agenda of peace studies reflects (and to a certain extent predetermines) this agenda, with its early introduction of new and different actors, and its more complex and holistic notion of threat and hence security.